



diogenes



18

An International Review of Philosophy and Humanistic Studies · \$1.25





diogenes

a quarterly publication of

THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR
PHILOSOPHY AND HUMANISTIC STUDIES

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE:

Professor D. W. Brogan (Great Britain)

Professor Gilberto Freyre (Brazil)

Professor A. Castro Leal (Mexico)

Professor W. Koppers (Austria)

Professor G. Levi della Vida (Italy)

Professor Richard McKeon (U.S.A.)

Professor Alexander Rüstow (Germany)

DIOGENES

EDITOR: Roger Caillois

EDITORIAL SECRETARY: Jean d'Ormesson

EDITOR OF ENGLISH EDITION: Richard McKeon

EDITORIAL SECRETARY: Muriel McKeon

The English language edition of *Diogenes* is published quarterly in December, March, June, and September by the University of Chicago Press, 5750 Ellis Avenue, Chicago 37, Illinois. Entered as second-class matter at the Post Office at Chicago, Illinois.

Business correspondence should be addressed to the University of Chicago Press.

Editorial correspondence should be addressed to Roger Caillois, Editor, International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, 19 Avenue Kléber, Paris 16^e, France.

Six parallel editions of the review are published simultaneously:

English: Published and distributed in the United States by the University of Chicago Press. Subscription rates for U.S.A. and possessions: 1 year, \$4.00; 2 years, \$7.50; 3 years, \$10.50. Canada and Pan American Postal Union: 1 year, \$4.50; 2 years, \$8.50; 3 years, \$12.00. All other countries: 1 year, \$5.00; 2 years, \$9.50; 3 years, \$13.50. Single copies: \$1.25.

French: Published by Librairie Gallimard, Paris.

Spanish: Published by Editorial Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, Argentina

German: Published by Kiepenheuer und Witsch, Cologne.

Italian: Published by Fratelli Bocca Editori, Rome.

Arabian: Published by the Librairie Misr, Cairo, Egypt.

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Printed in the U.S.A. at the University of Chicago Press, Chicago 37, Illinois

DIODENES

Number 18

Summer, 1957

CONTENTS

GILBERTO FREYRE	Microscopic History: A Meeting of Influences	1
PIERRE HUARD and MING WONG	Relations between Man and the World	24
RAYMOND RUYER	The Vital Domain of Animals and the Religious World of Man	35
DENIS SINOR	The Barbarians	47
JACQUES ELLUL	Information and Propaganda	61
NOTES AND DISCUSSION		
JAN DE VRIES	The Present State of Studies on Germanic Religion	78
PAUL-HENRI MICHEL	Renaissance Cosmologies	93
BOOK REVIEWS		
E. O. REISCHAUER:	<i>Ennin's Diary: The Record of a Pilgrimage to China in Search of the Law</i>	108
	<i>Ennin's Travels in T'ang China</i> (A. W. MACDONALD)	
E. EBELING and FRANZ KÖCHER:	<i>Literarische Keilschrifttexte aus Assur</i>	113
	(MARCEL LEBOVICI)	
WILHELM BERNSDORF and FRIEDRICH BÜLOW (eds.):	<i>Wörterbuch der Soziologie</i>	116
ARNOLD GEHLEN and HELMUT SCHELSKY:	<i>Soziologie: Ein Lehr- und Handbuch zur modernen Gesellschaftskunde</i>	120
PETER R. HOFSTÄTTER:	<i>Einführung in die Sozialpsychologie</i>	124
	(PETER HEINTZ)	
Notes on the Contributors		126

COMMITTEE OF SPONSORS:

Mr. and Mrs. Will Clayton, Houston, Texas

Mr. and Mrs. J. de Mênil, Houston, Texas

Mr. Paul Raigorodsky, Dallas, Texas

MICROSCOPIC HISTORY:

A MEETING OF INFLUENCES

Since 1940 I have been attempting to give a new orientation to the study of the early relations between Brazil and France. Preceding works have been limited to the examination of grandiose or picturesquely dramatic events—the piracy of the Normans in the Northeast, the Brazilian festival at Rouen, the repercussion of the French Revolution upon certain Brazilian revolutions such as the Inconfidencia Mineira or Villegaignon at Rio de Janeiro, the mission of French artists at the Brazilian court of Don João VI. Finally some interest has been shown in contacts with French scholars, among them Saint-Hilaire, and with Portuguese America; further interest has been evidenced in the influence which French scholars and artists exerted during the course of the nineteenth century upon the most cultivated people of Brazil.

Without wishing to impugn the importance of those subjects, I propose to give their share of credit to the innumerable petty technicians, businessmen, pastry cooks, pharmacists, and midwives, to the daguerreotypists—

Translated by Elaine P. Halperin.

Microscopic History: A Meeting of Influences

to all the French artisans who seem to me to have exerted a considerable influence on Brazilian life during the nineteenth century. However, their influence remained so obscure that not the slightest trace or acknowledgment of their good and faithful services is to be found in official documents. Therefore, in order for a researcher to reconstitute the principal data relating to their activities or their influence, he must leaf through less illustrious documents than those of the university or diplomatic files. He must have recourse to mere commercial reports compiled by consuls, the modest servants of diplomacy; or he must turn to letters or to family archives where, through sheer inertia, dressmakers', hatters', tailors', bootmakers', midwives', and carpenters' accounts have been kept; or else to the medical prescriptions compounded in the pharmacies of early days, or to the archives that have been preserved in a bureau like that of public works. He scans newspaper advertisements, the paying section of old Brazilian newspapers and peculiar, I believe, to them—under headings such as “at the request of an interested party,” “wanted,” “of interest to others”—which overflow with precious information, sometimes indiscreet and even scandalous, referring most intimately to the lives of apparently ordinary people. He must also have recourse to the confessions and denunciations in the Holy Office “concerning Brazilian territory,” that is to say, that entire portion of Brazilian society which is composed of sugar-cane planters, of priests (mostly Portuguese), of Christians of recent date. Among the latter are Lutherans, Frenchmen, Hollanders, Jews, Englishmen, and gypsies; Frenchmen and Protestants are far more numerous than one imagines.

In 1954 a historical seminar took place at Columbia University; among the participants were Professors Silvio Zavala of Mexico, Frank Tannenbaum, and Clarence Haring, Americans (from Columbia University and Harvard respectively), and J. M. Parry, an Englishman who, for a while, was connected with Cambridge University. All were shocked when I reminded them that Judaism and Protestantism, the one organized in synagogues and in communities, the other in chapels and in schools, had their origins in the very Catholic lands of Brazil; it was in Brazil that Jewish literature and the catechization of the Amerindians by Evangelical Christianity manifested themselves for the first time in the Americas. Indeed, the attempts of the French Protestants in Brazil to establish themselves in an orthodox French colony dates from the middle of the sixteenth century; it was organized or protected by Admiral Coligny and was also associated with the name of Villegaignon. This subject has already been studied by

Paul Gaffarel in his work entitled *Histoire du Brésil français* (Paris, Maisonneuve, 1878); it has also been examined in terms of a general movement (the Huguenot migration) by Charles Weiss in his *History of the French Protestant Refugees* (Stringer & Townsend, N.Y., 1854) and by Gilbert Chinard in *Les Réfugiés huguenots en Amérique* (Paris, 1935). But not one of these authors established the fact that it was at Rio, in 1555, that Protestantism for the first time systematically took root in the Americas; this initiative on Brazilian territory was followed by the establishment of Huguenots in South Carolina and in Florida, from 1562 to 1565, and in the Antilles in 1611.

Yet, as early as the beginning of the seventeenth century, it was not in the south of Brazil that the presence of North European Protestants, the French included, made itself felt, but rather in those regions of Portuguese America that were not subject to Lusitanian-Catholic domination: in the North and more precisely at Recife. At Recife itself, from 1630 on, with the help of the Dutch invasion (which altered the countryside and completely changed the mode of life through a transformation of ideas and techniques), a culture began to evolve that differed in some essential regards from the earlier one. In the old Portuguese city, now Dutch, European Protestants settled. Among them were Frenchmen and Sephardic Jews that came from Holland, as well as others of Portuguese and Spanish origin. Both Jews and Protestants lost no time in opening synagogues and temples. In the light of these facts, it is easy to understand the cosmopolitanism that developed in Recife, not only during that period, but also at earlier times. Recife was a center where Lusitanian-Catholic culture encountered various Northern or North European cultures. Among the latter a French culture asserted itself. During the epoch prior to the conquest of Pernambuco by the Dutch this had already worried the agents of the Holy Office, who feared that our culture might assume a Huguenot aspect or expression: a revolutionary or heretical aspect from the Lusitanian-Catholic point of view. Quite possibly, the word *francesia*, suggesting heresy, novelty, oddity, a certain refinement in attire, in manners, and in courtship, acquired at that time the special flavor that it was to preserve for so long in Brazil. This occurred, despite the presence among the European settlers of Pernambuco during the sixteenth century of Frenchmen of firmly established Catholic faith, like certain natives of Boulogne; in Picardy, "Reyno of France . . . married to Maria Cavalcanti, carpenter at Ribeyra, domiciled in the Isle of Tamaraca and presently residing in that city," as one reads on

Microscopic History: A Meeting of Influences

page 315 of the *Première Visite du Saint-Office aux Territoires du Brésil. Dénonciations de Pernambouc 1593-1595* (São Paulo, 1929). More about this person is recorded under the date line of August 31, 1595, thanks to the deposition of a Christian of old stock, Lope Martins, bootmaker: "... who has maintained a steady relationship with him and has always considered him to be a sincere man, and one of good conduct." Nonetheless, in the *Première Visite du Saint-Office aux Territoires du Brésil. Dénonciations de Bahia 1591-1593* (São Paulo, 1925), Capistrano de Abreu, the organizer of this precious material on the sixteenth century, observes that during the period of the visit of "antarctic France, Pero de Vila Nova, who had come from Europe, was still in Brazil, in the company of Bois le Comte and the delightful Jean de Lery" (and the historian believes that this can only be a reference to Monsieur de Bérit who appears in one of the denunciations). It was he who said at the Inquisition that Protestants coming from France had disseminated books and propagated the Lutheran doctrine, after having opened up schools of their persuasion. This same historian understood the importance of the fact, mentioned in *L'Itinéraire de Brésil* by the sixteenth-century settler, Gabriel Soares de Souza, that at the start of the century many Frenchmen—adventurers—were to be found scattered over Brazilian territory in search of "Brazilian wood"; they were not only living with Amerindians but also, in a sense, had settled on these lands, were surrounded by many women "and had not the slightest intention of returning to France." It was Frenchmen and many others "who came to Bahia and Sergipe each year in French ships and became incipient half-breeds, living and dying like pagans. We come across their descendants today; they are blond, fair-skinned and freckled and they pass for Tupinamba Indians and are even more barbarous than they." Consequently, it is understandable that in 1594 the great Portuguese Inquisitor was concerned with protecting the Portuguese domains of America not only from the dangers of Judaism, but also "from certain beliefs and other heretical misconceptions," including that of "certain people, men as well as women, who live estranged from our Holy Catholic Faith," committing and perpetrating "offenses and crimes of heresy."

On page seven of the *Première Visite du Saint-Office au Territoire du Brésil. Confessions de Bahia 1591-1592* (Rio de Janeiro, 1935), there is a revealing confession by the French Catholic, Nicolas Louis, "native of Dieppe, son of Robert Cluc and his wife, both of them French and Catholic, about forty years of age, residing in Brazil for twenty-two years, domiciled at Sergipe and married to Lusía Fernandes, half-breed"; the

declaration asserts that once, in the course of a voyage that included other Frenchmen, the ship was captured at sea by Protestants who were also French. Nicolas Louis lived with them for a month and a half, accompanied them under duress when they practiced their cult, although at heart he never approved of them. Another confession is even more revealing of the situation of Frenchmen of that era who, though they were Catholics, were sometimes obliged to appear to be Protestants. I am speaking of the confession of Pero de Vila Nova, "of French nationality, native of the city of Provins," mentioned on pages 91-93 of the same book; this confession contains a good many precious details. It reveals that Pero de Vila Nova, when he was still very young, came to Brazil, where he married a Catholic of very old Christian stock—Lionor Marques de Mendoça. He stated at the Inquisition that "in the year 1557 a flotilla of three ships came from France under the command of Monsieur Debuelle (Bois le Comte), a Catholic; also on board were Messieurs de la Fonsilha, Théret, du Pont, de Bérit, de Bolex, and de la Chapelle, accompanied by many noblemen and also by many Frenchmen, most of whom were Protestant. They arrived in three ships that landed at Rio de Janeiro, on the Brazilian coast. These Frenchmen settled there at a time when no Portuguese had as yet arrived at Rio de Janeiro." It was then that "the Protestants, who were far more powerful than the Catholics, began to disseminate their books and propagate their Lutheran doctrine by founding public schools," as we have already mentioned. Moreover, "they obliged and forced young men and even young boys, under pain of corporal punishment, to attend these schools and to study this doctrine." The man who made this statement found himself obliged to pretend Protestantism and to attend the Lutheran school and study its doctrine.

If everything that Pero recounts in his confession is true, he was a man more sensitive to his situation as a Catholic than as a Frenchman. He therefore fled and rejoined "the Portuguese Christians," after having encountered "pagan Indians, among whom he lived for nine or ten years, never knowing what day was Sunday, having completely lost all notion of time, unaware of when Lent occurred, and this is how he came to eat meat on days when it is forbidden by the church." Thus, Pero wavered for some time (although he preserved at heart his Catholic faith, according to his confession to the Holy Office) between three or four cultures: the French Catholic, the French Huguenot, the Amerindian, and finally the Portuguese Catholic—until the day when he fixed on the latter, his decision having been influenced by his marriage to a Catholic Portuguese. How-

Microscopic History: A Meeting of Influences

ever, he did not hesitate to divulge the Lutheran doctrines and rites to the Portuguese Catholics, although his intention (if we are to believe his explanations to the Holy Office) was to point up Protestant errors to those who asked him for details, and not to instruct or to present as good that which he did not view as such and of which he, in fact, disapproved. But however he revealed or divulged the doctrine, the fact remains that he spread information about practices which were unknown until then among Portuguese Catholics and that he thus became a propagator of "dangerous French ideas."

The same thing was doubtless true of his compatriots, Marin Paris and André de Fonte, who, according to the information Pero gave at the Inquisition, had also left the Huguenots in order to rejoin the Christians, one of them having married at Rio de Janeiro and the other at San Vicente.

It must be said that others among Bois le Comte's French companions, residing in Brazil, kept their Huguenot religion, although disguising it at times, and propounded their doctrines and their ideas. Thus, thresholds of Franco-Huguenot culture were constituted that differed from the dominant Lusitanian-Catholic. Curious prototype of the Franco-revolutionary culture of the eighteenth century, and even of the Franco-socialist of the nineteenth! It would not be an exaggeration to presume that many French or European Protestants, among those that settled at Recife at the time of the Dutch occupation, married Portuguese or natives as did Pero de Vila Nova and that they assimilated the dominant culture sufficiently to live among the Portuguese Catholics so that their different customs did not become an object of scandal in the eyes of the people. Nonetheless, they preserved, besides more delicate manners than those of the Portuguese, ideas and doctrines that were in contradiction to those in authority, and they even propounded them without any intention of imposing them, adopting the same propaganda technique that Pero acknowledged before the Holy Office. It was thus that they were to acquire favor among the Lusitanian-Catholic settlers. The latter differed from those recently arrived in the kingdom in that they were already settled on Brazilian soil and aspired to better treatment than they might have expected from their mother-country.

Leaving aside the doctrinaire content of the forms of persuasion utilized by the agents of French culture among other peoples, it is interesting to note that since the sixteenth century those who believed in Lusitanian-Catholic orthodoxy considered these agents to be extremely dangerous because they were essentially seducers; their forms of persuasion or of dis-

semination of new ideas were equally seductive. In his *Histoire du Brésil français au XVI^e Siècle* (Paris, 1878), Paul Gaffarel points out the fervor with which Villegaignon informed his friend, the austere Calvin, of his plan to conquer the southern territories of Brazil, the source of antarctic France's development; it is quite clear that one reason why the undertaking failed was the excessive Calvinist austerity which typified this attempt at European colonization in the tropics. But we must not forget that these excesses were Calvinist and Swiss rather than French or even Franco-Huguenot; nor should we forget that among the Europeans of French language and Protestant faith who surrounded Villegaignon (who was surrounded, moreover, by French Catholics as well) conflicts rapidly broke out, not alone of a theological but also of a psychological nature. An example was the struggle waged by the "Geneva doctors" and the Reverend Cointra (whom José Carlos Rodrigues calls the "Sorbonne doctor" on page two of his *Mémoire sur les Religions acatholiques*). We must emphasize that this conflict involved two types of characteristics and of national cultures (whose apparent common denominator was the French language): the French type and the Geneva type.

Although divided, the Protestants—Frenchmen, in part—who settled in Brazil with Villegaignon acted with intelligence against Lusitanian-Catholic orthodoxy. They not only spread "heresies" among the "pagans" in 1560, of which Abbé José Anchieta, a Catholic missionary, spoke with indignation in a letter addressed to Cardinal Don Henrique; they also sent many pagan children to Calvin himself, or elsewhere, to become propagators of their faith. Even Villegaignon took a certain number of them with him. Anchieta has left us further information according to which, after the capture of Fort Coligny by the Lusitanian Catholics, "a great quantity of heretical books . . ." were found there. The Lusitanian Catholics then became alarmed and decided to take firm action against the Frenchmen who returned to their camp because the latter, influenced as they were by such reading, could be very dangerous as propagators of heresies; and also because among them in Brazil were experts in the liberal arts, in Greek and Hebrew, who had composed veritable Holy Scriptures.

No one seemed more dangerous to them than one of these "experts" or "doctors," discovered among those deserters from the Calvinist retreat who rejoined the Lusitanian Catholics. He knew the Spanish language and he knew it well. It was in its idiom—we are citing here from Anchieta's account in a letter dated June 1, 1560, to the general Father of the Company—that the intruder "immediately began to laud himself as a gentle-

Microscopic History: A Meeting of Influences

man and a doctor, and thanks to his titles and to his natural amiability, he quickly began to attract people and to win their respect. . . ." He was accompanied by three others whom the letter described as "idiots." Furthermore, in the seventeenth century, another Jesuit, Simão de Vasconcelos, recounts this episode on page 136 on his *Chronique de la Compagnie de Jésus au Brésil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1864). He recalls that this intruder, a seductive man endowed with some scientific knowledge and not too refined in his manners, but on the other hand gifted with the art of oratory, in confronting his audience which consisted of simple people (such were most of the Lusitanian Catholics), used to mingle with his tales of "voyages, saints, indulgences, bulls, stories of the Pope and of the Roman church, jests or proverbs which made those who understood them laugh and impressed the ignorant, for he spoke a perfect Spanish and everyone loved his verve." In Simão's opinion, this seductive person was Béles, who was executed by the Lusitanian Catholics. Others believe that it was Cointra, the Sorbonne theologian who accompanied Villegaignon to Brazil; certain people—Baron Ramiz de Galvao, for instance—have suggested that it was a Brazilian historian and that the fact that Cointra was the lord of Boules accounted for the confusion. In any case, this madman who disrupted Lusitanian-Catholic orthodoxy in Brazil during the sixteenth century was French. And only a Frenchman of that epoch, a French intellectual, who stood out from the three "idiots" who accompanied him—Genevans, no doubt—could have conducted himself among Lusitanian Catholics as our anti-Catholic doctor did: by adding to his science a "joyous and easy natural amiability," by enlivening his scholarly work with persuasion and "francization," with humor and proverbs which made those who understood them laugh and impressed the ignorant. . . ."

The memory of these contacts with the French, always "charming" though heretical, explains the fact that during the eighteenth century at Pernambuco an anti-metropolitan movement began to take shape. Among the conspirators, as José Domingos Codeceira—along with other historians—recalls, on page 86 of his book, *L'Idée républicaine au Brésil. Priorité de Pernambouc* (Recife, 1894), someone concluded that it would be preferable, as a last resort, "to give in to the French, those clever warriors, rather than to serve those uncouth, ill-mannered and ungrateful Portuguese."

Documents relating to the so-called Bahia revolution "of the tailors" reveal that the conspirators entertained such a warm feeling for the French, for their ideas and their doctrines, that it would be no exaggeration to regard this revolution as a somewhat lyrical monument erected by half-

breeds who were nourished by French ideas. The revolution of the Inconfidência Mineira also had at its head students and priests imbued with these same ideas. A decisive role in its most secret organization is even attributed to a Brazilian who had studied natural sciences at Coimbra, José Alves Maciel. He happened to be in Paris when "the French government was preparing an expedition under Lafayette's command to aid the Americans," and "he contacted Jefferson"—an admirer of France. Maciel, who had succeeded in joining this expedition and in going to the United States, perhaps dreamed of a similar expedition to Brazil; that is to say, of an alliance of Brazilians with "the French, those well-trained soldiers" who, in the eyes of the most restless Lusitanian-Americans, continued to symbolize European civilization in its highest form—far superior to the Iberian forms of civilization. Consequently, it was thanks to contact with the liberal and progressivist ideas which characterized the century that the wish to escape from an inferior situation as a mere plantation colony began to take form in Brazil. The Pernambuco revolutions of 1817 and 1824 were born of this admiration for France, of this intimacy with French notions and suggestions that were suitable for adaptation in Brazil. Recife was the point of fusion.

It was here, too, that the social movement that erupted into the so-called revolution "of the beaches" was intellectually prepared. This revolution was presented more as a nativistic and anti-oligarchical exacerbation than as a socialist movement of a kind—socialism of French inspiration—which the people of Recife had dreamed about, nourished as they were by French ideas and by French political culture. But there is no cause to scorn the movement; it could be viewed, after all, as an ignobly demagogic explosion which consisted in "eating the sailors," that is to say, in massacring the Portuguese, in exalting the white and Indian half-breeds, and furthermore, in punishing members of the rich "Cavalcanti" family, the most feudal people of the province. We refer here to a Brazilian movement which broke out in 1849 in Pernambuco and in which the French engineer, Vauthier, certainly participated, although not directly and knowingly, of course. (Orthodox revolutionaries have never been his apologists and have always considered him a foreigner in the service of the Rego-Barros Cavalcanti oligarchy, and of other despotic elements of that epoch, all of them despicable in the eyes of the revolutionaries.) In other words, he was looked upon as having spread ideas contrary to the orthodoxy and to the dominant social order in Pernambuco (just as the French Protestants, to whom the declarations of the Holy Office refer, had done earlier). In

Microscopic History: A Meeting of Influences

Vauthier's case, this was a matter of ideas on "technical progress" linked with "social progress." Victorious, these ideas were to promote a new type of society and culture in which the leading class was to be found more frequently among scholars, technicians, and intellectuals than among land-owners or the rich. This wave of ideas, which in the beginning gave rise to "Fourierism," was to be transmitted to "positivist Comtism"; the movement developed in Brazil during the second half of the nineteenth century with remarkable vigor and expressed the most important intellectual and political influence which had ever been handed down systematically from France. It was a more powerful influence than that of the French Protestants, the Encyclopedists, or the revolutionaries of 1789; more powerful than the influence of Voltaire or Rousseau, Montesquieu or Diderot, or Cousin, Jouffroy, Proudhon, Saint-Simon and Fourier. Fourier was a kind of Jean-Baptiste mainly because of Vauthier's and Figueredo's efforts to disseminate ideas. For many Brazilians preoccupied with problems of technological change and social reorganization, it was Fourier who paved the way for the message, which met with hardly an obstacle, of "positivist philosophy" and "political positivism," and for the republican revolution which took place in Brazil and which was to substitute the positivist sphere with the slogan "Order and Progress" for the national monarchical emblem. Indirectly, however, and without marked republican inclinations, Vauthier, the engineer of Ponts et Chaussées who, from 1841 to 1846, headed a technical mission in Pernambuco, helped to set the stage for this new movement and to insure its success, thanks to his having propagated doctrines and ideas on "social progress" which supplemented those on "technical progress." These doctrines which harmonized order and progress were propounded by Fourier and Saint-Simon and later developed by Comte.

Why, then, has Vauthier been so forgotten in a study on the evolution of Brazil which is not only technical but social and political as well? Doubtless because, in the eyes of many people, and despite his status as a former pupil of the Ecole polytechnique of Paris, he was merely a technician like dozens of others. And also because Brazilian history is written without proper regard for the significant effort that so many technicians, engineers, artisans, small businessmen, and industrialists contributed in order to modernize the apparel, the mode of life, and the social customs of the country. These people did not attain great political or academic honors for their innovations, but they were nonetheless men who, without fanfare and without publicity (except for the indiscreet, paid sections, entitled "of interest to others," or in the marriage or obituary columns), greatly

contributed to changing the life, the environment, the regional, local, and sometimes even the national landscape. Let us take as an example the Frenchmen who persisted in bringing to Brazil vegetables from the south of France and Europe. They wanted to enjoy, in tropical America, the familiar French flavors in their soups and stews, mixed with the meat of tropical animals like the armadillo or the wild boar. And there were many other such examples and experiments, forgotten today, which enriched the Brazilian diet.

Vauthier was a name not entirely unknown when, in 1937, it appeared in print and revived, in the minds of Brazilians, the somewhat forgotten story of this French engineer. He headed a mission of technicians in Recife which achieved a kind of French revolution in the north of Brazil. It endeavored to build bridges instead of guillotines. Thus new relations were established between men who had been separated by the awesome waters that flowed in the tropics and created profound social cleavages between groups of human beings. The mission, therefore, had this human aspect, further reinforced by Vauthier's socialist point of view. In the eyes of the Brazilians, he represented the propagator of Fourier's ideas. His name was not unfamiliar to the most cultured Brazilians. But little, indeed, we might say nothing, was known about his life, his training, and his secondary activities in Brazil.

Luck was in my favor because my friend, the Paulist historian, Paulo Prado (who knew of my interest in the Brazilian activities of that French engineer), discovered in Paris the manuscript of Vauthier's personal diary in which he had made notes on his principal technological experiments as well as his experiences as a European in Brazil, his reactions to the stimuli and complications of an environment that was entirely new to him and at the same time archaic in contrast to his science and knowledge. I was also fortunate when many of his letters from Recife on Brazilian architecture were published in Paris in a review that specialized in architecture and even contained a few illustrations. Furthermore, another friend, Professor Arinos de Melo France (the author of a work of great value for anyone interested in the study of the relations of France and Brazil: *L'Indien brésilien et la Révolution française*), responding with kindness to my request, was able to interview, during his stay in the French capital, one of the European descendants of Vauthier. This man gave my friend copies of many documents dealing with the adventures—for it was adventure in the best sense of the word—of young Louis Léger in Brazil, during the first half of the nineteenth century.

One of their most significant aspects was that they did not merely repre-

Microscopic History: A Meeting of Influences

sent the experiences of an engineer or a technician but also those of a socialist. Vauthier was one of the pioneers of the expansion of French ideas in Brazil. It was largely thanks to him that a desire for the social renovation of the Brazilian people was awakened among the intellectuals and even the politicians in Recife. This desire was in harmony with the pre-Marxist, socialist suggestions which, having given what we might call today a laborite tone to what seemed at first to be merely the political claims of the so-called "Revolt of the Beaches," remained vivid in the mind of Antonio Pedro de Figueiredo. These suggestions were manifest in the thinking of Nascimento Feitessa, and in the end they gave a fresh orientation to the abolitionist preoccupations of Joachim Nabuco.

Joachim Nabuco, as we know, was not content to be solely an abolitionist; he never resigned himself to fighting for exclusively juridical or political solutions to problems, but always tried to consider them in the light of their social complexity. Nor was he willing to be merely a disciple of some professor of law on the faculty at Recife—a school that made no impression on his intelligence nor on his character—or a disciple of the Saint Paul school, where he finished a part of his higher education by conforming to that excellent custom of the time which required future politicians, judges, or lawyers to attend both institutions. How, then, do we account for his inclination toward socialist ideas, and his predilection for social solutions? It would seem that both university and extra-university contacts of intellectuals, politicians, and the more restless students with European or American ideas of social reform were traditional at Recife. Some of these ideas were propounded in Brazil by Abreu e Lima, Bolivar's friend and collaborator in the Hispano-American struggle against Spanish domination. It also seems that Joachim Nabuco was deeply inspired or stimulated by these intellectuals, Antonio de Fagureido, for example, and some publicists, none of whom, by the way, had a university training. Perhaps, as a child, he had read in his father's library (his father represented Vauthier in a law case at Pernambuco) the collection of reviews called *Le Progrès*. This publication was tinged with socialism and contained European and particularly French innovations in the field of inventions and technology, presented in a somewhat romantic fashion. Doubtless he also read the French socialist publications for which, for a time, Vauthier seems to have been the principal propaganda agent in Brazil and that the latter's remarkable influence made itself felt as far away as Rio.

We must not forget that Vauthier had just graduated from the Ecole polytechnique of Paris, one of the most advanced centers of European

science during that epoch. In France, then a leading country in the field of pure and applied sciences, the Ecole polytechnique was on a par with the Ecole normale supérieure as regards the renewal of teaching, scientific research, and also social philosophy. France, whose technological activity was to have repercussions in the United States—at that time very French in trend—was not to be outstripped in this domain by England until after 1850 and by Germany only at the end of the century.

Occasionally one closely associates the development of applied sciences (which can never be totally divorced from the pure sciences) in France with the French Revolution, the leaders of which, at a given moment, called upon the nation's scientists and even demanded of them solutions to problems of a political nature, thus stimulating an alliance between the sciences and industry, technology, the discoveries of engineers, and the work of administrators. S. F. Mason, both a scientist and a historian, in a recent book, *Main Currents of Scientific Thought* (New York, Schuman, 1953), reminds us, on page 353, that after the Jacobins closed the Académie des sciences de Paris in 1793, after they executed Lavoisier and the astronomer Bailly (who was the mayor of Paris), after they drove Condorcet to suicide and were responsible for the terrible words, uttered by the vice-president of the revolutionary tribunal that condemned Lavoisier: "The Republic has no need of scientists"—a reaction against this anti-scientific stupidity set in among the revolutionaries themselves. Then a movement of great appreciation for scholars and men of science sprang up which led to the establishment of the mathematician Lazare Carnot as minister of war and the geometrician Monge as minister of the navy. The chemists Fourcroy and Berthollet were encouraged to pursue their experiments, which were regarded as serving the public interest. The Académie des sciences were reconstituted as one of the three sections of the Institut de France, whose activities were also devoted to literature and to the so-called moral and political sciences.

It was precisely in this atmosphere of high appreciation for scientists, for the pure and, above all, the applied sciences as taught by scholars, that the Ecole polytechnique and the Ecole normale supérieure were valued as almost messianic institutions by France and by individuals or groups who looked toward France as toward a new Jerusalem. In 1794, the four hundred students of the Ecole polytechnique had as professors such men of genius as Laplace, Lagrange (who taught physics and mathematics), Monge, professor of geometry, and Berthollet, professor of chemistry. These truly illustrious scientists had as pupils, and were to have as succes-

Microscopic History: A Meeting of Influences

sors, physicists like Malus, Arago, Poncelet, Poisson, Cauchy Sadi Carnot; chemists like Gay-Lussac, Thénard, Vauquelin, Dulong, Petit. The Ecole polytechnique and the Ecole normale supérieure, with their great professors concentrated in Paris, became for French or European youth, thirsting for knowledge and science, what Professor Mason calls a veritable "Mecca." There sprang up an atmosphere imbued with the presence of famous scientists who were at that time the greatest of university scholars, the greatest inventors, and the most revolutionary men of science, from a social point of view, in all Europe. These schools constituted the threshold of irradiation of a regenerating culture which emerged from a country which some considered to be not only the most admired among Brazilians but also the most loved during the first half of the nineteenth century. S. Dutot, on page 33 of his book, *France et Brésil* (Paris, 1857), stated in general terms that the Brazilians respected the English and valued the Germans, but "it is the French whom they love and imitate." One can even go so far as to say, in speaking of north European technology, and principally of French technology, that for many enthusiasts of Progress with a capital "P" and of Science with a capital "S," it represented for Brazil and the Brazilians the cure for all the ills engendered by the Portuguese system of colonization based upon slavery. "Every European who becomes acclimated to the tropics, every discovery which places the power of a machine where man's strength is giving out, in short, all progress brings the day of delivery closer," according to Dutot. On this point he would not have had the complete approval of another Frenchman who had contact with Brazil during the same epoch, the Count de Gobineau. The latter considered the theory of ethnic determinism to be a formidable reality, greater than all the purely social progress which idealists or naïve reformers might dream about. It was from this "Mecca," from this almost messianic school which the Ecole polytechnique represented, that a French engineer at the head of a technical mission was to come to Recife. The presence of this mission in Brazil was to mark one of the most important revolutions which occurred in Brazilian life thanks to a team or an organized group of technicians under the command of a man of science who also had economic, social, and political knowledge. Indeed, some of his reports, the one of 1844 for example, was to harmonize with the works of Bishop Azevedo Coutinho and also with those of the "Bahian School" of economists, because of the attention paid to an examination of regional economic conditions.

During the period of the Ecole's greatest splendor as a center of technical

science and of moral thought, the young Vauthier got his higher education. There he learned his trade as an engineer which he later dedicated to Pernambuco, and there he acquired his knowledge, the best that a young man in his field could aspire to in all of Europe, in fact, in the entire world.

Let us not forget that at the time of Vauthier's arrival in Brazil Fourierism was in vogue among the French intellectuals of that period. This was principally true of "the early students of the Ecole polytechnique and the Ecole centrale, the businessmen, industrialists, and physicians," as Professors F. Armand and R. Maublanc state in their study on Fourier, first published in Paris and then, in 1940, in Mexico in a Spanish version, thanks to the efforts of the Fonds de Culture économique. Both these French professors think of Fourierists as "the heirs of the eighteenth century," in other words, of the French rationalism of that century, and as "romantic enthusiasts"; and, in both instances, as "sincerely and profoundly socialist." These innovators made no secret of this; they declared themselves to be socialist through "philanthropy" and also because of a "clear insight into the vices of the dominant regime" of which Fourier had made a critical analysis, brilliant in its lucidity and reasoning. But, although they were revolutionaries in their objectives, they were not at all so in their means of action. On the contrary, the violence that the Marxists and the anarchists were to adopt was repugnant to them.

Many researchers, in studying the history of socialist movements in Europe, have found evidence of the decisive influence of Fourierism upon Marxism in regard to objectives common to both movements. Apparently Marxist socialism drew away from Fourierism principally on account of the means of achieving the socialist "utopia." Therefore comparisons made by researchers like Armand and Maublanc between what they call the "phalansterian utopia" of the Fourierists and the "Soviet reality" of the Marxists are not out of order. They stress the fact that while Fourier regarded work in the "phalansteries" as the "finest of sports" and workers as "industrial athletes" or "agricultural champions," the U.S.S.R. has created "oudarniks" and Stakhanovite teams which represented nothing more than the application of Fourier's ideas to industrial enterprises governed by a dictatorial state. The Soviet tendency to use newspapers, inscriptions on bronze, and even statues for glorification stems from Fourier's influence (the application of Fourier's semi-anarchical and syndicalist ideas). In glorifying men who broke this or that record in doing a difficult type of work, and thus endowing work with a magnificently sporting characteristic, Stalinist-Leninism utilized intelligently one of the most brilliant of

Microscopic History: A Meeting of Influences

Fourier's insights. Perhaps the same intuition occurred to Vauthier when he came to Brazil. The country at that time was in such a state of pre-industrialization that its economy was still in a feudal phase. This was hardly conducive to organizing workers into a more sporting than martial form of "industrial armies." Even under such conditions, Vauthier perhaps came to realize that, in certain patriarchal Brazilian communities, the work of the slaves followed rhythms that emanated from the preservation, on the one hand, of African rites of solidarity, harmony, and cooperation, and, on the other, of Christian and European syndicalist rites which we still find in Brazil today in the ceremonies of brotherhoods and congregations. Moreover, these rhythms foreshadowed the sporting rhythms which were part of the psychological technique of the cooperative and socialist work organizations recommended by Fourier to his disciples; this technique was practiced in those phalansteries that were not uniquely romantic, but practical and objective as well. Furthermore, it was these same rhythms that the Marxists of modern Russia were to imitate and which the Russian Soviet were to put into operation on a large scale in their vast empire, under the pressure of a tyrannical, dictatorial regime—a regime that has been going strong for many years in the famous USSR and which is defined as state socialism in its most authoritarian form, doubtless in keeping with the necessities of the Russian situation and with the semi-Asiatic antecedents of Russia.

But I merely wish at this time to emphasize the considerable influence that the technique of applied science and the work of French engineers exerted upon Brazil during the first half of the nineteenth century, culminating in the arrival in the north of the empire, dominated at that time by somewhat feudal barons, of a French engineer who was also a socialist. This socialist was engaged to head the public services in the northern province at a time when one of these so-called feudal barons was the president or governor of the province. The truth is that this baron was reared in France. Doubtless it was there that he became acquainted with new French technical methods. Doubtless, too, he heard French voices announcing a new world—a world that would result from scientific progress and from intelligence directed to perfecting the conditions of life and of human relations.

It was during the regime of João VI that advertisements similar to Carlos Durand's (March 18, 1818) began to appear in the *Gazeta do Rio de Janeiro*. Durand announced that, "at the request of several artillery officers of this city," he had sent to Paris for "complete boxes of compasses with a

table of calibration for cannons which had been mentioned in an imperial ordinance." These boxes, Durand added, came from "the workshop of the famous Lenoir, first mechanical engineer of his Royal Highness, Louis XVIII; Lenoir had a monopoly on the manufacturing of tools destined for the French Ecole polytechnique." And finally, "the beauty of execution and finish of these tools leave nothing to be desired." What more could one ask for in the mathematical instruments of that time? These tools, emerging from Lenoir's hands in Paris, represented the best of their kind. Lenoir was his Royal Highness the King of France's first mechanical engineer. France was the queen of all nations in the field of mathematical and physical sciences as well as in that of the arts. Paris was its capital and the Ecole polytechnique, for which Lenoir worked, was located in Paris. His instruments would be close to perfect—well finished and beautiful. France was not England; her tools and machines combined "beauty of execution" with "finish."

"Writing ink" from France was also excellent, as was announced in this same *Gazeta* on September 12; excellent, too, were the shoes for men and women, not only because of the softness of their leather but also because they were made in Paris "with the greatest care." They were "to be used in America" "in accordance with the taste of the country," that is to say, Brazil, again according to an announcement by the same Carlos Durand on November 14. No less attractive were French inventions for Brazilian use like "the machine to husk coffee quickly, as well as rice and wheat," advertised by the inventor himself, a "French carpenter and mechanic recently arrived in this capital," on November 13, 1819. Or again the "well-known metal stills of French invention," advertised by "Dupont, French coppersmith," on September 6, 1820—metal stills which Dupont "manufactured for a moderate price" and which were capable of "distilling three pipefulls in twenty-four hours." The *Jornal do Commercio* was soon to publish advertisements of other French inventions, entirely adaptable to Brazilian use, such as shirt collars "which do not lose their shape because of humidity or bodily heat" and which, according to the *Jornal* of August 21, 1828, were on sale at Berthier's store. French satins were also advertised along with English. In an advertisement published on November 25, 1828, the public's attention was called to "a watch manufactured by Bréguet, first clockmaker of Paris, member of the Académie of sciences," a watch that strikes the quarter-hours and "is operated by a diamond, the essential part of the mechanism being also made of diamonds." This watch was so constructed that it was protected against impacts and changes in atmos-

Microscopic History: A Meeting of Influences

pheric conditions. Finally, it had, among other advantages, "a secret compartment in which to place someone's picture." Also advertised were "rich harnesses for one or two pairs of horses," recently arrived from France on the ship "Henriette" (December 11, 1828). The machines advertised in this same *Journal* on March 13, 1830, were also, it seems, French. They included a very recent one "recommended for the service it gives and its perfect adaptability to the usages and customs of the country: a machine to grind rice, corn and coffee that operates with from twenty-four to one hundred cogs. . . ." Other machines were advertised for sale at Coquet Frères: "To prepare cassava root; it does the work of from twenty to sixty mills which are usually used for this purpose"; "to dry flour without the intervention of anyone"; "to throw away rice kernels, to pick out ears of corn and bean pods"; "for cultivating rice and beans by reducing the enormous manpower which this cultivation formerly demanded"; "to search for gold or any other metal, for precious stones or springs, at any given depth"; "to uproot tree trunks and break up ground."

To these newspaper advertisements appearing in the capital during the reign of Don João VI and Don Pedro we must add some of those that appeared in Recife around the time when Vauthier was in Brazil. For example, in the *Diário do Pernambuco*, on January 9, 1840, a French bakery advertised that it made "bread by mechanical methods which made it better and cleaner"; in the same *Diário* of January 29, 1841, a goldsmith announced that he had brought from France "all kinds of instruments . . . most of them as yet unknown in Brazil." In the April 8, 1842, issue François Chabrilac, who claimed to be a "professor of the natural sciences at the Collège de Lyon in France," informed all those interested in natural history that "he stuffed all kinds of animals to perfection, for collections as well as for the ornamentation of rooms." These advertisements, which seemed to have been written by Englishmen (because of the supremacy which their authors claimed to possess in this or that technical or mechanical field), in reality were written by Frenchmen. This proves the extent to which Europe was still subjugated by the prestige of French science and technology which had scarcely begun to be overshadowed by England's progress. It is important to stress this point: to wit, that Vauthier came to Brazil when France, and more precisely the Ecole polytechnique, were at the height of their splendor as a European center of scientific progress and of the manufacturing of tools and precision machines which combined beauty with utilitarian value. French products, watches, shoes, mechanical inventions, were still rivaling those of England. In many fields the French

even had the advantage; for the Brazilians were more inclined to follow the French taste, styles, and techniques than the English or German.

Vauthier, while he was not a man of genius, was not an ordinary technician either. He did not come to Brazil with the primary purpose of amassing a large fortune, nor was he satisfied to make his mission essentially a bureaucratic one. He was an innovator who did not try to avoid the responsibilities incumbent upon him in an environment as different from Europe as was Brazil during the first half of the nineteenth century—the responsibilities of adapting, re-creating, and even creating.

In his book, *The Life of Braxton Craven. A Biographical Approach to Social Science* (Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1939), Professor Jerome Dowd began to wonder as early as seventeen years ago if the time had not come for certain sociologists to specialize in biographical studies. And he cited the example which a leader in the field had already provided, William I. Thomas. In his monumental work, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1918-20), Thomas devoted an entire volume to a biographical study of a peasant, Wladek Wiszenewski. The author justified the importance thus given to a single biographical study by asserting that all problems which lent themselves to psychological analysis were identical. This was so regardless of whether the material used for such an analysis stemmed from minute biographical data on people or from the study of the designated mass phenomenon. And moreover, in Thomas' opinion, this material should be regarded "as the perfect type of sociological material." The use of any other material can be explained only by the practical difficulty of obtaining sufficient quantities of biographical data to meet the sociological demands for generalization. On the other hand, when, as in Vauthier's case, one finds abundant autobiographical material, such as a personal diary and letters written from Pernambuco or Recife to France, about a man who can be regarded as representing an important group of French innovators and technicians working in Brazil during the nineteenth century, then this particular case is as deserving of sociological attention as the peasant, Wladek Wiszenewski. Of course, as Thomas observes, in referring to Wiszenewski, it is not possible for the sociologist to study the life stories of all those individuals connected with a social reality. Consequently, we have to limit ourselves, as Thomas suggests and as the naturalist says he does, to the study of a few representative cases that offer us results that are applicable, insofar as this is possible, to all the cases they represent. Vauthier's case is obviously that of a French technician representative of a/whole group of French technicians.

Microscopic History: A Meeting of Influences

The latter, during the course of the nineteenth century, constituted the messengers of specifically French knowledge, represented mainly by the Ecole polytechnique. The center of technical progress and, at the same time, propagators of a doctrine of social and technical renovation, they transmitted this knowledge to territories outside of Europe, particularly to Brazil, which at that time was one of the areas most accessible to French influence.

According to Professor Dowd, typology should be applied to biographical studies that culminate in sociological interpretations. Typology is defined by Thomas as dividing men into several groups: those who are essentially bohemian, leading a life that responds to transitory impulses, unstable in character and uncertain in behavior; those who are sedentary, that is to say, conservative in the sense that they are attached to conventions, rely upon them, and are incapable of efforts at independence or innovation; finally, those who are primarily creative, who pursue a definite goal in life, who are innovators, who instead of being dependent upon conventions or on a certain atmosphere, attempt to alter or renovate these.

During his stay in Brazil Vauthier must certainly have adapted himself. Indeed, studies of situations show that a man is not always the same in different atmospheres. He can be conservative in one situation (this was true of Don João VI when he was the regent in Portugal) and an innovator in another (as was this same prince when he settled in Brazil). Moreover, these tendencies vary with age. For example, Thomas deduced from his study of Wiszenewski that the Polish peasant was bohemian in his youth and a philistine when middle-aged. As for Vauthier, we believe we can say that he showed himself to be a mixture—both a bohemian and creative, with some of the traits of a mercenary philistine. But he was principally creative. An innovator by the very fact of the national situation that witnessed his birth (he was a Frenchman who grew up during a period when Europe was revolutionized by technology and science—and when French science outstripped English and German science) and by the fact of his university training; he also played a messianic role because of the very nature of his work. As head of a public work mission in a Brazilian province, Vauthier was to enjoy extensive and elastic powers that enabled him to innovate, renovate, and reform. As a Fourierist his socialist philosophy of life strongly reinforced this creative proclivity and predominated over his bohemian and particularly his philistine tendencies. He believed himself to be invested with a mission in regard to the Brazilians—a mission to propagate a philosophy implying a new social organization which paral-

leled a new technical organization. This philosophy of technical and social progress was also one of harmony, balance, and social order; of order and progress—in anticipation of Comte's positivist slogan.

It would be interesting to study Vauthier's personal diary today, his letters, his polemics in the newspapers, the articles in the paid sections of the newspapers, written either for or against him, in which all kinds of intrigues were either welcomed or repulsed. Such a study would enable us to discover to what extent the kind of personality he possessed when he arrived in Brazil from France changed under the pressure of an atmosphere determined by attitudes in harmony with new and, at times, unexpected and unforeseen situations. We know that it is precisely in the study of the boundary between these two factors (the personality type and the socially conditioned attitude) that the modern so-called social or humanist sciences today find their two principal criteria for a social analysis of man; the anthropological criterion which, as stated by Professors Leo W. Simmons and Harold G. Wolf (the latter a doctor and professor of neurology, the former a professor of sociology) on page 150 of their recent work, *Social Science in Medicine* (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1954), constitutes personality typing; and the sociological and psycho-sociological criterion which is that of attitude conditioning. These two criteria are closely related to each other in the sense of being integrated into the field of psychiatry. Several schools of psychoanalysis are interested in researches of a sociological and historico-social nature.

Under these conditions, the characterization of social individuals in terms of their type or by a study of their personality is not enough to explain their participation in the processes of contributing to or transferring culture. Vauthier, for example, helped to transmit French culture to Brazil during the first half of the nineteenth century. Yet, at the same time, he was a Frenchman particularly affected (given his type of creative-bohemian personality) by Brazilian values that were at times imposed upon him in situations to which a purely philistine Frenchman would not have exposed himself, either materially or spiritually, with the same intensity. Many are the works today in which, when confronted with problems such as these, comparatively diverse cultural and sub-cultural patterns are considered, as well as their impact upon personal adaptations.

The authors of *Social Science in Medicine* observe (page 104) that "when a person undergoes a new, arresting, or disconcerting experience, he may cast about for an explanation and assessment of it. The shortest and most usual course is to turn, just as a child turns to his parents or a religious per-

Microscopic History: A Meeting of Influences

son to his priest, to an authoritative surrogate who is ready with definition and elucidation."

For Vauthier, who was called upon to demonstrate his authority as chief engineer over the other French engineers working with him in Brazil, it would seem that the "authoritative surrogate" was France herself, not in her vaguely maternal form, but as represented by the Ecole polytechnique and by French scientific thought which had prepared Vauthier and his French collaborators for this Brazilian undertaking. It was this that inspired Vauthier's answer to a communication from a certain "Philopatria," in a correspondence published in the November 25, 1841, issue of *Diario do Pernambuco*. "Philopatria" had expressed doubts about the capacity of French technicians to do a good job on their project and had called them "impostors and adventurers." Vauthier answered: "I can easily prove by irrefutable documents that I have been a student of the Ecole polytechnique of Paris; attendance at this school, as everyone knows, is only permitted to the rare students who are able to pass many and difficult examinations and who have given incontrovertible proof of their profound knowledge of mathematics and other disciplines." He recalled with a certain lack of modesty his victories at the Polytechnique: "After serious study I left this school one year ahead of most of my friends in order to direct maritime projects in the department of Morbihan. . . ." Further on he said: "I can assure this dear Philopatria that I shall never regard as beyond our capacities the projects which the provincial government will deign to entrust to us, no matter what difficulties they might present." Again he protested: "Inasmuch as we have retained our jobs in France, thanks to the official leave given us by the French government, we are not afraid to re-enter our country where we shall always find a bread to eat that is less bitter than that of discredit and insult; for despite our absence, the minister of state in charge of our branch of the administration who requested and obtained high posts for us from our Sovereign, will always be pleased to have us return to share the heavy burden which our colleagues are carrying." And he ended up by saying: "Brazil is not a lesser place for having sought the help of French science. The Russian Ecole polytechnique was created by French engineers of the Ponts et Chaussées. . . . England, a country so rich in scientists and technicians, entrusted Monsieur Brunel, a French engineer of Ponts et Chaussées, with the task of digging a tunnel which will be the greatest accomplishment of our times. . . . It was French engineers who helped Mohammed-Ali with the tremendous projects carried out in Egypt. It was Monsieur Cerisy, a French engineer, who created the squadrons and

arsenals of this country; its schools are directed by Monsieur Lambert, and gigantic enterprises here are under the direction of Mougel, my compatriot and classmate. And, since I possess the same credentials as these illustrious Frenchmen, I do not consider myself incapable of rendering the same services to Brazil."

In other words, nobody could regard him as a stranger without a country or a trade, or as a man who was attempting to mislead the Brazilians with his false or superficial knowledge. He was a Frenchman, a French engineer and former pupil of the *Ecole polytechnique*, a classmate of French engineers who were already famous, like Mougel. He had a glorious mother—France and French science, the *Ecole polytechnique* of Paris—in short a nation, a science, and a school to which England herself turned for help in spite of all her scientists and technicians.

RELATIONS BETWEEN MAN AND THE WORLD

The relationship man-world is of very great importance for the primitive man who finds himself perpetually (even when deeply engaged in mechanical or technical pursuits) in a state of subjective participation with his milieu. No distinction whatsoever exists for him between the self and the world, but rather a constant and intimate liaison, made real by a mythical behavior which leads us to consider the myth as the most archaic stage of knowledge (Leenhardt).

Prehistoric myths were prolonged in the cosmologies by which the civilizations of ancient Asia tried to contemplate the world under the category of totality. The procedure of their attempts was the opposite of that of contemporary science, whose attitude is extroverted. They accounted for phenomena by projecting upon them, lacking all objectivity, their own sensory, emotive, imaginative, or intellectual reactions as well as their own subjective notions, introverted in value, of hierarchy and order. Pushed on by an invincible anthropomorphic tendency, they constructed a humanized nature by means of analogical deduction.

The fact is that if everything can be studied in its immediate function by observation and experiment, its transcendental meaning can also be sought, leaving aside all notions of cause and effect. A simple "short circuit of

Translated by James H. Labadie.

thought" (Gilson) permits one, basing his thought on a chance similarity of color, form, temperature, or degree of humidity, to connect the object with another element of the cosmos, whose essence one thus succeeds in penetrating.

Thus, all ancient cosmologies held that the human body (microcosm) was a replica of the universe (macrocosm) so that the same soul, the same component elements, and the same kinetic mechanisms were valid for both.

Although this macro-microcosmic symbolism is at bottom but a simple association of ideas, it is a respectable part of the history of civilization. It gave the world an image of incomparable ethical and aesthetic value by introducing a hierarchical subordination and an irreproachable order of a unity much more rigorous than that suggested by the modern mathematization of the cosmos (Johann Huizinga).

A. MORPHOLOGICAL ANALOGIES BETWEEN MICROCOSM AND MACROCOSM

1. Since Zoroaster (ca. 585 B.C.) innumerable analogical series have been imagined connecting the parts of the human body with those of the cosmos or with the different parts of the state. A comparative analysis of these is beyond the limits of this study, and we can only indicate the immense amount of material to be studied in the Far East, India, the Middle East, and the West, in classical science as well as in such pseudo-sciences as astrology and alchemy. We shall come back to this apropos of macro-microcosmic correspondences. Joseph Needham has shown that the two first European books devoted to this subject are those of Joseph Ben Zaddig (Córdoba, 1149) and of Bernard (Torus, 1150). Their common source is an encyclopedia written a hundred years earlier at Bassorah. Needham also established the fact that John of Salisbury (Policraticus, 1159) was the first Western man to point out analogies between the human and political structure, a subject which had already been considered in China by Ko Hong (281-361) in the *Pao P'ou Tseu*.¹

2. On another level, analogies between the color or the form of a plant or a mineral and those of an organ or a humor produced therapeutic deductions. This is the doctrine of "signatures" still being developed by Crollius in the seventeenth century.

The mandragore in the eastern Mediterranean area and the ginseng in the Far East owed their enormous reputations to the anthropomorphic

1. J. Needham, "Relations between China and the West in the History of Science and Technology," *International Congress of the History of Science* (Jerusalem, 1953).

Relations between Man and the World

aspect of their roots. For Paracelsus, the celadine was a cholagogue because of its yellow, bilious latex. But on the other side of the globe, in Indonesia, the rhizoma of curcuma was for the same reason considered as a hepatic medicament and used by J. Bontius in the treatment of jaundice. And it is noteworthy, from a pharmacological point of view, that mandragore, ginseng, and curcuma do have real therapeutic value.

The Galilean and Newtonian epoch was to defend the conception of ether in physics (Descartes, Newton) and in medicine (Hoffmann). But to the subjective system of elementary² and qualitative categories, it was to oppose matter,³ the only objective reality which can be measured and weighed, and thus to return to the old theory of the vacuum and atoms (Gassendi). Descartes, proclaiming that material bodies share everywhere a likeness to each other, renders absurd the alchemist's idea of transmutation and ruin. But if physics makes "essential qualities" absurd, the idea of the element remains very important, whether the old elements still permit the construction of scientific systems, or whether new elements affirm their existence.⁴

All these notions gave rise to artistic expression differing greatly between the Occident and the Orient. For the Greeks the microcosm is the measure of all things, and the glorification of the nude human form is the grand theme of art. Feminine beauty became the plastic symbol of the highest conceptions of Europe (religion, science, fatherland, humanity). For Asia, on the other hand, the macrocosm is the only real inspiration of art. The conscious and constant aim of Indian art has been to render the divine and the transcendental by creating morphological forms "beyond human forms." In the Far East, painting, sister of calligraphy, leans toward vegetable forms, animals (including insects), and landscapes. It is less concerned with showing a reproduction of nature than with eliminating all that is not conducive to a suggestion of the great cosmological myths (opposition of the two principles; idea of nirvana; eternal change).

2. "Sweet, bitter, hot, cold, color are but conventions. Reality is atoms and vacuum" (Democritus).

"These tastes, these odors, these colors, etc. . . . in relation to the object in which they seem to be found are nothing but simple names" (Galileo, *Il Saggiatore* [1623]).

3. "It may be that a single and unique fundamental matter, dispersed, divisible yet impenetrable is the basis of all bodies, and that the differences we perceive among them are but the result of unequal sizes and forms, of rest and movement, and of the relative position of the atoms" (R. Boyle, 1627-91).

4. R. Nooykass, "Elementelehre des Iatrochemiker," *Janus*, 1937.

B. STRUCTURAL ANALOGIES BETWEEN MICROCOSM AND MACROCOSM

1. The innumerable aspects of material bodies, of plants, animals, and men can be reduced to some common principles, as few in number as possible, known as elements and atoms. Elements constitute not only cosmic substances but, by contrasting with each other in their opposite qualities, antinomic series which are balanced, attract or repel each other, and are created or destroyed in a circular movement, so that nothing is lost or created, and which, in a mechanistic sense, explain both the permanence of beings and the infinite diversity of nature, as well as the possibility of the transmutation of matter (theoretical justification of alchemy).

The Greek theory of elements is quaternary (water, fire, earth, air); that of India is quinary (emptiness, wind, fire, water, earth) with higher (six) or lower (four) variants; in the Far East the theory is quinary, but with different elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth). The quinary theory was an important innovation, introduced by Tseu Yen (ca. 336-280 B.C.), but the elements did not supersede the two principles (*Yin* and *Yang*) which remained the keystone of Chinese cosmology.

2. Certain Greco-Indian schools of philosophy criticized the theory of elements and tried to replace it by the atomic theory, much closer to modern theory. The attempt, which failed, is mentioned only in passing.

3. The Stoics and Aristotle followed the quaternary theory but doubled the element of fire. The former distinguished two sorts of fire: that of heaven (*pur teknikon*), which is ether, and that of earth (*pur ateknikon*). Like the Pythagoreans, they admitted the transmutation of elements as a consequence of the continuous change of things. Thus the *aer* or *pur ateknikon* is susceptible to transformation into igneous and luminous *aither* (cf. Cyril Bailey, *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus* [Oxford, 1928], and Jean Beaujeu, *Plin l'ancien, histoire naturelle II*, p. 123). They likewise admitted for the element of air a spiritual part, the *pneuma*, half-air, half-fire, indispensable to the maintenance of the vital activities in living organisms. Aristotle constructed a dialectico-logical theory of the four elements and the four qualities. He completes it, however, with a fifth element, *aither*, or pure fire, which is not of the same nature as earthly fires.

4. Galen adopted in large part the Aristotelian system. To the element of fire corresponds innate heat. Its origin is in the heart, compared to a hearth providing at the same time fire and smoke (dusky vapors, as it were, eliminated from the body by expiration). The temperature of the left ventricle therefore is necessarily considered higher than that of other parts of the body.

Relations between Man and the World

The Arabs kept the quaternary theory but added a ternary system (sulfur, salt, mercury) which was to be viewed with favor during the Middle Ages in Europe, by the Paracelsians, and on to the time of Robert Boyle.

5. The occidental Middle Ages accepted for the most part the Arab doctrines; for St. Thomas Aquinas the Aristotelian *aither* is "subtile air" confined to high altitudes. The theory of the four elements is also a basis for the distillations of Arnaud de Villeneuve (*De vinis*) and Raymond Lully (1235-1315). The latter submitted plants to a quadruple distillation. The first separated the couple air-water from the residual couple fire-earth. The second (using a double boiler) isolated air and water. The third, operating on the pulverized residue, dissociated earth from fire, which was generally mixed with water. A fourth operation gave a pure fire (oil) from which every trace of water (phlegm) had been eliminated. Thus was obtained the quintessence, the vegetal soul or fire, of plants. These attempts were continued by Basile Valentin (ca. 1413). The latter added to the sulfur, mercury, and salt of the Arabs a fourth spiritual element—the central fire or life principle (*arche*).

6. During the Renaissance, Paracelsus⁵ (1493-1541) was inspired by the Neo-Platonic doxology, imported from Constantinople by Gemistus Pomponius, Laetos, and Marsilio Ficino, and also by the Cabala and by alchemy. His apparently revolutionary notion of the three principles (sulfur, mercury, and salt) is in reality connected with the age-old quaternary doctrine. The *Tria Prima*, as a matter of fact, are but the terrestrial and chemical manifestations of fire, air, water, and earth. For example, the body of sulfur is fire, and there exists a perpetual cycle of exchange between elements and principles. The notion of philosopher's sulfur (*sulphur embryonatum*) contains the germ of the *phlogiston* theory.

7. In modern times the complexity of the earth element became evident (Van Helmont), while the fire element continued to be of great importance.

a) Let us recall that the Atomists and the Epicureans are the creators of the fire-matter theory, declaring that flame is an outflowing of miniscule bodies which, becoming less and less dense, are invisible but which remain perceptible through the sensation of heat, giving rise to the belief that combustible bodies either contain the fire element in their substance or are transformed into fire. This belief is prolonged in the notion of the fire

5. Cf. F. M. de Feyfer, "Paracelsus," *Janus*, 1941; Nooykass, "Die Elementelehre des Paracelsus," *Janus*, 1935.

element and its essence, phlogiston, basis of seventeenth-century physico-chemistry (Descartes, Lemery, Boerhaave).⁶ Boyle believed that the increased weight of heated metal came not from oxidation but from ignition through combination of fire with the metal through the wall of the crucible (1673). Lavoisier (1774) was to show the error of Boyle and the lucky predictions of J. Rey (1630).

b) In physiology Harvey and Descartes, despite their differences, believed like Galen in the fire element. "The element of fire resides in the heart. Each time a large drop of cooled blood reaches a ventricle, encountering the ardent heat of the fire principle, it expands and is vaporized so that, occupying a larger and larger space, it distends the ventricles, causes their walls to expand and the sigmoid valves to open, and flows into the arteries." This is Descartes's explanation of the emptying of the heart in diastole (cf. Chauvois, "Un Colloque: Harvey Riolan, Descartes," *Presse medicale*, 1955, n° 7).

"The heart is the tutelary hearth which contains and conserves natural heat and the elements of fire. . . . It gives back heat and the vital spirit to the chilled and exhausted blood of the veins" (Harvey).

Borelli had only to plunge a thermometer into the left ventricle of a living stag to show that the temperature of the heart, contrary to the opinion of Galen, is not higher than that of the liver, the lungs, and the intestines. Stenon was to prove that the heart is but a muscle like so many others.

In animal mechanics Borelli had demonstrated that the strength of a bird's flight is due to its pectoral muscles, which constitute one-sixth of body weight, while the human pectoral muscles represent but 1 per cent of its mass. This notion is taken up by J. B. Verduc (*Nouvelle ostéologie où l'on explique mécaniquement la formation et la nourriture des os: Avec une dissertation sur le vol des oiseaux et le nager des poissons* [2d ed., 1693]) and by Diderot (*Encyclopédie* [1772]). Nevertheless de Vivens (ca. 1742) still maintained that birds fly by virtue of the fire element, with which they are abundantly endowed, much more than through the action of their wings.

In pathology the physicist Rabiqueau (1753) explained as follows the death of his colleague Richmann, killed by lightning in St. Petersburg: "The pure fire forming the lightning united with the vital fire of M. Richmann, depriving him at the same time of air, so that there remained nothing but matter incapable of life."

6. Milton Kerker, "Herman Boerhaave and the Development of the Pneumatic Chemistry," *Isis*, March, 1955.

In therapeutics the particles of fire contained in lukewarm water were considered capable of augmenting the "vital force" and thus of eliminating the danger of burying a patient alive. So J. P. Brinckmann (1746-85) injected lukewarm water into the jugular vein in case of apparent death.

It took the discovery of oxygen to put an end to the phlogiston theory. After Lavoisier, heat and fire were separated, heat becoming a product of the degradation of kinetic energy (Mayer, 1842; Joule, 1843).

8. Air and water as elements did not long survive the fate of the fire element. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the word "gas" acquired its present meaning, and Lavoisier showed that the term "air" or its substitutes (vapor, elastic, or aeriform fluid) designates not an element but a state of matter. Air then appears as a mixture of which Van Helmont had identified one of the constituents (*sylvestre* or carbonic gas, 1640). Ascending in a balloon to 7,000 meters, Gay-Lussac (on the 29th Fructidor, twelfth year of the revolutionary calendar) gathered air and showed that its composition at high altitudes is the same as at ground level. Thus disappeared Aristotle's *aither* and St. Thomas' "subtile air."

The decomposition of water by Cavendish in 1766, interpreted by Lavoisier in the "water controversy," permitted the latter to show that water is a combination of two gases ("flammable air" and "vital air"). While the old elements were being eliminated from chemistry, new elements whose existence the Greco-Latin world had never suspected became known (gold, R. Boyle; carbon, Réaumur, Duhamel du Monceau, Bergmann, Scheele, Berthollet, Lavoisier).⁷

C. ANALOGY BETWEEN THE SOUL OF THE MICROCOSM AND THAT OF THE MACROCOSM

In ancient civilizations breathing was considered as the test of life itself, and the soul assimilated to the vapor which left the still warm blood and visceral cavity. Air, the soul of the macrocosm, also maintained the life of the microcosm. Respiration was thus the function uniting man to the cosmos and renewing his organic activities by the absorption of the vital breath (Greek *pneuma*, borrowed from the Egyptians, Latin *spiritus vitalis*, Indian *prāna*, Chinese *k'i*, Greek arteries and veins) which assured health; its stoppage determined the nature of illness (pneumatic pathology). A better impregnation of the organism by the vital breath facilitated the union

7. Clara M. Taylor, *The Discovery of the Nature of the Air and Its Changes during Breathing* (London, 1923); Nooykaas, *The Concept of Element* (Utrecht, 1933); J. Schraeter, "La Découverte de la composition chimique de l'eau," *Revue Ciba*, 1946-48.

Please enter my subscription to DIOGENES for _____ year(s) at the rate of \$4.00 per year.

I am already a subscriber but would like to renew my subscription for _____ year(s) at the rate of \$4.00 per year.

☐ Remittance enclosed

☐ Bill me later

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

BUSINESS REPLY CARD

No Postage Stamp Necessary if Mailed in the United States

THREE CENTS POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

5750 ELLIS AVENUE

CHICAGO 37, ILLINOIS

FIRST CLASS

PERMIT NO. 1239

Sec. 349 P.L. & R

CHICAGO, ILL.



of the organism with the cosmic and created, physically, a state of super-health and, psychologically, a state of ecstasy. Thus the extreme importance attached to respiratory techniques from the Pacific to the Mediterranean, which are the basis of the training of Japanese Zen-Buddhists, of Chinese Taoists, of Hindu Yogis, of Iranian soufis and the monks of Mount Athos, adepts in Hesychastic prayer. The pneuma was believed to accompany the blood and the humors, passing through the vascular system, which it animated with beats (pulsations) similar to respiration. Taking the pulse gave one an idea of the functioning of all organs (Egyptian, Chinese, Greek, Arab, and occidental pulsology). The Chinese compared the passage of the pneuma to the circular movement of the stars and calculated it with the help of numbers which represented not concrete distances but cosmological values. This hypothesis was rejected by the Greeks. "Circulation" being an attribute of the stars, the movements of earthly bodies could only be rectilinear and that of the blood comparable to the ebb and flow of the ocean (Galen), a notion which was to endure to the time of Harvey.

Greek pneumatic doctrine survived nearly two thousand years, and Galen remained an important author more or less in favor until the eighteenth century. The "animal spirits" of Harvey and Descartes, become in the following century nervous fluids and sap (Hoffmann), were not rejected by Western medicine until after Haller, Tissot, and V. Sommering; then medicine, having assimilated and surpassed antiquity (about 1816), was able to move forward again.⁸

D. MICRO-MACROCOSMIC CORRELATIONS

The identity of elements in the three terrestrial kingdoms permitted the establishment of classifications and correlations among minerals, vegetables, animals, and man; minerals had, until Linnaeus, been considered as congealed life, therefore as sexed and capable of reproduction and transformation. But as soon as the Chaldean *mathematici* had created astrology, that is, explained the determinism of earthly events by the movement of the stars, new cosmological connections between microcosm and macrocosm were established.

The idea of a correspondence sun-gold attracted attention toward lizards, which were believed to drink the light of the sun. Gerbert d'Aurillac

8. Cf. Ch. Lichtenhaeler, *Les Dates de la renaissance médicale: Fin de la tradition hippocratique et galénique* (1952); P. Huard and M. Wong, "La Notion de cercle et la science chinoise," *Archives internationales d'Histoire des Sciences*, 1956.

and Pierre des Vignes ground these animals with mortar and pestle in the hope of finding the essential gold of the sun's rays. Gold was also to be considered a specific for maladies of the heart because of the relationship sun-heart.

The relation seen by the Arabs among moon, silver, and brain gave theoretical basis to the treatment of "lunatics" and maladies of the central nervous system by silver salts (lunar tincture, lunar caustic), a practice still followed at the end of the nineteenth century.

The pre-Hellenistic Greeks, preoccupied as they were with causality and the successive chain of facts, were lukewarm toward these considerations, which they preferred to classify in vertical diagrams. The Chinese expanded them considerably. The Arabs made of the astrolabe a medical instrument and placed such importance on the influence of the stars that they paid closer attention to the state of the sky than to the state of the patient. The spread of "zodiacal men" shows the influence of these conceptions on men like H. de Mondeville and Guy de Chauliac. The plague, syphilis, and influenza (*influentia astrorum*) were, from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries, attributed to the conjunction of stars with comets and meteors. Knapp (*New York Medical Journal* [1878]) still supported this pathogeny of epidemics. For the Chinese the constituent parts of the world form a network whose single elements, taken in isolation, are of no interest: only the whole matters. Thus the idea of correlation between macrocosm and microcosm led to a very complex horizontal system in which organs, breath, humors, notes of music, the seasons, elements, points of the compass, stars, etc., were grouped according to norms which, although simply emblematic, were considered as essential and valid in politics, biology, or military tactics. The result is a unique order, born of civilization itself (M. Granet).

A. Forke (*World Conception of the Chinese* [1925]) has shown the extent to which mystic European biologists (Paracelsus, Agrippa de Nettesheim, R. Fludd, etc.) had proceeded in the Chinese fashion in manipulating solidarities and polyvalent equivalences in which they had vastly increased their repertoire without in any way augmenting the subject matter of science. J. Needham brought new supporting arguments to this thesis.⁹

E. EVOLUTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP MAN-WORLD IN THE OCCIDENT

The "great democracy of the being," that indivisible solidarity of all living organisms (Max Schuller) in which, thanks to macro-microcosmic con-

9. J. Needham, *Science and Civilisation in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954 and 1956), Vols. I and II.

ceptions, man was joined to gods, animals, and vegetables by his rational, sensitive, and vegetative souls, an idea common to China and to Greece, was broken by a series of important changes in occidental science, techniques, and personality structure.

1. The great discovery of the Greeks (fifth century B.C.), reason, "which owes but to itself the norm of its certitude" (Léon Brunschwig), isolated in the cosmos a part without a soul—"matter," which obeys a finality. Nature being intelligible (idea of progress), man is able to act upon her by knowing the causal laws to which material objects are subject and, consequently, to impose his will upon her. Thus appeared the "Promethean" spirit which was to impel occidental man to construct within the universe an artificial world, obedient to his aims.

2. Christianity, by establishing an absolute distinction between God, on the one hand, and the world, on the other, continued to detach man from the universe in order to attach him to God. The sacred aspect which paganism had externalized in nature becomes internalized in the heart of the Christian. And the "desacralized," "desymbolized" external world becomes for man a simple object available to his curiosity and his desire.

3. The scientific revolution of the seventeenth century led to a mechanistic schema of the world favorable to the extraversion of thought oriented along the myth of progress and liquidating the traditional feeling of man's dependence vis-à-vis the cosmos. He leaves its service to become its master. The cosmological conception of culture is ruined. There is a tendency toward the elimination of every mystic or religious factor, an eventuality which had never before presented itself throughout the course of history.¹⁰

4. The eighteenth century saw the first total scientific discovery (Lavoisier, 1777) valid at once for physics, chemistry, and human, vegetable, and animal physiology (Vendryès), and in the nineteenth century brought with it the notion of metabolic and geochemical cycles (carbon, nitrogen, sulfur, oxygen); the Darwinian conception of human origin; the knowledge of meteorology-pathology, showing close and multiple correlations existing among the three natural kingdoms. But these scientific notions in no case led back to a transcendence of macro-microcosmic realities. On the contrary, in biology man became again a "unique being" (J. Huxley). The three industrial revolutions—of steam (1760-1860), of electricity and the internal combustion engine (ca. 1884), and of the atom (ca. 1945)—led to an increasing mechanization of the world, in which the body and

10. Hall, *The Scientific Revolution, 1500-1800: The Formation of the Modern Scientific Attitude* (London, 1954).

the life of man himself are but collections of objects among so many others which must be classified, organized, and, above all, utilized (Ph. Aries).¹¹

5. The total separation of the microcosm from the macrocosm, a condition essential to man's power, presents, nevertheless, undeniable psychological difficulties. The future will show whether they can be easily surmounted. A return toward antique anthropomorphism can already be noted (a return which is not necessarily a step backward) in an attempt to find once more in cosmic unity, lost for so long a time, the relationship between the human and the natural order (Guillaume).¹²

11. *Histoire des populations françaises et de leur attitude devant la vie depuis le XVIII^e siècle.*

12. *Introduction à la psychologie* (Paris, Vrin, 1946).

THE VITAL DOMAIN OF
ANIMALS AND THE RELIGIOUS
WORLD OF MAN

According to Auguste Comte, whose extravagant statements are almost always meaningful, the whole of the physical and mathematical sciences, once integrated into positivist dogma, must become cosmology—or, more properly, he qualifies, geology, in the etymological sense of the word: the study of the earth, of the “human planet,” as the necessary environment “of all the higher functions, vital, social, and moral.”¹ Even astronomy should be no more than “the heavenly study of the human planet, that is to say, the knowledge of our relations with those stars that are liable to affect and destroy our destinies by modifying the conditions of the earth.”² His religion is focused on the world, not on the universe.

One cannot understand religion in general, and religious truth or error, save by stressing at the start the fact that, although it goes beyond the nar-

Translated by Elaine P. Halperin.

1. *Catéchisme positiviste* (Paris: Leroux, 1874), p. 97; English trans.: *The Catechism of Positive Religion* (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1891).

2. *Ibid.*, p. 119.

The Vital Domain of Animals and the Religious World of Man

row confines of Comte's positivism, it flows from the cosmos of the world, the historico-geographical domain of man, not of nature, as an ensemble of the non-temporal laws or laws of the universe, devoid of center, which interests science. Religions contradict the positivist and humanist limitations of Comte. But this contradiction, this transcendence, is intelligible only if we define that which is transcended; and, in order to understand this, we must go all the way back to animal psychology.

An animal species cannot be described solely in terms of anatomy and physiology; it is characterized quite as much by the "world" in which it lives. Its anatomy is the result of its formative instincts; its "world" depends, in short, upon those instincts. Moreover, "world" and organic anatomy are strictly linked, just as the formative instincts are linked with those that regulate active life in the environment. Outside its world, outside its ecological niche, the animal cannot live. E. S. Russell cites numerous examples of the extreme specialization in the world of certain species of animals.³ The anteater is typical: it establishes its funnel trap in well-determined places and is unable to devour its habitual prey offered directly. The prey must reach it under specific conditions—sliding along the length of its funnel.⁴

The stimuli that provoke animals must be rigorously defined. The sloth is sensitized to a very definite sound within the range of a half-tone—the sound made by its young when they are hungry. The young of the tinamou react to a particular whistle (the natural note "fa") and are insensitive to sharper whistle sounds. If the animal is artificially removed from its ecological niche, it immediately makes an effort to recover its world. People have taken for reflexes or for mechanical and meaningless tropisms what in reality is an animal's instinctive behavior as it seeks to re-establish its ecological norm. This does not mean, of course, that the animal is clearly aware of this norm but only that its activity has, in fact, an over-all theme. From this point of view, tropisms and reflexes are but products of the laboratory—artificial segmentations of a behavior the meaning of which is immediately apparent if one observes the animal in or near its natural environment, its *Umwelt*, or vital domain.

All animals are not strict "*Lebensspezialists*" like the anteater, but it must be thoroughly understood that even animals that appear to be living in the same world as man, like cats or domesticated dogs, are in reality in

3. *The Behaviour of Animals* (London: Arnold, 1934); French trans.: *Le Comportement des animaux* (Paris: Payot).

4. Bierens de Haan (cited by Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 116 [French ed.]).

their own *Umwelt*. Their interests are so different that they do not perceive the same things at all. There is nothing to prove that a dog, upon entering the same room we do, and one which is as familiar to it as to us, would perceive the tables, chairs, or pictures that we note. It has perceptions and reactions, that is to say, which embrace only those places where it can lie down comfortably, stretch out to the warmth of a fire, find a ball to play with. Other objects are perceived merely as indifferent masses.⁵

As we know, it was Von Uexküll who stressed and systematically studied the animal *Umwelt*, the world of perception being adjusted to the world of action, and the animal perceiving objects only as signals, props of instinctive "gnoses" and evocative of corresponding "praxia."

In man, temperamental variations—psychic settings, spiritual interests, profound or momentary beliefs and motivations—play the role that specific differences do in animals. When these factors vary, the structure of the world, or, as the Gestaltists say, "the field of behavior," varies as well.

Von Uexküll refers explicitly to Kant, to Kantian criticism and relativism. In the specificity of the *Umwelt*, of the vital domain, he sees a kind of concrete realization, an external exemplification—which is the condition of the mind and human knowledge according to Kant. We cannot attain the things within ourselves, since the forms of our sensible intuitions and the categories of our judgments determine the objects of our knowledge. The animal's world, the objects that exist for it, are determined by its specific nature. One cannot say that the animal "perceives" the world, if one uses the phrase "to perceive" to mean purely passive receptivity: it constitutes the world. We know that observation of the satellites of Jupiter provided the most striking and expressive confirmation of Copernicus' theory, which ceased, then, to be a point of view. The pattern it described was literally seen in the system of Jupiter, and it was easy to imagine the sun in the place of the planet and the earth as one of the satellites. Similarly, experiments on the animal *Umwelt* yield a kind of visible pattern for Kant's "Copernican" theory.

In summary, as we have seen, Auguste Comte wants to bring man back to his biological *Umwelt*, to his vital and social domain of behavior. Religion, for him, must turn away from the universe of an overly speculative science. It perfects the organization of instincts and of human feelings and of that which concerns these in the world. A "religion" of the same order could easily and even logically have been taken from Kantianism,

5. Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 29 (French ed.).

The Vital Domain of Animals and the Religious World of Man

at least from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, since the two philosophers are in agreement in condemning metaphysics and pure speculation.

However, we know that Kant, less narrow than Auguste Comte, condemns only the dreams of visionaries of the Swedenborgian type and childish efforts to portray the Beyond, Paradise, the status of the Soul in its immortality, etc. But he does not attempt to limit man, at least not in the religious order, to the world here below, to a quasi-animal *Umwelt*. Religion "within the limits of pure reason" is not the ritualized humanism of Auguste Comte. Pure reason merely shuns what the Christian dogmas of realist metaphysics inclose. But religion "within the limits of pure reason" is still Christianity, which has simply been purified. After the "purification," Kant turns again to the Fall, Evil, Incarnation, the Trinity.

In general terms, Kant is right in his opposition to Comte's positivism. Man goes beyond his animal *Umwelt*, his vital domain, and he is only a religious animal on this condition. But Kant was greatly lacking in elements of comparison. He thought only of men, and of Western man, of the religion of the West, and of Western values.

Today, after the progress of comparative religion, and also what might be called "comparative humanism," we can make a much closer study of the manner in which the religious visions of the world emerge from the animal *Umwelt*. During the sixteenth century, humanism was the study of the Greeks and the Romans, the contrast between classical antiquity and modern humanity. Historians and ethnologists have broadened comparative research by studying Eastern and Far Eastern peoples as well as the so-called primitive ones. The American school has developed more impartial comparative studies by placing all the "samples of civilization" on the same plane and by attempting to describe Western civilized society in the same way that the ethnologist describes the Zuni, the Comanches, and the natives of the Trobriand Islands. Finally, with Portmann, Tinbergen, Lorenz, and Armstrong, we realize that we must go even further and that authentic comparative studies must deal with a comparison between the habits of men and those of animals.

Even if one were to find in the end that man is essentially different from animals, it is all the more necessary to begin the comparison at the level of zoölogy, for there is nothing to prove that the most advanced human cultures do not retain certain limitations or canalizations that go as far back as zoölogical origins. In his sickly misanthropy, Swift amused himself by imagining a civilization based upon the peaceful and highly socialized instincts of horses. D. H. Lawrence wonders what the metaphysical and

religious intuitions of a superbly solitary being like the shark would be.⁶ In a profound fantasy Clarence Day⁷ speculated on what human civilization would look like if man were related to the felines and not to the simians and if the development of cerebral hemispheres had been superimposed upon the ferocious instincts of the tiger and the panther. Human culture would have been "sublime in the manner of Assyrian art, as gracious as the rompings of young cats." The value that man attributes to freedom of speech or to freedom of thought is more understandable, he remarks, if we remember that monkeys also, in their forests or in the zoo, "chatter" endlessly. So much importance is attached to words that we preserve them, accumulating them in vast libraries, and that God, for us, is the Logos or the Verb. The feline men would be more likely to claim, first of all, the right of free individual combat, and the Fang, rather than the Logos, would become the supreme God.

If one could detect the manner in which the transition from the animal's "vital domain" to man's world occurs, one would come quite close to being able to define the essence of religion and, consequently, its truth. Man is "a religious animal," thanks to the fact that he is an animal without *Umwelt*, or an animal who has extended his vital domain to a total spiritual world. There is an obvious correlation between these two facts. Any rigid positivism will always encounter the objection that the animal is a more orthodox "positivist" than is man. Positivist religion is a contradiction in terms, for it attempts to bring man back to an *Umwelt*, whereas humanity and religion consist in going beyond the *Umwelt*. But in what specific way does man go beyond it?

The difference between the animal's vital domain and man's world does not consist in the fact that the animal is strictly limited to its sensations, to the spatial figure or temporal spatiality that these sensations determine. The animal's "positivist" orthodoxy does not go that far. For animal as well as human awareness always consists in going beyond the brute observable in order to apprehend meanings or what resembles meanings. There is nothing more "metaphysical" in the etymological sense of the word than instinct. The brute sensation is never more, for the instinct, than a key, thanks to which the animal has access to more profound knowledge, to behavior strangely in harmony with the most intimate nature of things.

6. *Kangaroo* (London: Heinemann, 1955).

7. *This Simian World* (New York: Knopf, 1920).

The Vital Domain of Animals and the Religious World of Man

Of all Bergson's theses, none was more criticized than that of the instinct-intuition. It became the ritual among Bergson's commentators to point out the error that he supposedly committed after Fabre concerning the Sphex and the precision of its stings. However, none of these theses is more incontestable; none by and large describes phenomena that are more indisputable. Whether or not the Sphex is a skilful surgeon, it is perfectly clear in any case that any bird that nests or emigrates is a skilful breeder and traveler, for whom the slightest sensorial signs reveal a whole world; it is evident that any bee is a skilful reaper and an even more skilful breeder; that any animal that breeds and hatches demonstrates thus that, in one way or another, it "knows" the embryology of its species and the anatomy and physiology of its partner. In this connection man is an animal, and it is amusing to note that the scholar who ridicules Bergson because the latter considers the Sphex a skilful surgeon knew, for instance, how to have children long before he was able to acquire a complete science of sexuality and embryology.

Of course an animal is not aware of the total meaning of its acts; but such acts would not be possible if the animal's fragmentary awareness did not go beyond crude observation and if the egg, for instance, merely represented a rounded form for the animal and not "an object to hatch" or "an object to take back to the nest." The objects of its *Umwelt* are signals, challenging patterns. They are not the mechanical causes of its behavior. An animal does not function; it acts. Animal psychology has revealed as clearly as possible all that is limited, that is philosophically "overrated" in the principle of causality, that so-called universal and fundamental principle which fails to include so many domains—that of microphysics, that of organic and of instinctual development.

If the animal is just as much a "metaphysician" as man, why then is it not religious? An initial difference between the animal's vital domain and the human world is that the former bears upon instinctive "valences" but not upon "values." The domain is but an organic extension. It comprises either territory, properly speaking—the exclusive property of the individual animal that occupies it and for which the animal feels an instinct of preservation as for its shelter and its own organism—or the home range, that is to say, an area regularly occupied but not safeguarded against others. A characteristic fact demonstrates this very well: the markings made by bark peelings, excretions, secretions, sometimes even by special organs, thanks to which the animal spreads its own organisms over its vital do-

main.⁸ The domain of animals contains neither pure stimuli nor meanings or values, properly speaking, but only psychobiological valences, that is to say, signal-aspects or challenging characteristics of vitally important acts. The animal aims at organic final conditions rather than ends, as we understand the term. The valences of an animal are closely linked to its organic type and even to a precise phase of its typical development and behavior. For the seagull the egg is successively (a) an object to hatch, (b) an object to take back to the nest, and (c) an object to eat. "If the seagull could formulate concepts and use words, it would have not one term to denote the egg but several to be used in accordance with different situations: 'to eat,' 'to take back,' 'to hatch'—in short, it would have word-signals and not word-symbols."⁹ Linguists used to believe they could discern analogous developments among the "primitive" peoples and in the so-called primitive languages. To denote very important things and beings—game of major importance, for example—a great number of specialized words designate the "squatting" animal, the animal "on guard," the "attacking" animal, the "fleeing" animal, etc. But this is actually an entirely different thing. In the eyes of the Eskimo, the seal always remains the seal, despite the variety of its names. It has an identity, a status, and even a mythical history quite independent of the concrete ups and downs of the hunt and the capture, and these dominate the happenings.

It is possible that what occurs is that, for the civilized hunter quite as much as for the primitive, a kind of momentary regression abolishes, in the heat of action, the customary structure of the human world, and that a sort of vital fellow feeling is established between the hunter and his game. Most hunters claim that they "love" the animal they kill more than do the members of a society for the protection of animals. And this fellow feeling is spontaneously stylized by magic. The Eskimo ritually sings to the seal he is about to kill, and probably in all sincerity: "I am the friend of the seals." At the end of his account of an afternoon of trout fishing in the Canadian forest, White adds enthusiastically that he spent his day "with the gods." Magic and mythology are certainly closer, as we shall see, to that which the animal *Umwelt* must contain than are philosophy and philosophic religion.

But the decisive step is taken with the passage from signal to symbol,

8. Cf. Sourlière, *Vie et mœurs des mammifères* (Paris: Payot); English trans.: *The Natural History of Mammals* (New York: Knopf, 1954); and Hédiger, "Instinkt und Territorium," in Masson, *L'Instinct*.

9. Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 221 (translated from French ed.).

The Vital Domain of Animals and the Religious World of Man

as Cassirer has shown, or from valence to value. We are in the human world from the moment that meaning and stable values, detached from human physiology, appear. Then all that is needed is a facile and almost instantaneously achieved intellectualization for the world of stable values to denote a God, a supreme Being as a correlative. Ethnography shows that it is probably through mythology, in the broad sense of the word, that is to say, through a personification of values detached from organic valences, that man made the transition from the metaphysics of animal perception to religious metaphysics.

One could describe this transition more precisely as an inversion of the role of the consciousness and—correlatively—of the brain. Man has a larger brain than even the most intelligent of animals. But size and even cerebral improvement in themselves explain nothing. It is easy to conceive of an animal more intelligent than man, that is to say, capable of more ingenious inventions in order to achieve its final conditions, to act according to valences in its vital domain—but remaining, nonetheless, in a vital domain, without acceding to the world of values and meanings, i.e., to the human level. The perfecting of the brain would intervene only as an occasional cause of inversion, in the way that dissolution of the immersed part of an iceberg, which normally should determine only a progressive sinking of the whole, sometimes causes a sudden reversal. In all living beings, in men as well as in animals, consciousness—or the brain—plays the role of intermediary between the rest of the organism and the external world. In the animal this intermediary is at the exclusive service of the organism; thereafter, the external world is but an *Umwelt*, a place of signals and of organic valences. In man the direction of the circulation is inverse; if we make an exception of the cases, actually rare, in which the human conscience is subordinated to a very powerful organic instinct—grave danger, extreme hunger or thirst—the values seem to him to dominate the world. His consciousness apprehends and recognizes them as independent realities; and his organic acts are spontaneously subordinated to them. The ritualism of the instinct, or that which can be thus designated, is merely a pseudo-ritualism. Man alone respects the world and its suggested meanings, which he upsets at his own risk and peril. He asks permission of the game to kill it; he asks the sea permission to navigate it, the earth permission to cultivate it. Neither animal nor man is limited to the visible world. But for the animal what lies behind the visible world is still the totality of the specific themes of its organic life. For man it is a Power, an autonomous Meaning.

This is why the diverse human consciousnesses, born in distinct and

separate organisms, nevertheless meet again in a hyperbiological world. This is why we can speak, converse, exchange ideas, even with men of another race and culture. This is why we can understand their sciences, arts, religions, and philosophies with difficulties that are merely superficial. These difficulties are due to the physiological, psychological, and social canalizations of a unique spiritual world. Social animals, on the contrary, can come together and understand each other only according to their specific *Umwelt* and because of the rigorous adjustment of the stimuli-signals that they emit. They correspond to each other only in the way that the outline of the crystalline lens corresponds to the optic cup, in the way that gastrulation corresponds with the formation of the neural plate or the male and female organs. The unity of the animal world is correlative with the unity of instincts. The swallow's instincts do not belong to the individual swallow; it merely shares them. In the same way, the swallow embryo is developed through participation in the memory of the swallow species. To the extent that man is still an animal, his instincts do not belong to him either but to the human species. What Kant was willing to say of ethics alone, we can also say of values and of all spiritual meanings—that they belong to "reasonable" beings and consequently can be shared by all. As Max Scheler rashly but truthfully remarked, this social intercourse would occur even if man were to find himself one day in the presence of a parrot or an elephant that not only was intelligent in its specific world but that had achieved reason, that is to say, the perception of values and not valences in the world.

It is true that the diverse cultures of humanity constitute a kind of intermediary stage. They seem to attempt to re-establish a limited *Umwelt* in the social order. Every culture has its stereotypes, its rituals, its basic personalities, its particularized values, as arbitrary as instinctive valences. One observes the closest connection between the description of animal instincts made by psychologists who study comparative animal ethology and the description of cultures by anthropologists and sociologists. Beliefs and social attitudes play the role of instincts; stereotypes and myths play the role of gnoses and of instinctual valences. But, since human cultures are always evolving and are constantly borrowing from each other, and since they are more or less chosen as much as they are endured, they rarely hinder a vision of the universal world that goes beyond the particular social worlds, the importance of which the sociologists, moreover, tend to exaggerate.

The transition of the valence to the value of the signal in the sense of symbol is the essential moment which explains the inversion of the role of the consciousness. From a tool at the service of the organism, which it was,

The Vital Domain of Animals and the Religious World of Man

it becomes the perception of a truly external world and, through it, of a transcendental world. From organic art, from the instinctive aesthetics of animals to the art of human culture; from implicit anatomical knowledge manifested by the instinct to scientific knowledge; from the parental instinct to maternal love; from organic technique to conscious technique; from the pseudo-ritual of specific behavior to the authentic ritual of human behavior; from the vital domain to the universal world—the transition is always the same, and it is possible to define with precision the nature of this transition or this inversion.

It is more difficult to know what has been its moving power. It is not improbable that the inversion began thanks to technique. The experiments made by Guillaume and Meyerson proved that this inversion was already taking place in the chimpanzee, at least under experimental conditions. For the chimpanzee the stick is not merely an organic extension; it is not only an "outstretched arm" but already an autonomous technical tool. Indeed, the animal is capable of using correctly a square stick attached at the top and making it swing in order to reach out toward a fruit. When it accomplishes this action, its consciousness is dual: subordinate to the organism that covets the bait but also subordinate to the very nature of the tool. If the animal, however, remains an animal, this is doubtless because it does not know how to gather together and capitalize on its occasional techniques by piling up a reserve of sticks—above all, by accumulating them in the memory and affixing a name to them. Perhaps all that would be required would be an entirely quantitative increase of cerebral energy or perhaps certain modifications of social life. In any case, once the accumulation of techniques has begun, and once it is fixed by the fundamental technique of linguistic symbols, inversion in other categories is easily conceivable.

To prove this, all one has to do is to imagine a *contrario* the almost immediate universal regression that the disappearance of all technique would produce among civilized men. Maternal love itself is only possible—going beyond the level of parental instinct and extending it—because even children who are distant in space remain present in the minds of their parents through the technique of communication, the mail, for instance, and because the distant countries where they reside are described daily by newspapers and radio. From the placental feeding to the infant's suckling it is possible not to go beyond biology and the *Umwelt*. To cable a child in America while continuing to think of him and to love him presupposes the notion of an external world structured by a technique that is independent of biology. Similarly, without accumulated technique, art immediately

becomes once again pure and vital: dance or spontaneous song, scarcely discernible from the dances and songs of birds.

It is often said that the animal adapts itself to the world, whereas man subdues the world and adapts it to his needs. This is factually true, particularly if one considers the general results. But this factual truth disguises a grave error of law, or perhaps even a basic error. In reality it is man and not the animal who yields to the world, who recognizes the very truth of the world.

Moreover, despite certain appearances, religion is no more a vital tool than is science. The values and meanings are more objective than the valences and the stimuli-signals of the instinct. Man has escaped the tyranny of his biological nature because he has complied with nature and has taken the time to acknowledge natural laws. It is precisely because man has complied with the norms of visible and invisible nature that he has been able to create culture in all the orders of values.

The animal is capable of learning, and any apprenticeship implies modifications in the vision of the *Umwelt*. Psychological experiments on animals have definitively demonstrated this. The animal becomes acquainted with a labyrinth. It learns to realize its biological purpose by passing through obstacles, by emphasizing the important, the valence of such and such a detail which it had overlooked at first. Its success or partial success, whether or not it is achieved accidentally, fixes its attention upon an object in stressing it as means in the field of end-means. The *Umwelt* is momentarily modified by virtue of the animal's needs, but it remains an *Umwelt*. The animal's apprenticeship modifies it only temporarily, because of the animal's physiological and psychic state and its temporary and fortuitous conditionings. The stable nucleus of the animal world is provided by its physiology and its instincts; the variable part depends upon its needs, on the one hand, and, on the other, on the fortuitous configuration of the environment which it is obliged to take into account in order to achieve its ends. For man, the stable nucleus of the world is provided, on the contrary, by the world itself, by the very meaning and value of objects and beings. The modulations and the distorted perspectives of human needs are never more than modulations. And this is the reason why man does not easily understand that the animal is not simply in the world as he himself is. This is why the notion of the *Umwelt* is a scholarly one, elaborated by specialists in animal psychology.

Let us imagine man in a very unusual situation—carried off by accident, for instance, in a stratospheric plane or an aerobus, without knowing how to pilot. He would seem as bewildered and awkward as an animal

The Vital Domain of Animals and the Religious World of Man

outside its ecological niche. His gestures would be ridiculously unadapted to the real situation, because they have been adjusted to the phantom of his customary world. Science and technology have had to accustom us very gradually to an enlargement of our world in order for the cabin of an airplane to become a familiar object to us. But we must not conclude from this that the difference between man and the animal is merely one of degree. Despite the ineptitude of a bewildered man, and despite his state of emotional regression, he remains spiritually within the universe, or within a universal world, even if he is psychologically faced with a situation that does not correspond to his habits. And for him even a state of bewilderment is an occasion to ponder the totality of the world. It is the essence of a world of values, as distinguished from a world of valences, to be, in principle, one and total, even if it is in fact partial. The eye of a mammal actually sees the stars, the Milky Way, the nebula of Andromeda, as well as the human eye, but man alone is concerned with the stars and names them, because he sees them as the basis of the world's unity and totality.

Hence, whether he imagines stars as gods or as dead souls, whether he visualizes the Milky Way as a mythological goddess or as the Saint James's passage, whether he studies the planets by scientific and astronomical methods, or whether, as idealist philosophy, he sees in them well-founded phenomena or the ideas of an absolute intelligence—the difference is not an essential one, provided that, at the same time, he ponders the totality of the world. It is hard to believe that there can exist religious adepts, scholars or philosophers stupid enough to perform the prescribed rites, calculate or make technical deductions without vaguely possessing the meaning of the actual universe in its entirety. Such stupidity could only be momentary; from this standpoint, if there is a difference between the scholar and the religious man, it is the scholar who tends to run the risk of regression. Positivism is a more natural temptation—or less antinatural—in matters of science than in the religious domain.

Auguste Comte was mad to think that his absurd interdictions would stop the scholars or prevent them from concerning themselves with stellar physics. But he was still more deluded to believe seriously that he could restrict the religious spirit to the closed domain of human life and that he could make men run indefinitely like rats within the confines of the closed labyrinth of his "subjective synthesis." In humanity religion is precisely the sign that man possesses a total vision of the world. Its subjectivity can never be truly acknowledged. And rightly so, for despite the puerility of its particular forms, religion is more objective, more true, than the experienced "positivism" of the animal.

THE BARBARIANS¹

The aim of this paper is to try to define the concept of the Barbarian and, at the same time, to show some aspects of the role that peoples entering into this category played in the course of history. We shall use the term "barbarian" in a very loose sense and will forego altogether the study of the history of the word itself. We know that it denoted successively the non-Hellene, the non-Roman, the non-Byzantine, the non-Christian, and, finally, even the non-Italian.² In spite of numerous secondary applications and even misapplications of the word, it is quite clear, and has been asserted more than once, that in its primary and principal meaning the term is the antonym of "civilized" and is, therefore, for all practical purposes synonymous with "uncivilized"; it has a distinctly pejorative flavor.

The fact that in its earliest, Greek, application "barbarian" simply meant

1. With insignificant alterations this paper is printed as it was read. As in most lectures, at some points considerations of entertainment have had to prevail over the exigencies of strict scholarship. A number of aspects—for example, the very important economic background of the Barbarian—could not even be mentioned, and the material adduced to sustain a given assertion is but a fraction of what is available. In spite of these, and possibly other, shortcomings, I feel that the following pages give a fairly accurate picture of what I consider the problem of the Barbarian. I hope to examine it one day with full apparatus.

2. The history and the different applications of the word have been studied time and again. The following publications may be chosen from among the relevant literature: Julius Jüthner, *Hellenen und Barbaren: Aus der Geschichte des Nationalbewusstseins* ("Das Erbe der Alten," Vol. VIII [Leipzig, 1923]); Kilian Lechner, *Hellenen und Barbaren im Weltbild der Byzantiner* (Munich, 1954); Rodolfo De Mattei, "Sul concetto di barbaro e barbarie nel Medio Evo," *Studi... in onore di Enrico Besta* (Milan, 1939), IV, 481-501.

The Barbarians

"foreigner," together with some other considerations, would suggest that this pejorative flavor is due to chauvinism: Country A tends to regard Country B as barbarous and vice versa. Superficial proofs could easily be found to warrant such a theory: the Romans were barbarians for the Greeks; China and Europe regarded each other as barbarians. However, to accept such proofs would lead us very much astray. A closer examination of, for example, Chinese-European relations would soon reveal if not a mutual esteem at least the recognition that each civilization is what the Germans call a "*Hochkultur*," a word which, for want of a better expression, we could translate "major civilization." For the Chinese, India was never a country of barbarians, nor was Persia, oddly enough, for the Romans or the Byzantines. This is rather surprising because for some time the Persians were for the Greeks the Barbarians par excellence—as far as the actual use of the term went. Later, even the denomination ceased to be applied to major civilizations; the Romans ceased to be called "barbarians" by the Greeks. It is interesting to note that Ammianus Marcellinus will not apply the term to the Persians, and this in spite of the protracted hostilities between them and Rome.³ It can be said that, notwithstanding the occasional use of the term for one or another of them, no major civilization considered another major civilization as barbarian (i.e., as uncivilized). The concept "barbarian" cannot be explained by simple chauvinism.

There is another fallacy, more dangerous because less easily detectable, that we must dispose of. Since the word "barbarian" has been recognized as almost synonymous with "uncivilized," must we not assume that the major civilizations regarded as barbarian all those that did not come up to their standards? The answer to this question must be an emphatic "No." The objectively low level of a civilization does not necessarily cause it to be called "barbarian." Even in modern usage, really backward populations of, say, New Guinea or Darkest Africa are never referred to as Barbarians. We call them, rather, "savages." Nor do we regard as barbarian despised or ostracized sections of a greater community, such as Negroes in the United States or in South Africa. Even more interesting is the fact that aboriginal populations pushed back, exterminated, or annihilated by an expanding human community do not enter, as a rule, into the category of Barbarians. The pre-Roman population of Italy, the Celtic nations of Europe, and the Indians of America exemplify well this statement. It would thus seem—and I am putting this forward as a provisional

3. Cf. Wilhelm Ensslin, *Zur Geschichtsschreibung und Weltanschauung des Ammianus Marcellinus* (Klio, Beiheft XVI [Leipzig: Dieterich, 1923]), p. 33.

conclusion—that to be branded “barbarian” requires attributes other than the possession of an inferior civilization. A barbarian must also be aggressive; he must be dangerous.

Peoples answering to these requirements are very often called, both in history and in myth, the peoples of the North. They are the Barbarians, and they are the subject of this paper. On the historical level they include, roughly speaking, and going from west to east, the Germanic tribes; the so-called nomadic tribes, such as Huns, Sarmatians, Avars, and Hungarians, who were known to Europe; Hiung-nu, Juan-juan, and Uigurs, who were known to the Chinese; Turks and Mongols, who were known from one end to the other of the great Eurasian continent; and the forest peoples living to the north of China, such as the Kitan, the Juchen, and the Mandju, to mention but a few among the great number of names known to us.

We must now examine the main characteristics of the relationship between these peoples and the major civilizations by which they were surrounded.

It is regrettable, although not surprising, that this relationship must be viewed mainly from the standpoint of the “civilized,” on whom we must depend for most of the written documents which form the basis of our research. For the earliest period we have to rely chiefly on Chinese sources, and not only because they are older and richer than those of European origin; the relationship between civilized and uncivilized is governed by a conception of the world which the Chinese evolved earlier and with greater clarity than the Europeans or which, at least, has been better preserved by them and handed down to us. It will be seen that, as far as the Barbarian problem is concerned, Eastern and Western conceptions show great similarities.

As far as our subject is concerned, the world conception of the major civilizations is egocentric: they form the center of the world. They represent—in fact, they are—humanity. Even during its decline the Roman Empire was considered in the West, by Romans and Barbarians alike, as the only possible political framework. China is the Central Kingdom, the “Flower of the Center,” surrounded by the four species of Barbarians, the Barbarians of the Four Seas.⁴ The Barbarians, although often related to animals, form, nevertheless, part of humanity—humanity taken in a large

4. A magistral picture of the relations between Chinese and Barbarians is given by Marcel Granet, *La Civilisation chinoise* (Paris: La Renaissance du Livre, 1929), pp. 86 ff.; English trans.: *Chinese Civilization* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1951).

The Barbarians

sense. The Barbarians are also actors in the human drama that can almost be conceived as a dialogue between the two species which, though opposed to each other, are complementary. "Inside are those who don the cap and girdle [the Chinese]; outside are the Barbarians," says the Chinese historian,⁵ to indicate that everyone is in his proper place.

War between Chinese and Chinese, that is to say, between the Civilized and Civilized is, theoretically, at least, impossible; it should never happen. If it happens, there is no glory in it for the participants. How different when it comes to combating the Barbarian! This is a manly sport. Victory over the Barbarian is the justification of the ruler; it is his foremost duty. The attacking Barbarian is guilty of rebellion. Is he not referred to as a "slave" even though in fact he is free? Wars are like the illnesses of the nations—according to Eustathios of Thessalonica—but a war waged by a Barbarian against Byzance is as if an illness were to defy the omnipotence of God.⁶

The greatest difference between the Civilized and the Barbarians is a difference in comportment: the latter have no manners. They act *κατὰ κόσμον*, without propriety, in disorder.⁷ "The rules of conduct," so we read in the Chinese *Book of Ceremonies*, "allow the Civilized to keep his feelings under control . . . to follow the inclinations is the way of the Barbarian."⁸ In a civilized state everything is order; among the Barbarians everything is disorder. They have no proper rule of conduct; therefore, they are unreliable, "irresolute as rats."⁹ They are ignorant. Salvianus of Marseille, by no means blindly prejudiced against the Barbarians, nevertheless considers them as "men void not only of Roman but of human wisdom."¹⁰ "They are called Barbarians," says Albertus Magnus, "who are not ordered for virtue by law or government or the discipline of any other system."¹¹

A true man knows how to dress; he knows what is becoming to his rank and state. "Well ordered are the garments and headgear," lauds an in-

5. Édouard Chavannes, *Les Mémoires historiques de Se-ma Ts'ien, I-V* (Paris, 1895-1905), III, 401.

6. Twelfth century; cf. Lechner, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 87.

8. *Li Chi*, ed. Couvreur, I, 215.

9. Cf. Édouard Chavannes, *Dix inscriptions chinoises de l'Asie centrale d'après les estampages de M. Ch.-E. Bonin* (Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1. sér., XI, II, 1902), pp. 193-295, 220.

10. *De gubernatione Dei* v. 8 (MGH. AA. I, p. 56).

11. *Ethic. Lib.* vii.

scription of the T'ang dynasty of China.¹² The Barbarians now button their garments to the right, as the Chinese do, and not to the left as they used to in their barbarous ignorance. They wear their hair "dishevelled, hanging on their shoulders,"¹³ unless, thanks to the virtue of the ruling Chinese dynasty, they renounce the custom. Shame on him who like Rufinus, minister of Arcadius, though Roman, wears barbarian clothes! The poet Claudius Claudianus seems to choke with indignation in reporting this fact.¹⁴ If around A.D. 400 some young bloods of Constantinople tried to show off in Barbarian costumes, the law soon put an end to this unseemly behavior.¹⁵ In 1274, almost three centuries after the Hungarians have settled in Hungary, the Pope makes bitter reproaches to King László IV for wearing his hair and his clothes in the fashion of the nomadic Barbarian Comans.¹⁶

I have endeavored to give a picture, sketchy though it be, of what we could call the "ideal Barbarian." Since we described him as highly unreliable, we may not be surprised to find a considerable discrepancy between him and the real, historical Barbarian. The characteristics of the two coincide on a certain number of points; for example, on their greed. "Know therefore," says the Emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, in his instructions given to his son, "that all the tribes of the north have, as it were implanted in them by nature, a ravening greed of money, never satiated, and so they demand everything and hanker after everything and have desires that know no limit or circumscription, but are always eager for more, and desirous to acquire great profits in exchange of small service. And so these importunate demands and brazenly submitted claims must be turned back and rebutted by plausible speeches and prudent and clever excuses."¹⁷

It is for the reasons expounded by Constantine that Barbarians like to receive presents, a tendency which Romans, Byzantines, and Chinese are unanimous in deploring. They also have a curious way of bringing

12. Inscription dated A.D. 640. Cf. Chavannes, *Dix inscriptions* ..., p. 218.

13. On this expression see James Russell Hamilton, *Les Ouighours à l'époque des Cinq dynasties* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1955), p. 92.

14. *In Rufinum II*, ll. 78-85, ed. Platnauer ("Loeb Classical Library").

15. Cf. Ferdinand Lot, *Les Invasions germaniques* (Paris: Payot, 1945), p. 168.

16. Cf. *A magyar nemzet története*, ed. Szilágyi, III (Budapest, 1896), 562.

17. Gy. Moravcsik (ed.) and R. J. H. Jenkins (trans.), *De administrando imperio* (Budapest, 1949), p. 67.

The Barbarians

presents. Tanguts and Uigurs, to "help" China, are in the habit of providing her with horses. For this service they are well compensated. Not only do they receive a much higher price than would be just for the sorry nags they present, but their traveling expenses are generously reimbursed; they are entertained on a lavish scale; and they themselves receive various gifts, pieces of silk and such like. To the scandal of the historian, they even behave improperly—they get drunk at the banquets and, with arms linked together, sing songs of their homeland. Millions were spent each year on the horses brought by the Barbarians, to the great distress of the officials. The emperor Ming-tsong (926–33), however, justified the practice by saying: "When the Barbarians bring tribute to the Court, China grants them presents; this is a normal function for an Emperor." The historian adds that thereafter sheep and horses of the Barbarians came in unceasing flow to the court.¹⁸

How applicable to the situation is the complaint voiced some four hundred years earlier by Salvianus of Marseille: "We must pay to the Barbarians taxes. The fiends sell to us the very use of light. That we have breath in our bodies at all, we owe to a trading-transaction. O evil fate of ours! How low have we sunk! And for this we give thanks to the Barbarians, from whom we buy ourselves for cash. . . . Further, we ourselves bring yet more ridicule upon us, calling the gold we pay a gift. We call that a present which is a purchase price, and indeed a purchase price for a very bitter and unhappy lot."¹⁹

One can see, in fact, that it is possible to find a *modus vivendi* with the Barbarian. Very often he wants nothing other than material security, food, some money. Although the moralist may condemn such action, the rulers, whether Roman or Chinese, have regular recourse to Barbarian armies, either to combat other Barbarians or to help against other "civilized" rulers. The role of Germanic soldiers in the late Roman Empire is too well known for us to enlarge upon it here.

As a rule there is no concerted action on the part of the Barbarian to destroy the existing order of the world; all he wants is to change sides or simply to take advantage of the facilities offered by the civilized. He is quite willing to settle down, to till the land, to occupy military or administrative posts. On the whole, he seems reasonable. With people like this it is possible to come to some sort of understanding. They can be

18. Cf. Hamilton, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

19. *De gubernatione Dei* vi. 98–99 (MGH. AA. I, p. 83).

absorbed, assimilated, or annihilated; they can be played out against one another, bought by presents or promises. Constantine's *De administrando imperio* is full of good advice on how to take advantage of their naïveté, how to rebut the demands "of these shiftily and dishonorable tribes of the north."²⁰ They may be dangerous opponents or awkward partners, but their evaluation of things is not basically different from that of the civilized. One could say, even, that they play the same game and respect the rules. "Inside are those who don the cap and the girdle; outside are the Barbarians," but it is possible to move from the cheerless outside to the friendly warmth of the hearth where happy people sit at their fleshpots. One could even speak of "tame" Barbarians, almost happy with their lot of unhappiness, mitigated as it is with the hope of their being admitted in due course into civilized communities. These tame Barbarians gather round the borders of the civilized world as moths gather round a lamp. But it would be mistaken—and how many rulers have fallen victim to this mistake!—to consider them as the true representatives of Barbarism. They are, to use wartime jargon, the "collaborationists" among the Barbarians, those ready to accommodate themselves to, and take maximum advantage of, the existing circumstances. They form, as it were, a protective crust around the major civilizations.

What is beyond this protective layer of half-assimilated, tame, Barbarians—the Civilized hardly knows. He is, in fact, inclined to think that there is nothing behind it. Who would bother to measure the depth of "the country of the horses and the thieves," as the Chinese call it?

It happens, however, that hitherto unknown tribes burst forth from behind the known Barbarians. They menace the order of the world; they disturb the equilibrium; they level Barbarian and Civilized. They spoil the game. When they appear, the Civilized shrieks with indignation and invokes rules set up by himself precisely to keep the Barbarians at bay—rules which the latter do not respect. One cannot play cricket with people who think that the bats are clubs.

There is a considerable difference in the attitude of the Civilized toward the two types of Barbarians which, for want of a better distinction, we could call the "ordinary" Barbarian and the "absolute" Barbarian. In Europe the Germanic tribes represent the former type; Huns, Hungarians, Mongols, etc., exemplify the latter, which, almost everywhere, appear as mounted archers. The balance we have seen established between the civilized peoples and the ordinary Barbarian is completely disturbed with the appear-

20. Ed Moravcsik-Jenkins, p. 71.

ance of the latter. The absolute Barbarian has a long-term policy; he cannot be permanently neutralized with presents or tributes. He claims universal recognition and feels that he has a mission to fulfil. Very often he is Barbarian "by divine right."

"When, above, the blue sky and, beneath, the brown earth were created, between the two were created the sons of men. And above the sons of men were set my ancestors Bumin kaghan and Istemi kaghan," read the Türk inscriptions of the Orkhon.²¹ Having described the decadence of the Türk power, the inscriptions continue: "Above the God of the Türk the holy land of the Türk thus decided: the Türk people will not come to nought they said; it should become a nation they said; and they raised my father Ilteris kaghan and my mother the katun Ilbilge." In a letter addressed to the Emperor of Byzance, the kaghan of the Türk calls himself "chief of the seven races and lord of the seven regions of the world."²²

Attila, king of the Huns, had in his possession the sword of God (of Ares, Priscus tells us), found miraculously and giving him power over the whole world.²³

The consciousness of a divine mission is particularly apparent in the case of the Mongols, for whom our sources are so much more detailed. The seal of the Mongol khans bears the inscription *Mongke tngri-yin kücün-dür*, "In the force of the Eternal Heaven."²⁴ In his letter to Pope Innocent IV, the great khan Güyük calls himself "the strength of God and the ruler of all men." In the same letter we read: "We by adoring God, in the strength of God have destroyed all the earth from the East to the West. And if this were not the strength of God, what could men have done?" Speaking of various eastern European nations, Güyük continues: "Because they did not obey the word of God, the command of Chingis khan and that of the Kaghan [Güyük], and having held a great council, killed our messengers,

21. Eighth century A.D. My translation, which endeavors to follow the original as closely as possible but does not claim strict philological accuracy, is based essentially on the inscription of Kül-tegin, as edited by V. Thomsen, *Inscriptions de l'Orkhon déchiffrées* (Mémoires de la Société Finno-ougrienne, Vol. V [Helsinki, 1896]), and by S. E. Malov, *Pamjatniki drevnetjurksko pis'mennosti* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1951), pp. 19-55.

22. Theophylactus Simocatta vii. 8, ed. de Boor, p. 257. A translation of the whole passage relative to the Türk can be found in Édouard Chavannes, *Documents sur les Tou-kiue (Turcs) occidentaux* (St. Petersburg, 1903), pp. 246-49.

23. Ernst Doblhofer, *Byzantinische Diplomaten und östliche Barbaren* ("Byzantinische Geschichtsschreiber," Vol. IV [Graz, 1955]), p. 51.

24. For the most recent study of this seal see Antoine Mostaert and Francis Woodman Cleaves, "Trois documents mongols des Archives Secrètes Vaticanes," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, XV (1952), 419-506, esp. pp. 485-95.

God commanded them to be destroyed and gave them into our hands. Else, if God had not done it, what could man do to man?"²⁵

This is not the voice of the Barbarian asking humbly for admittance into the empire. He who speaks like this cannot be expected to show consideration for a myth—the myth of the inherent superiority of the Civilized.

Suidas transmits an interesting anecdote. When in Milano, Attila saw a fresco representing Roman emperors seated on golden thrones with slain Barbarians at their feet. He then ordered another fresco to be painted, representing him seated on a throne, with Roman kings carrying sacks on their shoulders and pouring gold at his feet.²⁶

The true Barbarian—as represented by some of the nomadic peoples—is conscious and proud of his state. I repeat: he is not a beggar asking for protection from and offering his services to the Civilized. He deliberately declines, in fact, to be civilized, being no longer a Barbarian by necessity but one by choice. The Orkhon inscriptions, in describing the period of decadence of the Türk Empire, exclaim against those nobles who "abandoning their Türk titles accepted Chinese offices and for fifty years put their strength at the disposal of the Chinese emperor."

John of Plano Carpini records that the Mongols "are most arrogant to other people and look down on all, indeed they consider them as nought, be they of high rank or low born."²⁷ The Türk kaghan "Me-ch'o," according to the Chinese *Annals*, "proud of his conquests, despised China and was bursting with pride."²⁸

We have said that the true Barbarian had a long-term policy—that he consciously represented some ideal, some conception which should be studied from the political, economical, and social points of view. I shall limit myself here to a discussion of the social aspect of the Barbarian concept, which, in my opinion, is the most interesting of the three.

The rise of a nomadic Barbarian empire, such as that of the Huns or the Mongols, can in many respects be considered a revolution, a rising of the

25. Quoted in the *Cronica* of Salimbene (MGH. SS. XXXII, p. 208).

26. Quoted by Amédée Thierry, *Histoire d'Attila et de ses successeurs, I-II* (Paris, 1856), I, 213.

27. *Istoria Mongalorum* iv. 4. I quote from the excellent translation made by "a Nun of Stanbrook Abbey," published in *The Mongol Mission*, ed. Christopher Dawson (London and New York: Sheed & Ward, 1955), p. 15.

28. Stanislas Julien, "Documents historiques sur les Tou-kioue (Turcs)," *Journal asiatique*, II (1864), 424. The fact that the quotation comes from a secondary source is, for our purpose, unimportant. I had no opportunity to check the translation against the original. In any case, similar statements abound in Chinese sources.

poor, disinherited classes of a society. It is easy, in such a situation, to read into the past political and social currents and tendencies proper to our own time. To avoid projecting into a different epoch problems and tensions which are alien to it, to avoid easy and false analogies, one must abide more firmly than ever by the testimony of the texts and resist their supplementation with hypotheses, however tempting.

We have clear evidence that the rise of the Türk Empire (sixth century) began as a revolt of the metallurgist Türks against their Juan-juan masters. In the inscriptions of the Orkhon which have already been quoted, the ruler of the Türks, speaking in the first person, gives a poignant picture of the difficult process of bringing prosperity to a people of paupers:

"I did not reign over some rich people, but I took the lead of a people vile and wretched, [of men] with no food inside them and on their out-sides no clothes. We discussed the matter with my younger brother Kül tegin. . . . For the sake of the Turk people I did not sleep at night and did not rest by day. Together with my younger brother Kül tegin and two dignitaries we worked [?] to exhaustion. . . . The dispersed people came to me on foot and naked. In order to raise the people I led twenty-two campaigns. . . . Through the command of Heaven and because I was fortunate, I led to life the dying people, I clothed the people that was naked, and I made the poor rich. . . ."

The great Barbarian empires were not national states. They were multi-lingual and were not held together by a common religion. They represented, at their inception, the reunion, under strong, individual leadership, of disinherited, often half-starved populations. The "Secret History of the Mongols" says repeatedly that Chingis "united the peoples living under felt-tents."²⁹

Even at the height of their power the peoples of Barbarian empires remained astonishingly poor. The Huns who made Europe tremble were—so we are told by Ammianus Marcellinus—accustomed to endure hunger and thirst from their cradles and wore their clothes on their backs until "they had been reduced to rags and fallen from them bit by bit."³⁰ Plano Carpini exhibits admiration mingled with horror for the diet of the Mongols. "They have neither bread nor herbs nor vegetables nor anything else, nothing but meat, of which, however, they eat so little that other

29. Text dated 1240, first edited by Erich Haenisch, *Manghol un niuca tobca'an* (*Yüan-ch'ao pi-shi*) (Leipzig, 1937).

30. Translated by John C. Rolfe for the "Loeb Classical Library" (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1935-39) xxxi. 2, 4-5.

people would scarcely be able to exist on it." In the winter "they boil millet in water and make it so thin that they cannot eat it but have to drink it. Each one of them drinks one or two cups in the morning and they eat nothing more during the day; in the evening however, they are all given a little meat, and they drink the meat broth. . . . When they are without food, eating nothing at all for one or two days, they do not easily show impatience, but they sing and make merry as if they had eaten well."³¹

Even their rulers lived very modestly. The Byzantine ambassador Priscus noted at a banquet that Attila was served from wooden plates, drank from a wooden cup, and ate only meat. He was dressed with simplicity.³²

The sparseness of Barbarian life and the elementary social justice which seems to have characterized it were not without attraction to the less fortunate sections of the civilized community. Priscus records a long discussion he had with a Roman who chose to live with the Huns and who proffers very bitter charges against Roman justice, which does not compel the law-breaking rich or the mighty to pay a fine but is ruthless toward the poor, who have no means of defending themselves by suborning the judges.³³ One could consider his presentation of the facts as a sort of *apologia pro vita sua* were it not for other corroborating evidence, for example, Salvianus of Marseille's terrible indictment of fifth-century conditions: "The poor are spoliated, widows sigh, orphans are trampled upon. Things have deteriorated to the extent, that many—and often people of noble origin and good education—take refuge with the enemy, so as to avoid death under the pressure of the persecution by the state. Among the Barbarians they search for the humanity of the Romans because among the Romans they cannot endure the barbarous inhumanity. And though they differ in custom and language from those among whom they take refuge and even though they may be repelled by the evil smell of the Barbarians' bodies and clothes, they prefer to suffer among the Barbarians from the strangeness of their way of life rather than to suffer under the Romans from horrible injustice."³⁴

Other instances could be quoted in illustration of the Civilized praising the Barbarian. Philosophers in Rome and China, in Byzance and in France,

31. Dawson (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 15-17.

32. Doblhofer, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

34. *Op. cit.* v. 21 (MGH. AA. I, p. 108).

The Barbarians

were often tempted to contrast favorably the Barbarian with their own decadent civilization. Still more often they use the Barbarian as a convenient dummy masquerading in their own favorite political ideas. A curious example is the apocryphal letter of Chingis, said to have been sent by him to the Taoist Ch'ang-ch'un:³⁵ "Heaven has abandoned China owing to its haughtiness and extravagant luxury. But I, living in the northern wilderness, have not inordinate passions. I hate luxury and exercise moderation. I have only one coat and one food. I eat the same food and am dressed in the same tatters as my humble herdsman. I consider the people my children. . . . At military exercises I am always in the front, and in time of battle am never behind. In the space of seven years I have succeeded in accomplishing a great work and uniting the whole world in one empire."

Such favorable utterances, whether based on personal observation of advantages offered by Barbarian societies or produced by wishful thinking, are but rarely applied to the true Barbarian. This idealized Barbarian is always identified with Germanic tribes in more recent European political thought or literature, from Montesquieu to the German Nazi writers. The divergence between the two types of Barbarian is strongly emphasized by Montesquieu:

"The nations in the north of Europe conquered as free-men, the people in the north of Asia conquered as slaves, and subdued as others only to gratify the ambition of a master. . . .

"Hence it follows that the genius of the Getic or Tartarian nation has always resembled that of the empires of Asia. The people in these are governed by the cudgel; the inhabitants of Tartary by whips. The Spirit of Europe has ever been contrary to these manners, and in all ages, what the people of Asia have called punishment those of Europe have deemed the most outrageous abuse.

"The Tartars who destroyed the Grecian empire established in the conquered countries slavery and despotic power: the Goths, after subduing the Roman Empire, founded monarchy and liberty."³⁶

There are no horrors that have not been attributed to the true, the aggressive, Barbarian. They are indeed the "detestable race of Satan."

35. E. Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources, I-II* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1910), I, 37. Cf. also Arthur Waley's remark in *The Travels of an Alchemist: The Broadway Travellers* (London: Routledge, 1931), p. 160.

36. *The Spirit of the Laws*, trans. Thomas Nugent (London: Bell, 1914), p. 280 (XVII, 5).

"They are terrible in person," we read in Matthew Paris on the Mongols, "furious in aspect, their eyes show anger, their hands are rapacious, their teeth are bloody and their jaws ever ready to eat the flesh of men, and to drink human blood."³⁷ Cannibalism is but one, though admittedly an important, peculiarity ascribed to the true Barbarian. It stigmatizes him as the Unclean, it puts him outside the bonds of the civilized world. There is a standard set of abominable crimes of which the Barbarian is accused. Huns, Avars, Hungarians, and Mongols are all described in similar terms; often whole passages are simply copied from ancient writers and applied to the people most recently emerged from the "northern wilderness." Who are they? Where do they come from?

"It would seem," writes Chateaubriand, "that they have heard something from the South that calls to them from the North and from the East. What is their name, their race, their country? Ask this of the Heavens, which alone must show them the way, since they are themselves as unknownst to man as the place from which they come and where they are going. They come: all is prepared for them; the trees are their tents, the deserts their paths. Would you know where they have made camp? Witness the bones of slaughtered sheep, pines, broken as if by lightning, forests in flames, and plains strewn with ash."³⁸

Are they perhaps the Lost Tribes of Israel, the people of Gog and Magog shut up by Alexander or some other hero behind precipitous mountains, locked behind iron gates? But who can be sure that they are safely imprisoned? At any moment they may break out to destroy the order of the world. No atrocities can be exaggerated; no adjectives are too vile to describe him who dares to challenge the Civilized, the guardian of world order. The Barbarian living on the border of the civilized world and modestly asking for admittance may be inferior, even despicable. But he is as it were a necessary evil; he is needed in the great drama of history to give the cues to the Civilized. But woe betide him who refuses to take part in this play! There can be no place for him on earth, no honor for him in history.

The entry of the true Barbarian upon the stage is the signal for the finale: "And when the thousand years are expired, Satan shall be loosed out of his prison. And shall go out to deceive the nations which are in the four quarters of the earth, Gog and Magog, to gather them together to

37. *Chronica maiora, Additamenta*, ed. Luard ("Rolls Series"), VI, 77. Trans.: Giles, III, 451.

38. *Les Martyrs*, VII (ed. Garnier Frères, p. 128).

The Barbarians

battle: the number of whom is as the sand of the sea."³⁹ But even the eschatological appearance of the Barbarian must end in ignominy; he is doomed to failure, given up to destruction: "Yea, the Lord will answer . . . I will remove far off from you him who comes from the north and I will drive him into a land barren and desolate . . . and his stink shall come up, and his ill savor shall come up, because he has done great things."⁴⁰

39. Rev. 20:7-8.

40. Joel 2:19-20.

INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA

If there is one well-established commonplace, self-evident and completely reliable, it is the difference between information and propaganda. Any honest man knows that in our times information is indispensable. It is, indeed, a positive acquisition, and to know each morning what is happening in China or the decisions of our own government is one of those advantages that distinguish us from men of earlier days. Moreover, Alfred Sauvy has shown us that information is the key to democracy. There can be a valid democratic way of life only if the people are correctly informed on the political, economic, and social questions which the democracy, as sovereign, must decide. This, too, is part of our self-evident truth. And if information is, by nature, completely honest, unadorned, and clear, then propaganda, we know, is falsehood, desire for power, Machiavellianism, crooked in intent. This reassuring contrast enables us, as men correctly informed, to sleep peacefully and, it goes without saying, to be invulnerable to propaganda.

But, when we examine the problem more closely, we run into difficulties. We can point out at the start the impossibility of giving a clear definition of propaganda at the present time. Every author who writes about it offers his own account; every shading is represented, from the extreme of "everything is propaganda," including the Mass and primary school, to the other extreme that claims for propaganda no specific characteristic, therefore no existence. I will not venture along these paths in quest of a

Translated by Elaine P. Halperin.

Information and Propaganda

definition that would separate us further from our object, but I must remind the reader that the areas are not plainly delimited.

In 1949 the United States Congress, having studied the government's information services, concluded, after hearing numerous reports, that it was unable to distinguish between information and propaganda. This is not the frivolous opinion of hasty politicians. In 1922 Walter Lippmann, in his classical work *Public Opinion*, presented theses on information very much akin to those supported by Sauvy. Little by little he abandoned hope of the possibility of disseminating true information and, in 1939, on the brink of war, he acknowledged that propaganda and information were singularly confused.

We will grant those who insist upon good, serious, documented, honest information the difficulties involved. It is quite true that it is difficult to find a corps of competent statisticians, suppress secret diplomacy, obtain the publication of complete and clear budgets of a nationalized or a large private enterprise; but this is not the problem. All the difficulties connected with establishing correct information are based upon circumstances beyond our control. Even in regard to the free flow of information—a facet to which Americans are most attached and which seems to them to be the key to the problem of information—the difficulties are great but not insurmountable.

The only point which to me seems serious is the following: in the opinion of most writers, when difficulties concerning the organization of information are resolved, everything will be resolved. This is a dangerous illusion because actually nothing will be resolved. The fundamental problem regarding information resides elsewhere, within the close relationship between information and propaganda, which cannot be separated from one another. Furthermore, we must first of all accept a few facts about propaganda. For example, propagandists have for a long while realized that a lie is not good for their purposes, that "truth pays," that propaganda must be based upon facts. We must also note that there is collusion between the propagandist and his target; that the latter (usually unwittingly) provokes the act of propaganda, which therefore is not objective in character but is achieved by the psychological collusion of opinion.

Current propaganda is a little more subtle than the kind we customarily fortify ourselves against and which we judge with composure.

We can rapidly pass over the easily ascertainable fact that the means of propaganda are the same as those of information: material means (news-

paper, radio, television, movies, lectures) but also psychological means, since one must be able to "pass on" information—it must be made known and in such a way as to capture the public's attention. What good would a fine information service do if nobody read its compact and boring pamphlets, if nobody listened to the learned disquisitions on the radio? Even more important is the task of convincing the listener that the information is fair and credible. Every means of persuasion must therefore be utilized. Actually, information that limits itself to a mere exposition, presented objectively with all the dryness of bare facts, would reach practically nobody and would weary an audience immediately. Indeed, one must always take into account the reality of the individual one addresses. Who is this man that we want to inform? He is, first of all, a man who has little time and much work to do. He can become informed only during his moments of leisure. And those whose profession it is to be informed know how much time it takes and how difficult it is merely "to keep up to date." To take a very small, concrete example: it takes at least two hours a day to read and completely digest the contents of an informative newspaper like *Le Monde*; and still one cannot claim to be sufficiently informed. What man has two hours a day at his disposal for this purpose. And what man will subject himself, after work, to the additional fatigue thus incurred? Information, therefore, must be condensed, absorbable in capsule form; but then is it truly information? Moreover, this information must be presented in a pleasing, seductive, and arresting manner. Balance sheets, statistical analyses, comparison of sources. Come now! The tired man requires a pleasing formula, a striking account that seems to him to synthesize a great deal of information. And, what is more, it must be easily assimilable, since serious information presupposes in the reader a considerable fund of prior knowledge. It is not enough to know how to read. A complete knowledge of history, geography, politics, economy, is necessary. Otherwise the information means nothing at all. Only a man who begins with a relatively large fund of knowledge can understand what he is being told.

But it is not merely a matter of knowledge; intellectual development is necessary as well: a capacity for synthesis and above all a well-trained memory. These are not natural gifts. A man who is not trained to this kind of work cannot be accurately informed. And even those who should have an adequate memory are apt to show unfortunate tendencies in this regard. Quite recently, on the subject of people's republics, we watched our intellectuals seriously assert the exact opposite of what they had said

Information and Propaganda

a few months before—not even alluding to their former stand and demonstrating that there is frequent loss of memory. Yet there can be no information without a sustained memory on the part of the listener. The informed must possess such qualities that the organization of an honest, scrupulous, truthful body of information can have only one effect: to point up the differences between men. Far from contributing to democracy, this inevitably leads to a separation between those who really understand political and economic problems and those who are so much more ignorant that the information is all the more effective because nothing enables them to assimilate themselves to it. And if one must pitch information on the level of the man who, after five or six years, has forgotten all that he learned in primary school, if one has to spare him an intellectual effort that he is unable to make, if this information has to penetrate indirectly—then is it still information? And where exactly is the boundary between propaganda, a massive affirmation of simplified facts, and information made up of general formulas, elementary themes, over which the reader has not the slightest control or power?

I know very well that I will be told: "Everything depends upon the intention of the man who directs the operation. If he wants to 'influence' the public, then it is propaganda; if he is attempting to seduce or direct, then it is information." Such purely subjective distinctions seem evanescent to me. Who can say what lies in the heart of man? Who can say whether the attitude of this man is constant or whether he varies in his intentions? And let us not forget the ever pertinent truism, "Hell is paved with good intentions."

Even the purest information is not necessarily free from a wish to influence. It is natural that the state, for instance, should want to make known its accomplishments. It is natural for a government to want the public to understand its motives in reaching a decision. Let us suppose that a government, in adopting a measure, does so because it believes it to be good, just, and beneficial to the country. Yet, in our times, this government can rule only with the approval of public opinion. This is one of the triumphs of democracy. But the public is not aware of the motives that guided the government; in order to inform opinion correctly, the government must explain the real nature of its decisions, give its reasons, show why it believes the decision to be a fair one. Even if we place ourselves on the level of information, and if we are convinced that the government has no intention of influencing the public, nevertheless the task of keeping

the public up to date, of providing it with the elements it needs to form a judgment, would inevitably seem to amount to a *pro domo* harangue. And indeed how can we expect that a government that believes a certain measure to be good will not attempt to share the reasons for its decision with the public? One can readily believe that a government has a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of the situation than an ordinary citizen; therefore, if the citizen were given the facts relating to a problem, he might tend to share the government's opinion. But would this not constitute propaganda, since the diffusion of certain facts definitely modified the citizen's opinion and led him to adhere to the government's policy?

We must go even further. When a government restricts itself to spreading information about its accomplishments, isn't this necessarily a glorification of its work? Yet isn't this indispensable? The public has to know about an accomplishment in order to judge it properly. But doesn't the mobilization of all informational services with a view to disseminating news about a certain decision give this decision an emphasis, an esteem, a forcefulness that brings us singularly close to propaganda? Isn't emphasis on an endeavor because it is a governmental one another means of influencing public opinion? The same is true even of quite neutral problems. For example, in the United States the Department of Agriculture maintains a highly developed informational organ for the purpose of explaining decisions and enlisting the co-operation of the mass of farmers. But it soon becomes apparent that this informational device is actually propaganda. The Department of Agriculture is very important in the opinion of the public; it also has means of indirect propagandizing throughout the entire country, although it was not originally created in order to laud or win support for certain measures but merely to explain the reasons for them or their consequences. Yet at present one cannot get along without this kind of psychological intervention. How many perfectly sensible economic measures have failed merely because of a lack of public information! Thus, information is by definition a distortion of public opinion. But where and to what extent does the transition from information to propaganda take place? Moreover, opinion itself, through modifications and elaboration, can transform into propaganda what in the beginning was information. Lyautey is an interesting case in point. He was very clever at utilizing information for all his undertakings in Morocco; he gave his achievements an indispensable publicity, knowing the importance of the psychological factor. However, one must concede that he did not make

Information and Propaganda

propaganda. Moreover, the global structures of propaganda were not yet so well known in his era. Yet with the aid of the information and the pictures he spread, public opinion established a kind of myth, which is one of the remarkable characteristics of propaganda. Had there been no information about Lyautey's work, there would have been no Lyautey myth. The latter is a product of information. And yet this myth is comparable in every way to those created by pure propaganda.

The influence of information must be viewed from another angle. Actually, if honest information is to bear fruit, it alone must reign. All propaganda must be eliminated if the public is to be truly educated. Of course there will be state propaganda (which must have the wisdom to limit its intervention to a purely informative service—to accept the control of enlightened public opinion). There will also be foreign affairs propaganda as well as propaganda about individuals. Indeed, it is not possible to permit really honest information to compete with one or several types of propaganda. First of all, since we know that propaganda always states facts and always appears to be information, we must ask: How will the public differentiate between information and propaganda? Which of two contradictory versions of the same fact carries with it the assurance that it is purely objective? One has absolutely no means of judging, no reason to accept the truth which the honest informant gives his audience. Moreover, propaganda employs psychological methods of influencing; it attempts to predetermine a decision; it involves one in a current of thought and violates both conscience and will, while information must respect freedom of choice and belief. The man who informs honestly must say: "Here are the facts, believe them or not as you see fit." And so from this point on the struggle is not an equal one: propaganda will always triumph over information.

Finally, experience teaches us another advantage of propaganda: the use of the myth. We must have no illusions; when facts are presented in all their brutality and nakedness, and when, in contrast, a mythical, expository system is presented, man spontaneously chooses the myth and refuses to acknowledge reality. Our so-called realistic era probably abounds in myths to a greater extent than any other since the beginning of historical times. Information, therefore, cannot achieve its ends as long as propaganda is at work. Why is it that when the state (for it alone, in the last analysis, can either perfect a widespread and independent information service or else guarantee and support a private enterprise providing free information) disseminates honest information, men will accept the free play of

propaganda which makes a mockery of an honest endeavor? If the real facts as they are presented are denied by the propaganda of a party or of a foreign country, they are no longer accepted as facts. Wherever there is propaganda, information, if it is to survive, must utilize the same weapons. It must engage in a struggle against the inaccuracy of the facts proclaimed by propaganda. But to engage in battle on these grounds is to begin another kind of propaganda, for it no longer suffices to say, "Here are the facts"—they have to be proved, and the individual must be reached and convinced: the very things propaganda has attempted to do. Any kind of propaganda, therefore, forces the informant to engage in counterpropaganda. If one wishes to avoid this conflict and preserve independence, objectivity, the dispassionateness of information, then all kinds of propaganda must be forbidden. Strict control must be exerted over the press, the radio, and so forth. This would call for a rigorous censorship. Only controlled information could come through—information devoid of trends and influences. In other words, the guaranty that information would have its full educational effect would rest on authoritarian measures. But can one guarantee truthful information under a system of censorship, when its free flow seems to be precisely the key to its very nature?

Up to this point we have come up against the impossibility of clearly distinguishing between propaganda and information. But there is another kind of difficulty which jeopardizes the objectivity of even the most honest kind of information. Information must transmit facts and only facts. It must acquaint the public with what is happening. So we have to ask ourselves the question, "What facts?" And these two words involve us in a labyrinth of difficulties. The man in charge of information is in the same position as the historian; the facts that are brought to his attention are but a small part of those that actually occur. The historian working in archives knows that the document he has in hand is but the survivor of many—one thousand or ten thousand—which have disappeared. The texts that have disappeared might contradict, complement, minimize, or enhance the one he has in hand, but we will never know. It is equally certain that all the monuments commemorating some historical event have disappeared, and consequently the event has disappeared with them. Yet, of the millions of events that occur in the world every day, only a few are brought to the attention of the public information services. The reason for this is merely that the great majority of facts have not been recorded.

Furthermore, we must not believe that facts which have been collected

Information and Propaganda

are more objectively important or significant than others. Many essential facts which might have had enormous repercussions are not known, while entirely trivial ones are brought to the public's attention. For example, accidents or murders are given a good deal of space, although they have no objective importance. On the other hand, a fact like the rapid reduction of infant mortality in North Africa between 1918 and 1936 was practically unknown even to the people in charge of information. It was only around 1935, when this phenomenon became widespread, that anyone took notice of it. Yet, from the start, it was a decisive factor the importance of which we can evaluate only today. Similarly, when a reporter travels abroad and sends in his information, we can be sure, without questioning his good intentions, that what he sees is less important than what he does not see. Monuments, architecture, receptions are less significant than the standard of living. But it is impossible to evaluate the standard of living on the basis of a few schematic data. We know how difficult it is to do so in our own country, in view of the great divergence of opinion on the subject. How, then, obtain accurate data about other countries? Similarly, cultural manifestations are less important than the prison system, concentration camps, police methods, etc. But in every country in the world all these are strictly outside the realm of information. We must realize that often chance plays a large part in the access one has to information, to say nothing of the essential facts which are deliberately camouflaged in every country. But there is also a dual decision that the informant must make. At the start he obviously is responding to the peculiarities of his profession. Really to know facts about a given country or a category of phenomena, one must be a specialist. A man responsible for spreading information would tend to stress the angles peculiar to his profession; he would, for example, gather information that had meaning for him but not for others; or he might not see certain events or phenomena and would perceive what he himself had to transmit only from a single perspective, from a very limited point of view. Furthermore, it is difficult not to consider the fact closest to one as the most important. Here again we make the same mistake that history does when we attribute the same importance to the French Revolution as we do to the entire history of Egypt or the whole of the European Middle Ages. It is obvious that French events are more important than others in the eyes of a French observer because they are closer to him. Therefore, even under an honest system of information, French opinion would be fed above all by French reality. Yet this gives rise to rather serious difficulties: for instance, the Frenchman's conviction that the inter-

national importance of France is always great. Inversely, it is regrettable that American newspapers devote such scanty space to information about France.

Doubtless one might reply that these two shortcomings of objectivity could be eradicated by a plurality of informants, by pooling all world information, by elaborating a complex and coherent system of information. There is a good deal of truth in this, but, besides the extreme difficulty of setting up such an organization, I do not believe that it would really overcome the difficulties we have outlined.

Let us go even further. The informant gathers facts, a considerable number of them. Daily cables filled with thousands of items of information pile up on his desk. It is impossible to feed them all to the public. To transmit all the facts brought to his attention is not the task of the informant; once again we must compare him with the historian. All the documents in an archive must necessarily be published; but this is not history. Only specialists will know how to make use of the published documents. Similarly, if the informant publishes all the information on his desk, only specialists who spend all their time on politics, economics, and social problems will profit by it. But we must not forget that all of public opinion—the average public—must be informed. Consequently, the informant must select the facts and decide which ones he will transmit and which he will ignore. He has to use his judgment, just like the historian. What should he keep? The most significant facts, the most important ones—but in relation to whom? The richest people?

The historian knows only too well the difficulties of selection. Yet the informant's position is more difficult for two reasons. First, inasmuch as the historian knows the sequence of events, he can attribute greater importance to some of them because of their consequences. But the informant does not know the sequel of what he reports. Second, the historian is guided by a kind of consensus that has evolved in the course of an event (this consensus can be dangerous and can be a source of error, but it exists); the informant, however, is at grips on his own with entirely first-hand knowledge of an event.

And after he has chosen, more or less wisely, the facts which he will bring to the public's attention, he runs up against a second difficulty: how should he present these facts? All on the same level, in the same way, giving them equal importance, so that it will be entirely up to the reader to select and establish his own scale of values? Should information be a kind of daily dictionary in which the articles are alphabetically classified? Obvious-

Information and Propaganda

ly, this is out of the question. Besides, despite appearances, this would not constitute true objectivity; one would be caught in the following dilemma: either to present facts of unequal importance as if they were all alike, and thus falsify reality, or to establish a hierarchy of facts—emphasizing certain ones and giving them a prominent place. If the scale of values corresponds precisely to reality, then the informant would be respecting reality. But it is not possible to be objective in establishing a scale of values or in classifying facts. The difficulty arises simply because the informant is a man and cannot function mechanically. There is no assurance that his decisions would be valid.

Finally, we run into a third difficulty: what level of analysis should satisfy us in regard to information? This is a very serious problem, not only for information, but also for the social sciences, politics, and economics as well. Should we merely mention the most general facts, national or even international in scope? Should the phenomenon of macroeconomy, macropolitics, be a subject of information? Actually, as soon as such a phenomenon is observed, we perceive that it has deeper roots, that it relates to local facts, to economic or political circumstances of a more limited scope, to fortuitous events. Should one, then, aim at this deeper level of microeconomy or micropolitics? But sociologists are immediately aware that it is difficult to stop even there, since all social phenomena go back to the individual. It is the individual who must be studied, the individual case that must be examined; only after one has gathered a good deal of information about individuals can he draw general conclusions. And if one does not go as far as to collect information about the individual, at what level should he stop?

This problem of levels of analysis has another angle. We perceive in the social domain as well as in the physical that what is correct at one level of importance becomes incorrect at another. In probing one level of analysis, it becomes apparent that the global facts observed at a different level dissolve and do not correspond to reality. Without even interpreting facts, informants can transmit radically different aspects of a same phenomenon merely because they have chosen a different level of analysis.

Thus, whether it is a matter of the selection of facts, of their respective classifications, of the importance attributed to them, or of the level of analysis in regard to a phenomenon—it is always the informant who decides. He has no *a priori* method, no universal criterion, no scientific framework. While information is supposedly objective (under the most favorable circumstances, where there is no deliberate wish to falsify facts, no systematic interpretation), actually it is subordinate to the subjectivity

of the informant. We know that our subjectivity is at the mercy of our presuppositions, our prejudices, our pre-established attitudes. Lenin is doubtless right when he states that in the bourgeois, capitalistic world all the facts are interpreted, quite unconsciously and unwittingly, according to bourgeois ideologies. And to his claim that the deliberate workings of Marxist interpretation rectify one's vision of the facts, the only refutation is to argue that one is confronted with two opposing interpretations of reality (neither of which, it is certain, corresponds to reality) and that one chooses between them for ideological reasons alone. But to believe that in selecting facts the informant has not the slightest desire to orient, educate, or influence opinion is to picture him as superhuman. He thinks he is telling the truth and indeed he will respond to some truths that seem self-evident. In all the serious newspapers or news reviews one easily discerns a few of these truths, shared by a great number of readers. By coincidence, the informant's prejudgments are precisely those of his audience.

We often hear it said that the best way of combating propaganda is to disseminate correct information. Just as a truthful account dissipates error, so the clear and courageous statement of reality is the best weapon against the fallacious arguments of the propagandist. We must acknowledge, albeit with all the reservations of the ideas we have just presented, that there is some truth in this statement; only "some" truth because, from an entirely different point of view, we must admit that the existence of information is a necessary prerequisite of propaganda. Indeed, in order for propaganda to exist, there must be some reference to current political and economic realities. The dogmatic, historical argument is only indirectly effective as propaganda, its true power residing in the interpretation of events. Propaganda operates only when opinion is already aroused, troubled, or oriented in a certain direction by political or economic events. It is grafted upon an existing psychological reality—not a permanent one, but rather a reality whose immediacy is produced by the event. Moreover, these psychological realities do not last long; they have to be maintained, kept alive; they give rise to public opinion by virtue of the fact that they are prolonged and kept alive. Yet public opinion is precisely the broad foundation of propaganda. If no public opinion about politics or economics exists, no propaganda is possible. This is why the propaganda of most ancient countries was addressed to those circles that had to do with political life, not to the masses who were indifferent to such problems. And why were they indifferent? Because they were not informed.

The masses will become interested in political and economic problems,

Information and Propaganda

in the great ideological debates that relate to them, only if there are mass media of communication by which information can be disseminated. But it is then, too, that propaganda can become widespread. The best arguments used by propaganda will derive from the facts that information has given to the public. We know that the most difficult people to reach are the peasant groups, who are the most refractory mainly because they are the least informed. Through analysis of rural groups it has become plain that propaganda begins to have its effect precisely when information has been disseminated, when the facts are known, and concern about certain problems has been aroused. If I do not know that there is a war going on in Korea, that North Korea and China are Communist, that the United States has occupied South Korea, or that the United States of America represents the United Nations in Korea, what meaning can Communist propaganda about American bacteriological warfare possibly have for me? Propaganda means absolutely nothing unless information has been at work beforehand. This is so true that anyone who attempts to mobilize opinion by propaganda in a politically ignorant milieu must begin by creating an extensive, thorough, and serious information service. We observe an example of this in Communist China. Their ultimate propaganda will be all the more effective because information has been ample and, we must admit, objective and serious. We must repeat that it is not to the advantage of propaganda to base its claims on errors but rather on precise data. It even seems that opinion is all the more sensitized to propaganda after it has been informed (I say "more," not "better," sensitized) the more ample the knowledge of political and economic facts, the more sensitive, delicate, vulnerable is opinion. The intellectual is more easily overcome by such propaganda, particularly the kind that toys with ambiguity.

And so, not only does information offer propaganda a basis in fact without which it could not operate but, even more important, it provides it with an opportunity to function. For actually it is information that creates the problems that propaganda will exploit and to which it will claim to offer solutions. Indeed, propaganda exists only when a totality of facts has become, in the eyes of those who constitute opinion, a problem. It is when "problems" are raised in the public mind that the propaganda of a country, a party, or an individual completely evolves. Because, on the one hand, propaganda exacerbates the problem and, on the other, holds out the hope of a solution. But it is difficult for it to create, out of whole cloth, an economic or political problem. There has to be some real basis for such a problem. It does not necessarily exist objectively in reality—it is enough that there might be some reason for its existence.

Thus, for example, if daily information introduces a man into the complexity of economic facts, he will experience difficulty in understanding the reality of these facts because they are many and multiform. From then on he will feel that economic problems exist. But this assumes a different and more acute significance if public opinion should refer to his personal experience. If we consider a man who is not informed about what is going on in his country, in the world, and who has no other source of information than his personal contact with the external world or the conversations he might engage in with his neighbors (whom he will imagine to be in the same position as he), then, as we have said, propaganda cannot function. This is true even if the man is experiencing personal difficulties that stem, in reality, from the social or political situation. Propaganda had no effect on the people of the fourteenth century, even when some villages were pillaged by soldiers, because man, when confronted with a personal experience, responds by spontaneous or group reflexes; but he is responding to a limited local situation. It is the hardest thing in the world for him to objectify his situation, to think of it as the pattern of a universal phenomenon, and to establish an attitude that is in harmony with such objectivization. This presupposes a deliberate and considerable intellectual effort. Propaganda becomes possible only when one is aware of universal problems, when one's attitude is objectivized. And this is precisely what information can do for those individuals who have a limited experience of social reality. Thanks to information, a man becomes part of a context; he is apprised of the reality of his own situation in relation to all of society. And it is this which will lead him to take political and social action. Take, for example, the problem of the standard of living. The workingman knows nothing about wages outside his personal experience; he only knows about the money he earns and spends, plus, of course, what he learns from talking to his neighbors. If he is dissatisfied, he might feel rebellious. Eventually he might rebel against his immediate superiors, his bosses. But we know that individual reaction does not end there. This was the great discovery of the nineteenth century. Actually, information will teach each workingman that his situation is the same as that of thousands of others, that workers can pool their interests and act. At the same time information enables the worker to locate his situation within the context of the economy as a whole and to understand that industrial relations are world wide. Finally, information will teach him to value his personal experience. It was thus that class-consciousness sprang up among the workers during the nineteenth century, far more as the result (and the socialists are right in

Information and Propaganda

maintaining this) of information than of propaganda. Also this represented the transition from a spirit of revolt to one of revolution. Because of the dissemination of information, people became aware of the fact that their personal situation had been raised to the dignity of a social problem. We are speaking now not of the elementary kind of propaganda that a few leaders address to a few rebels but of the complex, modern propaganda that is based upon mass movements, upon knowledge of important, general, economico-political facts, and upon involvement in a certain world-wide current created by the sameness of information received. Information, we must remember, is an element in mass psychology.

And this concludes our reference to the preparatory role played by information to the advantage of propaganda. The large number of individuals who receive the same information often react in the same way. They have identical "centers of interest" (the general problem presented to them by the press and the radio); their opinions tend to agree, and this constitutes one of the essential elements in the formation of public opinion.

More than that, it leads to the development of common reflexes, shared prejudices. Of course, there are exceptions. Some individuals, because they already harbor other prejudices, or have "wilful personalities," or are basically negative, do not react to information in the usual way. But this is more rare than one would suppose. The convergence of the individual's attention on a category of problems, on certain aspects that have been stressed by information, very quickly results in what is called "mass psychology," which is one of the prerequisites of propaganda.

Finally, information is not only a basic prerequisite of propaganda; it creates a need for the intervention of propaganda. What, really, is the situation of the man who is exposed to information, who wants to be informed, who is the recipient of a good deal of daily news? First, we must remember that pure information transmits only detailed facts. The event that has just occurred, no matter how important, is always a unique fact. Information cannot be world wide. The informant's task might be to relate one fact with another, to reveal its antecedents and give its context, and perhaps even to provide some interpretation or explanation; but this is not pure information. Moreover, this kind of thing can be done only in regard to the most important events; usually a single fact alone is given to the public. But if ten thousand details, which represent the daily or monthly situation, are all revealed at once, the average man of good will would be confused and would get nothing at all out of the facts. He would have to have

a remarkable memory to relate to one another events that occurred three weeks or three months apart. The facts that information transmits bear upon a considerable range of topics and of geography and on a wide variety of problems. But an important event of the same order does not occur each day. If we look at information bulletins somewhat carefully, we see that subjects vary about 80 per cent each day. Of course certain important topics (Indochina, Germany, Morocco, Algeria, Hungary, for example) are, or have been, continuous; but, generally, the information given is only superficial. Usually further details are printed two weeks or a month after the first mention. And so one must have the patience to do some research in order to achieve any kind of continuity of news. The average man has neither the memory, the time, nor the desire to do this kind of research. He finds himself caught, therefore, in a kind of ceaseless kaleidoscope consisting of thousands of pictures, each following the other at an extraordinary pace and all devoid of any real continuity. It is unbelievably difficult for him to form a judicious opinion from the thousands of small brush strokes, so variable in color, intensity, and dimension, with which the newspaper presents him. And so the world appears like a stippled canvas. A thousand details make a thousand little points. But there should be some precise juxtaposition of these points. There is none; there are empty spaces, blanks, that prevent a continuity of vision. One should be able to step back and see the panorama from a distance. But the law of information is that it is provided daily. A man can never step back to get perspective because he is immediately the recipient of another batch of information that blots out the preceding one, requiring fresh clarification for which he has no time. Endlessly changing scenes—*pointillé* scenes. For this reason the average man who likes to keep up to date has a tremendously incoherent impression of a world that seems absurd, without rhyme or reason—a world that changes with terrifying rapidity—and he is unable to understand the reasons for these changes. Furthermore, since the information usually deals with accidents (in the literal sense of the word), he gets a catastrophic impression of the world. This is a terrible and worrisome period. In the end a man feels that he is entirely overcome by problems and events. He no longer feels adequate. He has a very strong sense of being overwhelmed. He is aware of his impotence, his smallness. He perceives no connection between his own possibilities of action and the complex situations which propaganda suggests. He begins to have feelings of inferiority and fear. Yet man cannot accept such a situation. He cannot accept the thought of being part of an absurd, incoherent world (he would

Information and Propaganda

have to be heroic; and even Camus, who has portrayed this attitude as the only honest one, cannot really maintain it). Nor can he accept the fact that the problems that spring up before his eyes cannot be resolved or that he himself is made to feel inadequate and helpless to stay the course of events. A man who wants information is in desperate need of a framework within which to classify information. He needs explanations, broad answers to general problems. He needs coherence, an affirmation of his own worth. All this is the direct consequence of information. The more complex the phenomena, the more simple the explanation must be; the more detailed the pointillism, the more schematic must be the framework; the more difficult the problems, the more global the solutions must be; the more threatening the sense of personal inferiority, the more a man's worth must be exalted. But all this is propaganda, and only propaganda can provide it. Of course a superior man, a man of tremendous culture and intelligence who has a constant supply of energy, can seek his own answers, can accept absurdities, and can decide for himself what action to take. But we are not speaking of the superior man (naturally, we all think of ourselves as such) but of the average man.

In analyzing the reasons for propaganda's success, we begin to feel that the principal one is that it responds exactly to the needs of modern man. We cannot give a complete analysis of this statement here, but we must at least point out two elements: man's need for explanations and his need to feel worthy. We have demonstrated that these two needs result—not entirely but in great part—from information.

Effective propaganda must provide man with a global view of the world. This is not so much a matter of dogma—which is entirely too intellectual—but of vision. This vision would include, first of all, a general, historical, economic, and political panorama which is the very basis of propaganda's power because it is the apparently objective justification for the propagandist's activities. It is always necessary to show that we are part of the current of history and progress. And this panorama enables the individual to classify correctly the facts with which information has provided him. It offers a criterion for shaping an opinion: to stress some facts and ignore others, depending upon whether they fit into the framework or not. This corresponds to man's essential need not to have his vision blurred by an unrelenting gray canvas of undifferentiated facts which shuts perspective out.

But propaganda must also explain the event, answer the question "Why?" and give the reasons for political and economic situations. Information seems less formidable when it gives news for which the individual has

ready-made explanations or a ready answer. Propaganda's great power is precisely that it furnishes modern man with simple, global explanations, broad, dogmatic causes without which, engulfed by information, he cannot live. Man is doubly reassured by propaganda: first, because he sees in it an explanation which he can readily understand of the events as they occur; second, because he is promised certain solutions to problems which arise when his limited personal experience yields to objectivity. But propaganda also teaches him that these problems can be solved only if he participates in the actions proposed for their solution. This is how it makes the individual feel his worth. Overwhelmed by information, he regains his balance, thanks to propaganda. He had acquired a sense of his extreme helplessness in a world that had become too vast and too complex, and now he becomes aware of his own importance. Propaganda tells him that his adherence is essential, that his intervention is being relied upon, that his action is decisive, and that nothing can be solved without him. While information is necessary for self-awareness, propaganda is necessary to prevent self-awareness from turning into despair. Man is enriched by the conviction that he can intervene effectively in political life. Furthermore, propaganda teaches him that the extraordinary problems which information has revealed can be solved, but on condition that a certain party, a certain nation, a certain movement, triumphs; and that he, an ordinary individual, will be the artisan of this triumph and will be clothed in glory. Thus information receives its answer and is put in its true place. It does not produce further obstacles; on the contrary, it becomes another reason for action. We saw this swing of the pendulum from propaganda to information when a group called "Combattants de la Paix" was publicized. The propaganda in this instance stressed the individual's awareness of his own worth and the conviction that his personal decision has an enormous bearing on the destiny of peoples.

In the light of these facts it is apparent that the relationship between propaganda and information is complex and difficult to assess. Their boundaries are vague and undefined. Almost inevitably information turns into propaganda; it makes propaganda possible, feeds it, and renders it necessary. It creates a need for propaganda in man, which in turn opens the door to psychic aggressions and to sentimental, political seductions. Once again, let us refrain from erecting the kind of Manichean world that propaganda suggests—one side white, the other black, a good side, a bad side—saintly information, on the one hand, diabolical propaganda, on the other. The truth about the devil is that he created ambiguity.

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

Jan de Vries

THE PRESENT STATE OF STUDIES ON GERMANIC RELIGION

When a new method of scientific study comes to the fore in any field, its *raison d'être* can be explained only in relation to previous research. We shall try, then, to assess the value of nineteenth-century contributions to the knowledge of pagan religion among the Germanic peoples. At a first glance their value seems hardly to justify the tireless efforts of the illustrious scholars who devoted themselves to the task. The failure of so much scientific endeavor is no longer surprising, however, when we recall the character of that era. Opposing the bold and often fanciful syntheses of Romanticism, the nineteenth century advocated a rigorous analysis of the mythological tradition; it wanted first of all to discover what was authentic material in a confused mass of texts emanating from a period that was at once backward and colored by a long Christian tradition. A close examination, largely philological in nature, seemed to reveal that most of the myths and legends conserved in the rich literature of the Eddas consisted of mere fables or simple popular tales embellished with names of gods by adapting hands little concerned with the old pagan traditions.

The apparent abundance of Scandinavian literature was thus reduced to a very slim store of sure and authentic data. And, surprising as it may seem,

Translated by James H. Labadie.

the "loss" caused no discomfort, but, rather, general rejoicing that a large body of worthless and apocryphal legend had been eliminated.

Two new sciences, expanding prodigiously in the nineteenth century, exercised a decisive influence on studies of mythology: folklore and ethnology. Their importance is obvious. Popular traditions had aroused the interest of romantic scholars. Jakob Grimm, creator of the science of folklore, had clearly felt the value of these traditions for medieval literature as well as for Germanic mythology. Boldly advancing into what was still an uncleared wilderness, he proclaimed the importance of popular tales (*Märchen*) as secular heirs of the pagan myths. In *Deutsche Mythologie* (Gütersloh, 1835), his most important work, he raised the ancient Germanic religion into a magnificent system, drawing equally upon Eddic traditions, popular tales, and old beliefs and superstitions. It was in fact a premature work, though astonishingly rich in both documentation and erudition. Succeeding generations have gradually crumbled Grimm's imposing structure, arriving at a critical attitude which destroyed the whole pagan tradition except for a few scattered debris. Popular tales were not ancient myths at all but belonged to an autonomous tradition; if there were points of resemblance between myths and tales, their relationship was the other way round: the tales were believed to have provided the themes for a quasi-mythological literature. The German scholar Eugen Mogk, fervent adept of folklore studies, sincerely believed that he had uncovered (in a study published in 1924!) adaptations of popular tales in the most venerated of age-old myths.

Now, in devaluating the pagan traditions of Germanic mythology, one runs the risk of depriving the gods of all their many and varied activities, reducing them to the status of proper names totally lacking in substance. Such a result squared marvelously well with the results reached in the field of another recently founded science, ethnology. I shall limit myself to a résumé of some themes in vogue during the second half of the nineteenth century. The study of so-called primitive peoples had revealed religious forms of striking simplicity. Instead of personal gods had been found a swarm of demons, specters, and souls or even mere magical forces like the *mana* of the Polynesians. The concepts of *totem* and *tabu* had become the property of intellectual circles. Vestiges of them were soon found among Indo-European peoples; even today there are illustrious scholars who attempt to show in Greek and Roman religions the vestiges of these religious phenomena of a prehistoric period. It was agreed that the existence of individual gods should be denied to the Indo-European peoples;

for gods were substituted demons of the vaguest sort, or else impersonal forces resembling the primitive "*mana*" concept (for example, the *numen* of the Romans or the *megin* of the Scandinavian tradition).

From that point on it seemed justifiable to eliminate the traditional gods, with their richly developed mythology, from the tableau of Germanic religion in the prehistoric period. This whole pantheon, which had appeared to be so solidly constructed with the help of an often very bold etymology, was destined to crumble; there remained only the figure of the supreme god: in Sanskrit, *Dyaus pitâ*, in Greek, *Zeus pater*, in Latin, *Jupiter*, in Germanic, *Tiwaz*. He at least resisted even the irreverent blows of a stern criticism which sometimes tended to be hypercritical. All the rest were judged the chimerical result of a faulty method.

And so a new generation of scholars found itself faced with the task of explaining how all these gods, so varied and complex, so fully accepted by previous tradition, had developed out of an empty sky where the single "father Zeus" had dwelt in majestic solitude. But the idea of development was dear to the scholars of the nineteenth century, a period which rightly boasted of a conscious and fundamental historicism. The gods, supreme manifestations of an absolute Being, were subjected to the laws of Becoming. Scholars furiously set about the task of shedding light on their "origin," the point of departure of their "extension" in space and time, their modes of adaptation to new milieus. At the same time they began to realize the role of the Near East in prehistoric times, notably for Indo-European peoples who came in contact with civilizations which had existed for thousands of years. What more natural than to suppose that newly developed agriculture should have brought with it a whole body of beliefs and concomitant rites? This current of cultural influences had not been interrupted in the following centuries, even well into the historical period. The striking cult and myth of the Scandinavian god Balder bore a puzzling resemblance to those of Attis, Adonis, and Osiris; remarkable reflections were found even for the traditions of Christ's passion. Here then was an immense field for research carried on in a strictly "historicist" spirit, a field which was considerably enlarged as the ancient Orient disclosed more and more of its secrets.

The Germanic peoples, last to enter upon the stage of history, were an easy prey for research of this order: one by one their gods were robbed of their originality, treated as intruders come from all directions—Occident as well as Orient. The well-ordered pantheon of Scandinavian gods in historical times was considered as having been gradually formed from a series

of borrowings and adaptations. This should not surprise us, as the syncretism of the Hellenistic world offered a clear example of such a religious amalgam. The comparison is, however, pointless. That syncretism had been the result of a cultural movement in a world where religious faith was shaken and where sects agitated by fervent proselytism attracted a dislocated people avid for redemption. The Germanic peoples were still far removed from such a dissolution of morals and traditions. Even at the time of the conversion to Christianity, their pagan religion was in general solidly established in individual consciences; before the arrival of Christian missionaries, the propagandists of a new faith had failed utterly. How is it then possible to imagine methods of dissemination by which gods and cults were brought from all points of the compass to the Scandinavian people?

At the end of the nineteenth century it was felt that the time had come to draw up the balance sheet of mythological research; the manuals of Golther, E. H. Meyer, and E. Mogk were the curious result. They show an abundance of folklore data, a swarm of giants and gnomes, spirits and demons, fairies, wood nymphs and water nymphs. On the other hand, the picture of the pagan religion is deplorably sketchy; by ignoring foreign newcomers, and reducing myths transmitted into the region to a series of secondary versions of fairy tales, the authors had come up with a minimum of more or less solidly established divinities, which were considered almost exclusively from the point of view of naturalist method.

Such a conception of pagan religion was subject to caution; it was contradicted by the Scandinavian tradition itself. How could this religion, which had shown remarkable tenacity and resistance in the face of Christianity's superior forces, have been formed by a series of borrowings and resulted from a late and incoherent development? It was however a true religion, including a solid faith and a ritual as rich as it was subtly varied, and in no sense a mere mass of curious myths, more or less authentic. Unfortunately, the entire domain of the pagan rite was poorly documented in our literary sources; hardly any but mythological traditions were at our disposal.

The twentieth century, which saw the mind of Western man shaken to its depths by gigantic crises, forced science to consider the problems of cultures and religion from an entirely different point of view. Materialism, hand in hand with irreligion and the "desacralization" of life as a whole, was unable to arrive at an adequate evaluation of archaic beliefs. What was especially lacking was the respect due even the most primitive religious manifestation. Ethnology, which has led astray studies of re-

Notes and Discussion

ligion and mythology, also found the way to a more generous appreciation of religious facts. A more exact and sympathetic study of primitive data revealed more shaded and complex articulation than could be included in the simple concepts of *mana* or *tabu*. Finally, the role of myth itself was understood; instead of a fantasy recounting the acts and gestures of the gods, it must disclose a religious phenomenon intimately related to the cult. Thus the myth, however bizarre and ridiculous it may appear to our eyes, is marked by an indisputable sacredness and possesses a dynamic force manifest in the course of the accompanying ritual. Such a discovery necessarily had repercussions in the study of archaic religions; it was again necessary to take into account the character of mythological traditions.

The first sign of an about-face in current opinions came from an unexpected quarter. Since 1909 the Danish scholar V. Grønbech had been publishing a series of volumes on Scandinavian religious ideas modestly called *Vor Folkeæt* ("Our Race"). He was better prepared for this task than the philologists who had monopolized the domain, because as a theologian he was able to apply a method better adapted to this sort of research. Rather than occupy himself with the mythologies which had already been the subject of so many arid studies, he concentrated especially on the Icelandic saga, a rather faithful image of the pagan mentality. With penetrating lucidity he disclosed the religious bases of this whole violent and passionate life, dominated by hate and vengeance, by the desire for power and riches. The defense of peace within the family or the clan, the defense of one's honor and even of material prosperity, showed the religious structure of the pagan communities in all its uncompromising rigidity.

The new orientation of the study of Germanic mythology is really not clear, however, until about 1930. I limit myself to the mention of two works which appeared almost simultaneously during the thirties. The first, *Kultische Geheimbünde der Germanen*, was published in 1934 by Otto Höfler. Based on previous researches of Lily Weiser-Aall and Richard Wolfram, it constructs an imposing record of popular traditions connected with New Year's customs. In Austria and Bavaria, in the Low Countries, and in Scandinavia, young men on that day form processions of masked demons, circulate through the fields, and visit the farms. They spread terror far and wide with the frightful din of horns, whips, bells, and rattles. Others do not dare show their faces in the street; this would be particularly dangerous for young girls, for, if the procession of demons finds them in its path, they are chased through the village, seized and carried off, taken

a considerable distance away, or even tossed into manure heaps. Traversing the fields, the young men dance and jump; it is believed that the wheat will grow as high as their leaps. When they enter a farmhouse, the inhabitants feel greatly honored, entertain them royally, and grant anything they may request.

These young men, wearing demonic masks, represent demons, particularly spirits of the dead who, according to a very widespread belief, visit the world of the living at the time of the winter solstice. In Norway this procession has names related to that of the Scandinavian god Odin; this leads us to suppose that the custom which has almost everywhere degenerated to the rank of rural amusement was formerly a serious and important rite. In fact, Mr. Höfler has gathered an impressive number of ancient texts by which we are able to reconstruct, with the aid of modern traditions, a pagan ritual of considerable interest. There is reason to link this with the institution of associations of warriors, described with sympathy and even admiration by Tacitus under the name of *comitatus*. The central god of these institutions was Odin; the *Einherjar* gathered in his celestial dwelling, Valhalla, correspond to this type of warrior community. The time propitious for these ceremonies is precisely that of the *Jul*, when the spirits of the dead are believed to be present among the living and when Odin himself, at the head of the "savage hunt," shows himself in the storms of the solstice. In a later book, *Germanisches Sakralkönigtum*, published in 1952, Mr. Höfler added a good number of new facts, leaving no doubt as to the existence of these organizations with their ritual ceremonies.

The importance of these studies can scarcely be exaggerated. Popular traditions are treated in such a way as to cast no suspicion on the authenticity of the literary sources; on the contrary, pagan rites and modern customs are mutually complementary; they are but the elements of an uninterrupted tradition dating from the prehistoric past, doubtless already Indo-European. One is led to the conclusion that ritual acts belonging to Germanic paganism kept their form and their value even after the disappearance of pagan culture and that they have persisted, in slightly altered form, in a profoundly Christian atmosphere. Gods may pass, but rites cannot be uprooted as easily from the collective consciousness.

The new orientation of mythological studies appears also in the manual *Altgermanische Religionsgeschichte* which I first published in 1935-37, as Volume XII of the *Grundriss der germanischen Philologie* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2d rev. ed., 1956-57). This work was a new edition of the book

written by the scholar E. Mogk for the *Grundriss der germanischen Philologie*. I have already mentioned that Mogk belonged to the folklorist school and that he underestimated the importance of the pagan myths. I wished to give the work an entirely new orientation and to try especially to sketch the Germanic peoples' religion itself. First it was necessary to restore to the literary traditions their full value in the study of ancient religions. In accepting the idea that there were most assuredly secondary and therefore apocryphal elaborations, one's proper attitude toward these texts should be that of taking the myths literally and discovering their religious meaning. Too often one is tempted to reject a myth, calling it a simple popular tale, because one has failed to grasp its real meaning; such an easy solution should always be distrusted. It goes without saying that the main proof of a myth's originality is found in a concomitant rite; for this reason as complete a dossier as possible must be assembled for pagan ritual.

No less important, it seems to me, was a criticism of evolutionist theories, which had cast too much doubt on the originality of the Nordic pantheon. I was convinced that the gods handed down in the Nordic texts were extremely ancient; the introduction of a new divinity could only be a most exceptional case (e.g., a god with neither cult nor mythology, like *Forseti*). Nor did I wish to neglect the possibility of a close relationship between the Germanic gods and those of other Indo-European peoples; therefore, the thesis of a common heritage from an immemorial past had to be considered. I started down the path where romantic scholars had too often got lost, hoping that a saner method might lead to more solid conclusions. The stumbling block had been the war between the Ases and the Vanes: regarding this as the representation of a real war between two peoples of opposite faiths had robbed it of all religious meaning. Such an interpretation was satisfactory to the historicism prevailing in the last century; it was obvious, however, that a myth of such importance could not have risen from such a conflict, and I hoped to arrive at a more satisfactory conclusion by reintegrating it into the mythological system.

As a matter of fact, the negative criticism was relatively easy; evolutionist theories provided almost too many occasions for demonstrating the fragile basis of their deductions. But to prove positively that Germanic mythology derived from a wider Indo-European tradition was more difficult. Etymology was discredited by the abuses of the A. Kuhn-Max Miller school. Here and there a few myth motifs could be found. But did one have the right to make these so important as to deduce from them an Indo-European origin? What was the true character of these gods whose personality was so delicately shaded, even, at times, contradictory? The

naturalist theory which had reduced these divinities to natural phenomena such as sun, lightning, and storm had lost its appeal, but what was to replace it? With Wotan defined variously as the god of death, of magic, of war, of poetry, of ecstatic fury, it was difficult to see how these divergent qualities could be united in a single central function. Donar was doubtless a warrior god whose weapon was lightning, but he was also the god of fertility and the protector of the clan and other human groups.

Besides all this, historicism had broken up the pantheon into an incoherent mass of divinities, differing widely in both age and source. Now, a polytheism is not and cannot be an arbitrary collection of independent and autonomous gods; it is a system in which each god fulfils his own function and which embodies all aspects of both cosmic and human life. Where could be found the formula by which the elements of this complex divine world could be united in an organic system?

By the time my book appeared, Georges Dumézil had already published studies ("Le Festin d'immortalité" and the "Problème des centaures," 1924 and 1929, respectively) in which he successfully defended the Indo-European origin of several Greek and Hindu myths. Thus science retraced its steps by rallying to the cause of the romantic theses which had been so often derided. But this time a vast amount of carefully verified materials, resulting from a half-century of positivist studies, made possible an exacting criticism. So M. Dumézil succeeded in showing the likelihood of an original, Indo-European unity for several important myths. A bold etymological approach, utilizing the subtleties of an almost algebraic linguistics, was not the point of departure of the investigation but provided the keystone which finished off this study of comparative mythology.

I am sorry not to have been able to utilize M. Dumézil's studies to the extent they deserved. The apparatus of scientific research was not sufficiently developed; new publications were slow in crossing linguistic and national boundaries. Despite diligent efforts to overcome it, this regrettable hindrance to world co-operation has not been entirely suppressed even today. M. Dumézil's books are hardly known outside France; repercussions in the Germanic world have been rare and accidental. However, M. Dumézil has continued to make new contributions in his *Ouranos-Varuna* and *Flamen-Brahman*; in considering several aspects of the ritual, the latter is extremely important. When, two years after the publication of my own book, he answered it, so to speak, in his *Mythes et dieux des Germains*, his handling of the comparative method could be seen, as sure as it was flexible.

It was only with the publication of *Mitra-Varuna* and the trilogy *Jupiter-*

Notes and Discussion

Mars-Quirinus that the main lines of his theory were fully revealed. He had successfully systematized the Indo-European pantheon, with three main functions homologous to those of human society. Royal authority, the warrior-class, and the mass of peasants and tillers of the soil constituted the Indo-European society, although the same structure existed elsewhere. But unique among the Indo-Europeans was the polarity of the first function, shown in a pair of complementary divinities like *Mitra-Varuna* in the *Rg-Veda* religion, and *Tiwaz-Wotan* in that of the Germanic peoples. On the one hand, a beneficent god, guaranteeing the stability of the social order; on the other hand, a violent, tumultuous, dangerous, and even chaotic god. An entire philosophy of royalty can be discerned in this polarity; as a guarantor of laws and conventions it ran the risk of being fixed in rigid and immovable forms; thus from time to time the petrified system had to be broken by an eruption of creative forces allowing a regeneration of social life. This duality of the royal authority is also found in the Germanic world; no better definition exists for the characters of *Tiwaz* and *Wotan*, who formed a couple truly antithetical and complementary.

M. Dumézil has in recent years published a series of new contributions to this work of synthesis. He has refined his method and the somewhat rigid and oversimplified mechanism of his earlier system. Several gods, acting with special functions at a lower level than the great protagonists, have successively found their place in the tripartite system of Indo-European gods. We are beginning to discern, to our continuing amazement, the complexity of this system, which is at the same time very well balanced. There is nothing "primitive" about it in the ordinary sense of the word, but recent ethnological research has shown that the word "primitive" does not at all mean simple or undeveloped; on the contrary, it often connotes a bizarre complexity which can be reduced to a coherent view of man's vital problems.

A new theory is now demonstrating its accuracy, or at least its heuristic value, by its applicability to religious facts which had previously resisted the efforts of scholars. The war of the *Ases* and the *Vanes*, of which I have already spoken, fits marvelously well into the tripartite system; Indo-European analogies (among the *Hindus* and the *Romans*) show its original meaning. The equilibrium of human society, composed of three classes each having its own interests, is menaced by dangerous tensions. The myth gives us the symbol of this rivalry in the war *in illo tempore* between the ruling classes and the *tiers état*. The peace which ended it guaranteed

established order for all time to come, a guaranty made irrevocable through the exchange of hostages. This long-debated problem finds a plausible solution in M. Dumézil's thesis.

When the character and function of important gods like Tîwaz, Wodan, Donar, Njord, and Freyr have been clearly defined, the Germanic pantheon presents us with a large number of minor, complementary divinities. How can they be assured their proper place in the system? Sometimes one has the impression of parallel deities, as in the case of the Scandinavian god Ullr, whose function is homologous to that of Tîwaz; he opposes Odin in several Scandinavian myths transmitted in the prolific work of the Danish writer Saxo Grammaticus. Sometimes a god seems to fulfil a need to limit more precisely the too-wide functions of one of the major gods. I have tried to define in this way the character of Heimdallr, whose tradition is at one and the same time very restrained and very disconnected; following the studies of Messrs. Ohlmarks (Lund: Heimdalls Horn & Odins Auge, 1937) and Pering (Lund: Heimdall, 1941), I wrote an article on him in *Études germaniques* in 1956. This divinity, linked in curious fashion to the tree of the world, has been compared by M. Dumézil to the Roman god Janus and the Hindu god Vâyu; it is true that he is the model of a god of commencement and a remarkable example of a god of sovereignty.

The gods Balder and Loki, ever since the earliest mythological studies, have attracted special interest from scholars through the myths that are attached to their names. Balder, faced with imminent danger, was made invulnerable by an oath offered by all of nature save for one inoffensive plant, the mistletoe, which became the cause of the death of the god: a blind god, his hand guided by Loki, threw the plant at Balder, who fell dead, to the great consternation of the other gods. There are here remarkable analogies with the plots involving agricultural divinities, especially the myths of Attis and of Adonis; this is why Gustav Neckel conceived of an adaptation from the religions of Asia Minor through the Thracians (*Die Überlieferungen vom Gotte Balder* [Dortmund, 1920]). The Finnish scholar Kaarle Krohn brought up several very late traditions regarding the passion of Jesus Christ and sees in them a proof favoring an adaptation of Christian traditions (*Skandinavisk Mytology* [Helsinki, 1922]); this point of view can be understood only in terms of the rise of evolutionist theories and especially of nineteenth-century rationalism. None of this agrees with the undeniable fact that Balder does not at all belong to the Vanes because he is closely associated with Odin; we must not minimize the completely unequivocal data of the Scandinavian tradition in this regard. Whereas

agricultural divinities experience death in order to be revived in a new fullness of life, Balder dies definitively, and the attempt to deliver him from the realm of the dead fails lamentably. This is why I have sought the solution of this mythological enigma in another direction (see my article in *Arkiv för Nordisk Filologi*, 1956), associating it with a universally widespread tradition: the one showing how man, destined to happy and eternal life, has been subjected to the fate of death.

His adversary Loki is no less difficult to describe. M. Dumézil and I have attempted to resolve this problem. In a book on Loki, published in 1933 in the series "Folklore Fellows Communications," I followed the lead of the great Danish scholar Axel Olrik, attributing to Loki the role of an impostor god, a crafty and astute trickster, a figure who often doubles as a civilizing hero. In this case his activity as an enemy of the gods, even as a true Satan, would have been a later development. M. Dumézil, on the other hand, in his book on Loki published in 1945, sees this activity as an original trait; by an ingenious comparison with a satanic being named Syrdon, in the Ossete tradition (also an Indo-European people), he reaches a tempting conclusion. It would be premature to say, however, that the case of the god Loki is definitely closed. The Swedish scholar Folke Ström has recently made a further attempt to discover Loki's secret (*Loki* [Göteborg, 1956]).

In the studies listed here as examples it has been constantly clear that the solution to a religious problem is found only through its integration into the mythological system common to all Indo-European peoples. It goes without saying that there has been no lack of support for evolutionary theories as well. But the solutions proposed by these scholars are hardly convincing; when the Norwegian folklore specialist Nils Lid considers the god Ullr as a woolly doll, and the Swedish scholar M. Eldquist interprets the same god as a divinity of bubbling springs, we see how arbitrary such interpretations really are. In singular fashion they limit narrowly the basis of the mythological notion, and we are not convinced that a god like Ullr could have developed from such humble origins. For Ullr was certainly the figure of an important cult: his name appears in a large number of Scandinavian place names. It is safe to predict that mythological research will be increasingly oriented toward the method so brilliantly begun by M. Dumézil. However, along other lines, the Würzburg scholar F. R. Schröder has made valuable contributions, especially to the conceptions and myths of fertility divinities.

The study of archaic religions of the polytheistic type can easily be lim-

ited to defining the personalities of the gods and, which is worse, to sterile efforts toward demonstrating their origin and modes of development or extension in time and space. This is due to the state of our documentation, which is limited to myths told about the gods. One too often gains the impression that these gods figure in rites strictly regulated by the changing seasons of the year; the whole apparatus of the cult seems to tend toward satisfying community needs. Now, we ask first of all: What is the relationship between man and the supernatural beings he adores? Sacrifice is an act of faith, and we wonder what was the religious attitude of men as they participated in ceremonies taking place during the great seasonal festivals. Of this we know next to nothing; the Germanic tradition as transmitted by Christian writers is singularly silent on this point. Was the sacrificial meal really nothing but a feast whose participants were regaled with horsemeat soup and ale? After all, the priest officiated and the gods on their pedestals were present. This leads to a crucial question: Where was the center of the pagan faith? What was the source of the lively emotion which took hold of the soul in communion with the gods? A religion which is but a series of sacrificial acts ordered by custom inherited from ancestors is, after all, an empty shell. Indirectly, we see that Germanic religion was by no means a matter of pure and simple tradition; its bitter resistance against the assaults of the Christian mission shows us that the pagans knew they must defend something very important, something indispensable.

The religious vocabulary of the pagans calls for examination. One's first reaction is disappointment; at the time of conversion, they were defending their religion not in the modern sense of the word but in that which Scandinavian texts call the *sidhr*; this is precisely the word for "custom, usage." Likewise the Christian religion was called the new *sidhr*, as if the essential part were the Mass, the ringing of bells, the glow of candles, chanting, and liturgy. Did the preaching of Christian doctrine have less importance than the exterior trappings of the cult? We are inclined to believe so, considering that paganism itself knew no dogmas which clearly defined the fundamental traits of its beliefs. Another word seems to lead us to the same conclusion: the verb *trua*, whose meaning, "to believe," was acquired only after the conversion. In pagan times the word was the equivalent of "to trust, to have full confidence." But let us remember that the god Thor is called *fulltrui*, "the one who is trusted completely," and then we seem to glimpse an element of intimacy between god and man, not limited to moments of ceremony but extending throughout the life of the believer. When one embarks upon a dangerous enterprise, one feels

that the god is quite near, that he will be of help in case of danger. It would be easy to show that there are in relations with Odin, too, elements of devotion and of a confidence essentially personal. Although it is difficult to discover just what went on within the pagan heart at the moment of communion with the gods, we may suspect that it included strong and sincere feelings.

On the one hand, texts give the impression that men and gods met on an equal footing, but, on the other hand, the gods appear separated from men by a clearly marked sacredness. Just what is the sacral character of the gods? The Germanic languages have two words to express it; in the religious vocabulary of a people, two words for the same notion are certainly not identical in meaning. First there is the very widespread word: Gothic *hailags*; Old Scandinavian *heilagr*; German *heilig*; then the Gothic word *weihs*; Old Scandinavian *vé*, which disappeared after the conversion but which is found in the German verb *weihen*, "to consecrate." As is usual in these cases, etymology is of little help to us. The original meaning of *heilig* would be "total, intact, healthy"; there is no need to read into it the slightest religious element. The texts themselves must be examined. M. Baetke has done this in *Das Heilige im Germanischen* (Tübingen, 1942), where he compares the two words, concluding that the two notions may be seen as the positive and negative sides of sacrality. *Heilig* is an attribute exclusive to the gods; even when manifested in a human being or a thing, it remains an emanation from the divine world. Everything which belongs to the cult as a source of sacrality is called *heilig*. But the other word, while it is also applicable to the sacral qualities of the gods, indicates the total separation of the sacred and profane worlds; it expresses approximately the same nuances as the term "taboo" in ethnology: a person or a thing to which the word *weihs* applies is by that very fact inviolable and excluded from profane usage. Such a study, completing the earlier work of V. Grøn-bach, shows that a careful examination of texts can lead to clear and truly revealing definitions.

It is fortunately possible to cite several efforts toward determining the exact sense of religious ideas. Once again it was a French scholar who instituted such studies of the religious vocabulary: M. Cahen, whose thesis, *Le Mot Dieu en vieux scandinave*, published in 1921, was followed by "Études sur le vocabulaire religieux du vieux scandinave, La libation." Others might be mentioned. The importance of the idea of fate in the Germanic world is well known. Epic poetry shows us the hero in the grasp of a pitiless destiny; he stands against this fatal power with magnificent bravu-

ra, only to succumb at the end. This dominant feeling of man's dependence on his destiny created personal forms, such as the Norns, and especially Urdhr, goddess of destiny, superior even to the powers of the gods. Sometimes the god Odin seems to assume the role of an implacable destiny, especially when he assigns victory or defeat in combat. What was the role of fate in the real life of men? In recent years several scholars (Walther Gehl, Martin Ninck, Ladislaus Mittner, Eduard Neumann) have attempted to elucidate this complex and important idea; tragic events in Germany aroused interest in the idea of a fate menacing man throughout his earthly existence. Attacking the problem from several sides, these scholars have shed new light on it. They inevitably encounter the question of the relation between fate and the power of the gods and run the risk of posing a problem which by its very nature must remain insoluble. The Greek world at the time of Homer experienced the same aporia. It may perhaps depend quite simply on the attitude of man himself in regard to all that menaces his fragile existence; he may see in this the action of a god who leads him through life by obscure paths; he may also see the will of a powerful destiny inexorably pushing man toward his downfall. To make logical distinctions among these conceptions so intimately dependent upon psychological attitudes can be but a distortion of nature.

In view of the great difficulties arising from the vague and incomplete state of our sources, the study of pagan religion often assumes the character of a Tantalus' punishment. At the moment we think we are near a precise knowledge of a religious fact, it escapes our efforts; does this mean that it will always remain a nebulous specter which can never be grasped? We must, however, remember the character of polytheistic belief. A dogma tracing the form of its faith with a clear line is absolutely wrong; this divine world is revealed only through symbols, hidden in the ensemble of the myths. The gods act, behaving too often in a purely human way; it might be said that they are energies rather than modes of being or aspects of the cosmic world. When they *are* the latter, it is in an almost subconscious manner. We must try as it were to test the quality of their divine power; the required condition is a respectful attitude, ready to receive their revelation.

Now, it is respect for religious facts which was above all lacking to the generations of scholars of the second half of the nineteenth century. Comparing our research methods with theirs, we have a right to believe that today's attitude is better adapted to the subject matter. The method which consists of treating myths as traditions without any value, of questioning

Notes and Discussion

their truth, of breaking them up into folklore motifs, seems to us a curious aberration, a consequence of the sterile rationalism of that period. We want to believe in the myths even before we understand them; we see in them grandiose symbols in which the great problems of life and the face of the cosmic order are revealed. And here we are closer to the great scholars of the romantic period; although we reject in large measure the results of their too superficial comparisons and too fantasy-laden schemes, we are convinced of the sureness of their intuition, which saw in Germanic mythology the venerable legacy of an Indo-European past. To make that intuition more conscious, to arrive at an over-all view showing the articulations of a complex yet homogeneous organization in scattered elements, this is the task of our generation—a task which requires the collaboration of philologists, folklorists, ethnologists, and historians of religion. If religion is one of the grandest revelations of the human spirit, it is worth the effort needed to know it in all its fulness and in all its depth.

RENAISSANCE COSMOLOGIES

I

"NATURA ARTIFEX": MARSILIO FICINO AND GIORDANO BRUNO

In the prose commentary to Chapter VI of his poem *De monade*, Giordano Bruno designates Ficino as one of the princes of Platonism: "unus e principibus platonis Ficinus." Statements of this kind are all the more valuable because they are rare. Bruno seldom cites his sources; he utilizes his authors more often than he names them, and it requires a certain attentiveness to perceive that he knows Platonism and particularly Neo-Platonism only through and thanks to Ficino. On occasion Bruno makes use of Plotinus' opinion, quoting texts that one would seek in vain in the *Aeneid*; they have been taken from the Ficinian commentaries. The same is true as regards Porphyry and Jamblichus.

Thus certain concordances reveal direct and more or less disguised plagiarisms. Others are fortuitous, or, rather, they reflect a common tradition. For example, a like tolerance for complicated and detailed allegories is to be found in both writers. When one reads in Book IV of the *De minimo* the description of the residences of Apollo, Minerva, and Venus, he cannot but think of the "temple of philosophy," the symbols of which are interpreted by Ficino in the general introduction to his translation of Plato:

Translated by Elaine P. Halperin.

the garden, the entrance hall, the portico, and the sanctuary of this cosmic edifice, dominated, respectively, by the superior principles of Apollo, Minerva, Jupiter, and Saturn, are the abodes reserved for poets, orators, jurists, and philosophers, the priests being everywhere.

A comparison of two texts like Ficino's *Commentary on Plato's Symposium* and Giordano Bruno's *The Heroic Frenzies*¹ reveals a closer relationship. The very word "furor," which Ficino uses to translate the Platonic term *mania*, is evidence of this. Ficino distinguishes between two kinds of furors, the one, bestial, in which "man turns himself into the nature of the beasts," and the other divine, "which raises man above himself and converts him into God." Between the two, reason has its domain. The *furor divinus* evidences itself by a transport of the fallen soul, anxious to return to its principle. And just as the downfall entailed four degrees, so the re-ascent was to take place by four degrees. Bruno simplifies this ordering but retains what is essential and, in the five dialogues of the *Fureurs héroïques*, exalts man's effort to return to his origin, which is none other than the supreme One.

In his fine book on *Marsile Ficin et l'art*, André Chastel² cites a passage of the *Theologia Platonica* where, he says, "the living organism of the Earth is described in terms that anticipate with great exactitude those of Leonardo in his *Introduction* to the *Traité de l'eau*: 'We see the Earth begetting with its own seeds trees and countless living things and causing them to grow by nourishing them, and even growing stones that are like teeth and grass that is like hair. . . . How can one dare to say that this woman's womb is not living since it produces little ones?' " The comparison with Leonardo is inevitable. But how many passages can be extracted from Bruno in which the earth is likened to a giant animal, and the celestial bodies as well, which move *secondo l'anima propria*? All are endowed with a soul, not only sensitive but also intellective, "as intellective as our own, perhaps more so than our own." These affirmations, moreover, are so replete with details that they provoke ironic amazement in one of the interlocutors of *La Cena de le Ceneri*, who was charged with presenting the argument. "It seems to me," he says, "that if the Earth is animate it should not experience pleasure when grottoes and caves are dug out of its back."³

1. Marsilio Ficino, *Commentaire sur le Banquet de Platon*, text ed. and trans. by Raymond Marcel (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1956); Giordano Bruno, *Des Fureurs héroïques*, text ed. and trans. by P. H. Michel (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1954).

2. *Marsile Ficin et l'art* (Geneva: E. Droz & Lille, R. Giard, 1954), p. 94.

3. Giordano Bruno, *La Cena de le Ceneri*, ed. Giovanni Aquilecchia (Turin: Einaudi, 1955); English trans.: *The Ash Wednesday Supper*. We can merely point out in passing the importance of this edition and of Aquilecchia's researches in the domain of studies on Bruno.

But whenever the subject is not the earth or some celestial body but rather the universe viewed as a whole, notable divergences appear between Ficino's animism and that of Giordano Bruno. According to Ficino, life circulates from the earth to the stars, "in order to constitute the uninterrupted tissue of the whole of nature" (*Theologia Platonica* ix. 7). One of the major points of this cosmology is that "the heavens are a great living thing, endowed with a soul with which all the souls of the living communicate. . . . The universe appears as a giant 'organism' in perpetual vibration, since the stars are the source of the active forces of insensitive matter, even of plants and animals" (translated from Chastel, p. 42). This word, "organism," which we stress, expresses very well the image of a coherent universe, of a unique and finite cosmos of the Aristotelian type. Its center is the earth, around which spheres gradually rise one above the other, each of which corresponds, as in the Pseudo Dionysius, to a level of the angelic hierarchy and whose container in the last analysis is the empyrean. Bruno no longer accepts this architecture. His universe has no center, or—and this amounts to the same thing—it alone is the center. It is infinite, immeasurable, formless, homogeneous in the sense that the elements of which the sublunar world is composed meet again in the immensity of the heavens. The stars are but other suns; the planets—satellites of the sun or invisible satellites of the stars—are but other lands possessing "the same properties and hazards as our own" so that if we were to escape from this globe, no matter how far we went, we would only meet other similar worlds, perhaps better, "perhaps worse." The infinite space in which the stars move does not constitute privileged regions, symbol of a hierarchy, or zones more or less distant from the source of energy that animates celestial bodies and imparts motion to them. The cosmic soul is omnipresent; it is at work everywhere, simultaneously, and in the same manner. This inorganic state is suggested by the very title of Bruno's cosmological poem: *De innumerabilibus, immenso et infigurabili*.

Whatever the structure of the universe might be, to conceive of it as a living thing is to think of it as inhabited by an internal energy—God, soul of the world, or *natura naturata*—of which the creative effort, ever at work, accounts for the sensible objects. And, since all creativity implies a mode of creating (can we venture to say a technique?), to speak of creative nature is to raise the problem of the *natura artifex*. This thought, common to both Ficino and Bruno, led them both more than once to compare nature's (or God's) effort to that of man. But here again an identical theme has been the occasion for very divergent interpretations.

According to Marsilio Ficino, God, like any artist, remains present in his

work (Chastel, p. 58). "He has been able, known how and wished to make his work as similar to himself as possible" (*Theologia Platonica* i. 5). On the other hand, "God is the center of everything because he is more internal to every being than the being is to itself. He is also the circumference of the world, because he exists outside of everything and he so fills to overflowing the whole of all beings that he rises, with all his dignity, above the summit of each. Center, he is in all things, circumference, outside all things. . . . Then what is God? A spiritual circle the center of which is everywhere and the circumference nowhere. But if this divine center possesses an imaginary or visible seat from which to hold sway in some part of the cosmos, it reigns mostly in the middle, like the king in the middle of the city, the heart in the middle of the body, the sun in the middle of the planets. It is in the sun and in the third essence, the median essence, that he has placed his tabernacle" (*Theologia Platonica* xviii. 3).

"This analysis," says André Chastel, "is not solely destined, as in the hermetic texts, to give an idea of God; it is not applied, as in Nicholas of Cusa, to an intuition of the universe; rather it aims at revealing their metaphysical relationship, at suggesting the two ways in which one can say that the divine *artifex* is present in his work. An image of the circumference possessing multiple centers expresses first of all the relation of a force with that which it animates. God being both the container of all things and the intimacy with each one, one perceives him at work precisely when one is able to conceive that the same principle of energy moves the spheres which envelop the world and gives the gift of life to all who inhabit it. But to express this dynamic relationship is not enough; one must also draw from the image of the circle the symbol-type imposed by the analogy of the structure of the circle with the privileged place of the sun in the visible world and that of the soul in the invisible world."

As for man, he is not only the intelligent and wonder-struck spectator of this continuous creation; he is the imitator of it: "It is by his creative undertakings that he demonstrates above all the identity of his genius with that of the divine *artifex*." He is the universal artist, the king of the nature which he subdues, of the animals that he trains and controls; he collaborates and he is aware of collaborating; he is aware of the work of the Creator. "The activity that one engages in in the name of art corresponds so well to divine activity that it alone can give a valid idea of that activity." Praise for the arts always consists for Ficino of high lyricism as well. Here is an example borrowed from the *Theologia Platonica*: "Human power is almost similar to divine nature; what God creates in the world by his thought, the [hu-

man] mind conceives within itself through the intellectual act, expresses it through language, writes it in its books, typifies it through what it builds out of the matter of the world." Other quotations, no less eloquent, are to be found, as well as numerous references in André Chastel's book (Chaps. I and II of the first part). We can but refer the reader to them. However, we must remark again upon another curious notation concerning the *mimesis*, the imitation of a "model" in which Ficino is not satisfied to recognize one of the essential conditions of our human art (in this respect he is in agreement with Léon-Baptiste Alberti) but also perceives the principle of all reality: "Just as works of art are the images (*simulachra*) of natural things so the latter are the images of divine things. Because of their material analogy, works of art come closer to the truth of natural things than the latter do to the truth of divine things. If the difference between a copied horse and a real one is only that the former is not true, the difference is far greater between a real horse and the divine horse, that is, the idea and the true reason of the horse, and one can very well say that it represents the shadow of the horse rather than the form itself" (*Theologia Platonica* xi. 6).

In the perspectives of Ficinian thought, the "analogy" between the painted or sculptured horse and the "true" horse is most striking. Both of these reflect their creator and contain the spirit of his thought; and the distance of the thing thought from the thing realized will always be greater than that from the thing realized to the thing realized. In other words, the distance that separates man's work (the art object) from that of God (the natural object) is not so great as the distance that separates God's thought from his creation. The universe is nonetheless as similar to its Creator as is possible, and the same must be true of the work of art: mirror of an individual thought, it will be all the more valid because the personality of the artist expresses itself more completely within it. It goes without saying that this rule is applicable to all the arts and not only to the plastic arts: "The mind of the artist manifests itself . . . also in speeches, music and song; the soul's form and its pattern are revealed in these" (cited by Chastel, p. 65).

Bruno, quite as much as Ficino, holds as incontrovertible truth that God, the center of everything, operating within all things, is more internal to each being than this being is to itself. Up to this point there is complete agreement between the two doctrines. But, as we have seen, Ficino admits of a cosmic center, a privileged place where divine action is initially at work, whence it springs as if from its source. The image of the circle (which Bruno was to make use of for different ends) suggests in his thinking the image of the heart, the vital organ of the organism; it also is used

by him to stimulate the idea of a closed world, harmonious and constructed, of an architecture of spheres. For Bruno the formal or spiritual principle, issuing immediately from God, is omnipresent as principle and its action, the same everywhere, operates everywhere at once in a limitless and formless universe, where the Sun is nothing more than our sun and the Earth our planet.

Therefore it does not surprise us that Giordano Bruno's God, less localized than Ficino's, is also more impersonal and that for the Ficinian comparison between God and the artist Bruno substitutes, with a different intent, a parallel comparison between nature and art. Once stated, this comparison promptly takes the form of a contrast and is developed in a remarkable page of the treatise entitled *De la causa, principio et uno*.⁴ It bears upon two points: the "matter" of art and nature and the "mode" of the creative operation.

"Nature, to which art is comparable, requires a matter for its operations." But the matter of art is a thing "already formed by nature, like wood, iron, stone or wool," while the "matter of nature has absolutely no form." The artist finds his work half-done: he gives form to that which already has form. He uses not the raw material from which everything can spring up but secondary matter, commonly but improperly called "raw material" and even, according to Bruno, improperly called "matter."

To this difference between art and nature another, even more important, is added—one that bears upon the mode of operation by which matter (raw material in the first instance and secondary matter in the second) is to be constituted in an object. Nature "works from within," *opra dal centra*; the artist, on the contrary, works "on the surface of his work." The creation of the divine *artifex* is a thought that takes shape; the creation of man, the artist, is a thought expressed—that is to say, projected from the outside.

The principal object of the treatise *De la causa, principio et uno* is to define with precision the three terms that constitute the title. For the moment let us merely envisage the first two terms. One of the interlocutors of the dialogue asks: "I would like to know if the two words 'cause' and 'principle' are synonymous in your opinion." Théophile (a person whose role it is to expound the author's doctrine) answers in the negative and, in so doing, gives the reasons which his interlocutor summarizes thus: "It seems to me that you would like the principle of a thing to be what intrinsically contributes to the constitution of that thing and which resides in the intent. . . . You call cause that which contributes externally to the produc-

4. Translated by Émile Namer under the title *Cause, principe et unité* (Paris, 1930).

tion of things and which has its being apart from composition." Théophile approves; but, if we now come back to explanations that he has given previously, it appears that this clarification was rendered necessary by the indifferent use that he made of the two terms, the meanings of which have finally become distinctive. Moreover, this indifference was justified to a certain extent by the fact that the two terms, when they are applied to divine action, are equivalent: "When we speak of God, first principle and first cause, we mean one and the same thing under diverse relationships," for God remains present in objects of which he is cause, he remains present as principle in the universe. On the contrary, "when we speak of principles and causes in nature (that is to say in the visible world) we mean, under diverse relationships, diverse things."

Is it not therefore obvious that the artist is the cause and not the principle of his work, while God is both cause and principle of the universe? The work of art is created from the outside: its cause is foreign to it. As soon as it is finished, it is abandoned by its author who no longer lives in it. The work of nature, on the contrary, being the product of the *universal intellect* which is here designated by the compelling term "internal artist" (*da noi si chiama artefice interno*), never becomes detached from the creative principle always present in it and in each of its parts and which gives it life. If Bruno compares it to the productions of our arts, he does so not in order to exalt the genius of man but to make apparent the limits of its power—its genius is not in question: "If we do not believe that this virtually dead work (*quell'opra come morta*), which we can represent with a certain orderliness and in accordance with a model on the surface of matter, is produced without either reasoning or intelligence—as when we cause the likeness of a horse to appear, by stripping and carving a piece of wood—how greatly superior should we esteem the artist intellect (*quel intelletto artefice*) which, from the inmost depths of seminal matter, solders the bones, stretches the cartilages, hollows out the arteries, airs the pores, weaves the fibers, causes the nerves to branch out, and disposes of the whole with such a great mastery? How much greater an artist, I repeat, is he who is attached not only to one part of matter but who works on the whole continuously and completely."

This last sentence that resumes the previously developed theme of divine omnipresence reminds us that, if the work of one man (its limitations enabling it to remain at the level of our gaze and commensurate with our investigative effort) enables us to know the man, the contemplation of the infinite universe cannot to the same extent elevate us to a knowledge of

God. "The fact that we do not possess a total view of this universe . . . has as its consequence that it is far less possible to know the first principle by its effect than to know Apollo by the statues that he sculptured;⁵ for we can see these statues in their totality and examine them part by part, but not the great and infinite purpose of divine power. This is why one must understand the analogy without comparing its proportions" ("Pero quella similitudine deve essere intesa senza proporzional comparazione").

II

THE REIGN OF UNITY: BRUNO AND CAMPANELLA

The editing of Tommaso Campanella's *Theology*, begun in 1613, was not completed until 1624. In the mind of its author, who had returned to orthodoxy, it was to constitute a new systematization of the truths of faith and to demonstrate, as Raymond Lulle, Nicholas of Cusa, and Marsilio Ficino had already attempted to do, that Christian religion explains and illuminates the truths concealed in the beliefs of the Gentiles.

Under the direction of Enrico Castelli and Giovanni Calò, the Edizione Nazionale dei Classici del Pensiero Italiano undertook in 1950 the printing of this monumental work, unpublished until then. The first book appeared in 1950, then, in 1955, Volumes XXVII and XXVIII.⁶ These two last books, which constituted an entity, shed new light on the little-known Campanellian eschatology. However, only one manuscript remained in existence, preserved in the archives of the Dominican Fathers of Saint-Sabini in Rome. This impelled Romano Amerio, the editor and translator of the text, to publish the books before their turn and without delay.

Combined under a common title of *La prima e la seconda resurrezione*, they represent a prophetic tableau of the last era of the world, that is to say, of the millennium which, after the downfall of the Antichrist, must precede the Last Judgment. They were written in 1623 and 1624, shortly before the end of Campanella's long detention in Spanish prisons—a time of suffering and even of torture but also one of fruitful activity.

The name of Campanella is frequently associated with that of Bruno by historians of modern thought. The courage of the two philosophers and their tragic destiny doubtless suffice to justify this association. However,

5. Bruno alludes to Apollo as a sculptor. This is but one of many examples of his indifference, if not contempt, for all that touches upon the arts.

6. Tommaso Campanella, *La prima e la seconda resurrezione* ("Inediti Theologicorum," Libri XXVII-XXVIII, testo critico e traduzione a cura di Romano Amerio [Rome: Fratelli Bocca, 1955]).

despite the opinions they hold in common on certain points (animism, for example), some caution should be used in drawing a parallel between their two doctrines. In the first place, their very divergent attitudes in regard to Christian religion should be taken into account; Bruno rejects it completely and definitively, while Campanella draws away from it only to return to it. Rome was not mistaken about this; in 1600 it condemned Nola to fire; in 1626 it freed the Calabrian and rescued him from the pursuit of his enemies. Equally anxious to harmonize their concept of the divine with the new scientific data, at a time when the horizons of the heavens had broadened immeasurably, Bruno and Campanella found themselves in the same sorry position in this respect. But while Bruno, having rejected any positive credo, experienced little difficulty in harmonizing his personal religion as a metaphysician and his concept of a limitless universe with new points of view, Campanella, respectful of dogma and singularly attached to the letter of the Scriptures, separated himself with regret from traditional teachings and experienced scruples that he shared with many scholars of his epoch—Tycho Brahe, to name one.

The question of the sublunar elements and of the celestial quintessence is one which manifests simultaneously and very plainly in both Bruno and Campanella the identity of their opinions and the contrast in their points of view. Both reject Aristotle's twofold physics which had long beaten a retreat but was stubbornly taught in the schools. They also repudiate the *Stufenkosmos* of which Cassirer speaks, the universe in stages which the Dionysian mystique had made the dwelling place and field of action of the angelic hierarchies. But their common position in this respect is inspired by different principles, as the emphasis in and the methods of their argumentation prove.

Indifferent to apologetics, Bruno attacks Aristotle with a fervor that is never restrained by respect for tradition and which a secret penchant for the scandalous would tend to reinforce. In the discussion he hardly attempts to invest himself with authority, or, if such a frailty assails him, he is more inclined to involve the pagan Epicurean or pre-Socratic philosophers than the Church Fathers.

Campanella, on the contrary, is only satisfied when he has found confirmation of his theses in Christian authors. Moreover, he shows the greatest respect for adverse opinion so long as it makes use of respondents of his own caliber. There exists, he admits, an interpretation according to which the heavens, being exempt from all imperfection save that of local move-

ment, have nothing more to anticipate but the cessation of this movement. Their *purgatio* would consist merely in immobilization: "satisfiet ergo eius perfectioni per solam quietatem." But, basing his argument against this doctrine on Psalm 101, St. Ambrose, "caeli peribunt et omnes sicut vestimentum veterascent," demonstrates that the heavens and the stars are susceptible to "passion," and he regards as heretics all those who, along with Aristotle, profess that the heavens are formed of a quintessence. The martyr St. Justin, Theophylactus, Origen, all the Greek Fathers, are of the same opinion. The same is even true of Augustine, himself, who is too often invoked by the Aristotelians as having, in his Commentary on the Genesis, portrayed the heavens as water vapor: "ex vapore aqueo caelum constituit." For several pages Campanella multiplies quotations and references only to conclude in the end that the heavens of fixed stars are vulnerable to impurity and that the four elements which we on earth know are also, as Empedocles claimed, those that constitute the firmament. These assertions no longer possessed the merit of novelty in 1623. They are perhaps less interesting to us than the discussion that introduces them and in which the author's desire to remain faithful to the teachings of the Scriptures is always apparent in his *Theologica*. He is inclined to follow the purest tradition of the Church Fathers and of all the great Doctors, not excepting the one who was reputed to be the most formidable champion of Aristotelianism—Thomas Aquinas.

If the celestial world is composed of the same elements as the sublunar world, it must be bound by the same physical laws: there is nothing to prevent us from supposing the presence in the heavens of stars that might be other suns, with their retinues of planets. This is one point where the adventurous cosmology of the *Cène des cendres* goes beyond the Copernican heliocentricism. Giordano Bruno wrote this remarkable dialogue in 1584 during his stay in London. Campanella has the advantage over him of being aware, some thirty years later, of the recent progress of science and of new inventions such as the telescope, thanks to which the phases of Venus had just been discovered ("telescopio experimur Venerem crescere decrescereque sicut luna").

The author of the *Theologica* also believes, after Copernicus and along with Bruno, that heavy bodies are attracted toward multiple centers of gravity and not in all toward the earth, the unique center of the universe. To this problem and to several others, Bruno and Campanella offer solutions which always contradict classical geocentricism. But here again, in contrast to Bruno, who is not inclined to dwell upon the difficulties that a

literal interpretation of such and such a passage from the Bible might engender—although he does not ignore them entirely—Campanella pays careful attention to the scriptural texts, since it is upon them, particularly the Apocalypse, that he proposes to base his eschatology. He seriously doubts that the stars fall upon the earth. "If, indeed, fixed stars are so many suns around which revolve planets that are invisible to us," they would constitute a mass far superior to that of the earth. Therefore we must interpret judiciously, but we must not reject the prediction concerning the fall of stars. This fall would not be a "descent upon the earth," which could be jolted; for the stars, it would consist of forsaking their orbit in order to surrender throughout heavenly spaces to the disorder of random movements. "Non . . . casus stellarum erit in nostram tellurem descensus. . . . Sed a suo ordine et gyratione, et in temerarias iactationes in toto spatio firmamenti"—grandiose vision of a "fall" which, in abolishing all cosmic law, extends its effects to the new dimensions of the universe.

Not satisfied to predict and describe the end of the world, Campanella goes into the details of a prophetic chronology. He does so both to raise the problem of time and, in a certain sense, to resolve it. This problem is not of lesser importance in Bruno's cosmology. And, in this final example, we are forced to observe that the two philosophers, starting from opposing principles, end at a determinate point with an identical conclusion.

For Bruno, the universe—God's reflection—is eternal, since it partakes of divine eternity. But this material universe is the domain of movement, of change, that is to say, of becoming (the *ens mobile* of the Aristotelians). How then can it harmonize that temporality which is its most obvious characteristic with the eternity which we attribute to it? Anaximander, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and many other pre-Socratic philosophers resolved this difficulty by introducing into their cosmologies the hypothesis of the eternal return. Hence, the time of the world, which the circular movement of the heavens makes rhythmic and symbolizes, assumes the form of an indefinite series of cycles. Bruno completely rejects this concept. According to him, the cyclicism of the universe, like its finitude, and for the same reason, would signify an impious limitation of divine power. The real in the ineluctable delays of a periodic becoming, as in the narrow prison of a closed world, would represent but the smallest part of what one might regard as physically possible.

No more than Bruno does Campanella admit the existence of cosmic cycles. He does not even consider their possibility, since he declares as fact the end of the centuries. Furthermore, agreeing in this with Bruno, he

believes that the world at no time can do without the action of its principle, that is to say, God. And in this permanent intervention of a free will he finds a further reason to exclude any notion of a fresh beginning. Certain authors—he cites among others Chrysippus, Albumazar, and other Platonists—claim that a time will come when all the planets, having pursued their course to the end, will find themselves back at their point of departure and that then everything will begin over again in a renewed world ("tunc mundum innovatum iri et easdem res reversuras et futuram ergo resurrectionem"). But this resumption of an initial position, giving rise to a mechanical resurrection, possibly conceivable in a limited system like the planetary one, could not be extended to fixed stars, which are considered the centers of multiple systems; nor could it affect the whole of the universe. Furthermore, even admitting this last and hardly plausible hypothesis, the earth nonetheless would still have evolved in a certain direction; in such a position in regard to the heavenly stars, it would be no less different from what it was in the beginning, because of its own attributes and the mutations it has undergone ("ob praeteritas passiones").

Less distant in its effects from apocalyptic cataclysms, the Empedoclean "conflagration" is no more acceptable than the return of the stars to their initial position, for it would not be the "end of the world" in Campanella's sense of the word and in the sense in which any Christian must understand the phrase. It would be no more than the end of a great cycle and the prelude to a physically impossible renewal. "Despite Lucretius and Empedocles, a worn out sword, a house destroyed, a city in ruins, do not spontaneously spring up again. They can be restored only by the artisans that made them. That which has been made by the supreme artisan (*a summo artifice*) will be remade only by him." After the end of the world a new world can be born only through God's will, by a new and free creation, which excludes any notion of inevitable renewal.

In summary, the cyclicism of cosmic time is equally rejected in all its forms by both Bruno and Campanella, but in the name of their two different theologies and cosmologies. According to Bruno, cyclicism is inconceivable because of the infinitude of the universe and because of the infinity of possibilities. For Campanella, it is inconceivable because of the finitude of the universe—an enlarged universe, but one that remains limited and organic, a body that must die and that cannot, by itself, be revived.

The concordances and disagreements between Bruno and Campanella which we have just pointed out, and which are apparent in themselves to

anyone who takes the trouble to contrast the works of the two men, seem to correspond to the combination of a desire for unity which is common to both with a perception of unity which is quite different for each.

Campanella dreams of an organic unity, of a harmony that would manifest itself both in a physical universe and in the human species, and which would make itself visible on this earth, whose place in the heart of the cosmos remains central, if not materially, at least morally. Preoccupied with political problems, Campanella calls for and proclaims the establishment of a human society assembled under the law of a single government, during the last days of the world. Thus humanity, at the end of time, would discover, with all the happiness and innocence of the first age, the system that was most in conformity with its nature. For in the beginning there was unity: there is only one race of men—all sons of the unique Adam, whom God created to be the priest and the king of the world (*"creavit in toto mundo unum Adam, qui pater et rex et sacerdos foret orbis"*). All evil, and consequently all misunderstanding, is the result of temptation and man's fall. The Devil introduces sin and, through sin, the sects, the multiplicity of states, schisms (*"peccatum introduxit et per peccatum sectes et diversitatem principum et schismata"*). But this lost unity must be recovered. Such is the desire of all mankind. At heart all men nourish the hope of a new golden century which will know none of the evils that assail us: famine, disease, and, above all, discord. But this happiness will become possible, as the book of the Monarchy of the Messiah proved, only through the religious unity of the earth and the subordination of all to a single prince. Thus will reign that great tranquillity whose image and outline unfortunate humanity had envisaged once before, during the Roman peace. "This peace appeared like a flower at the birth of Christ, under the Emperor Augustus, and it lasted in this world for eighteen years, but only in our hemisphere and in that part of the hemisphere which the Romans dominated." It was merely a prefiguration of the truly universal peace that will occur at the end of time, after the first resurrection, the resurrection of the martyrs, when the Christian church will extend its sway over all the earth.

Irenicism is inseparable from intolerance in this connection: Campanella regards religious unity as the triumph of Christianity alone and as the disappearance of all other religions, toward which he evidences a relentless severity. We can deduce this from what he says of Islam: Mohammed has sullied Paradise (*"ponit deiectiones excrementitias in paradiso"*); he made of it a Paradise of pigs. It goes without saying that spiritual and temporal

powers will be reunited; the Pope will govern all peoples. "After the fall of the Antichrist all the nations will walk in the full light of the Church and all the kings of the Earth will be bound to him. Not one hundred, nor one thousand, but *all*." And the seat of this monarchy will not be Rome, but Jerusalem, finally rebuilt ("Jerusalem reaedificandam fore sedem saeculi aurei potiusquam Roman et caput Monarchiae Christi").

No less obsessed than Campanella by the thought of unity, Bruno, declaring unity principle and end, endows it with quite different traits. In the infinite universe which he envisages, and in which the earth, both raised above its shame and stripped of its privileges, occupies the smallest place, the unity and omnipresence of the formal principle manifests itself as a rising up of the "being" everywhere. The infinite, everywhere and totally inherent in the finite, causes life to flower everywhere in forms that are varied but uniformly valid.

On our own earth, the effects of this universal law give rise to phenomena within our grasp and which we are able to interpret. Let us consider, for example, the diversity of the human races, the existence of men different from ourselves in size or color, like Negroes or Pygmies. Will we not be led to believe at the start in a multiplicity of families? The Hebrews claim that we are all sons of Adam; but Adam is no other than the father of the Jewish race. Bruno stresses this polygenism in his Latin poem, *De immenso*. But he had already alluded to it in his treatises, written in his own language, notably on a page of the *Spaccio*. In support of his thesis he invoked the discovery of America and the traces there of a civilization that is "more than ten thousand years old" ("è frescamente scoperta una nuova parte de la Terra che chiamamo Nuovo Mondo dove hanno memoriali di diece mila anni e più"). But these regions were unknown to the ancients and the sons of Adam could hardly have traveled there to found a line at a time when ships were not yet in existence.

It is difficult to admit that all men are the descendants of a common ancestor, since during the course of the long centuries the various human families could not have had the slightest contact with one another. But is not the impossibility of a common origin for the inhabitants of diverse planets even more obvious? Curiously enough, this impossibility is presented, in the fifth dialogue of the Treatise on the Infinite, as an argument against the plurality of worlds; an "unreasonable hypothesis, since these multiple worlds would be deprived of the benefit of civil life, which consists in commerce between humans." The champion of Aristotelianism who raises this objection against Bruno's philosophy establishes as a prin-

ciple that all thinking beings must have the means of communicating with each other. A few pages further on he is answered to the effect that relationships between the inhabitants of diverse worlds are in no way indispensable to the public good ("à la bontà civile") and that one might say the same of the relationships between men of different races who people the diverse continents of our planet. "Experience teaches us that the obstacles of seas and mountains which nature placed in the way of families were all for the good of the inhabitants of this world [the earth]. And when it did happen that, through human artifice, relationships between these families could be established, they were bound to lose more than they gained, since the result of such contacts was that vices rather than virtues increased."

The same idea is expressed in a page of the *La Cena de le Ceneri* with quite as much forcefulness and more asperity. Christopher Columbus is designated as one of the "new Typhon" whose discoveries had been announced by Seneca in his tragedy, *Medea*. These bold navigators had merely "disturbed the peace of others . . . added to the vices of nations . . . taught men a new art and new means of tyrannizing over and assassinating one another."

At this juncture we find ourselves far removed from Campanella and from any desire for the political and religious organization of the earth. Moreover, the earth is simply used as an example to demonstrate the impious vanity of any effort to cause unity to reign in a world whose proper nature is to be infinite and infinitely diverse. The unity that we must seek and recover is that of the principle common to every being, ever living, ever present. It is not the aim of a conquest undertaken throughout space; it is not the goal of an exodus but, as Bruno says, of an *eisode*, a voyage inward, toward the totally inherent infinite of each finite being—a voyage in which all diversity is resolved.

BOOK REVIEWS

A. W. Macdonald

*Ennin's Diary: The Record of a Pilgrimage
to China in Search of the Law*

Ennin's Travels in T'ang China

By E. O. REISCHAUER

(New York: Ronald Press Co., 1955.) Pp. 454+xvi; 341+xii.

With the appearance of these two volumes, Ennin, better known to some by his posthumous title, Jikaku Daishi, assumes his rightful place among those travelers who are widely known to have left behind them records of first-rate historical importance. He has had to wait a long time. This Japanese Buddhist monk, born in 793, crossed the sea in 838 to T'ang China, whence he returned to Japan in 847. During his nine-and-a-half-year stay in China he kept detailed notes of what he saw and experienced, which, in the words of Professor Reischauer, constitute "not only the first great diary in Far Eastern

history [but] also the first account of life in China by any foreign visitor." Yet it is probable that many long years went by during which no one at all read his account of his travels. Contemporary Chinese or Japanese are not necessarily more interested in their ninth-century history than we are in investigating European documents concerned with the same period. Moreover, history in the East has until recently been considered primarily as an exercise in the correct classification of officially important dates and proper names. Ennin's diary, on the other hand, in the text four bulky scrolls of over seventy thousand charac-

ters written in medieval Chinese and only accessible thanks to a copy made in 1291 by an aged monk, interests us above all by the detail of its observations, by the atmosphere it re-creates. Apart from sporadic mentions of fragments of his work accessible to specialists alone, the only other recent account of Ennin which may have filtered through to the general reading public in the West is to be found in a few pages of Dr. Arthur Waley's work, *The Real Tripitaka and Other Pieces*, published in 1952. Professor Reischauer, who holds the chair of Far Eastern languages at Harvard University, has now translated into English the entire text of the diary, which he has edited in a separate volume with copious notes and a short preface under the title, *Ennin's Diary: The Record of a Pilgrimage to China in Search of the Law*. In a companion volume, *Ennin's Travels in T'ang China*, he has discussed Ennin's life and sketched out the historical value of the *Diary*, thus providing a more than adequate introduction for the reader of the *Diary* in translation. Specialists will find the Chinese, Japanese, and Korean characters for proper names in the *Diary* volume, and in both books a twelfth-century idealized portrait of Ennin is reproduced in color. Both volumes are well produced and provided with indexes and end-paper maps. So it is now as easy, if not easier, to find one's way around Ennin's record than it is to keep track of the movements of Marco Polo across Asia.

In writing the volume *Ennin's Travels*, Professor Reischauer has naturally made much use of the materials furnished by the *Diary* itself, but he has

also utilized other sources. After comparing Ennin with some other travelers—a point to which we shall return later—*Ennin's Travels* gives a brief idea of the cultural situation of ninth-century China and explains how Ennin's text has been passed down to us. The next chapter traces out Ennin's life as a whole, his youth, entry into religion, his voyage to China, and his pilgrimage to what the wrapper calls "holy Mt. Wu-t'ai"; it gives a short summary of the attacks on Buddhism in China after 840, tells of Ennin's return to Japan and his subsequent life as a church dignitary, and then briefly assesses his personality and his historical importance. This chapter is based primarily on two biographies of Ennin written in the ninth and early tenth centuries. In the following chapter the author discusses the role of Japanese embassies in Far Eastern trade and diplomacy at the time, and the whole story of the embassy to which Ennin was attached is summarized, use being made of contemporary records of the Japanese court. Then comes a chapter wherein the contacts of Ennin with Chinese officialdom on the road to and in the Chinese capital are analyzed, the primary source in this case being of course the *Diary*. Ennin in the course of his travels copied down many official documents which are remarkably similar in style to the bureaucratic jargon which we all know so well in other countries today. While at Teng-chou, he attended an important official ceremony—the reception by local prefectural and subprefectural government officials of an imperial rescript—and his description of this ceremony is particularly interesting. Then comes a chapter

Book Reviews

on "Life in T'ang China," in which Professor Reischauer summarizes the varied information contained in the *Diary* concerning such matters as national festivals, taboos, conditions of travel and lodging, monasteries, the cost of living, readings of the scriptures in order to cause rain to fall or to stop it from falling, the prohibition of the purchase or sale of iron in Yang-chou, the digging of coal near T'ai-yüan-fu, etc. As Professor Reischauer justly remarks, on economic matters "Ennin's comments are more intriguing than conclusive. But for a man of religion, little concerned with such mundane affairs, he was not a bad economic reporter." The sixth chapter of *Ennin's Travels* is devoted to popular Buddhism. Here is brought together what the *Diary* has to tell us of the monasteries and their organization, the sectarian divisions of the Buddhist church, its services and its miracles. Particular attention is given to the diarist's description of the Wu-t'ai monastic establishments. The close check kept on clerical ordinations in China at this time is shown by the strict regulations concerning them which Ennin noted down. The *Diary* has also much to tell of other religious matters, such as "maigre feasts" and the cult of Monju, and describes in some detail the "five terraces" of Wu-t'ai. This chapter closes with some considerations on the apogee and decline of Buddhism in China. In his seventh chapter, which describes the persecution of Chinese Buddhism, Professor Reischauer draws not only on the *Diary* but also on other contemporary Chinese accounts. This persecution dealt a hard blow to Buddhism in China; frc1.. 845 onward the church

was never again to enjoy the same extensive secular power. Professor Reischauer's account of the different stages in the attack on Buddhism is painstaking and clear, and this chapter (sixty pages) is perhaps the most interesting in the whole volume. After the end of the period of persecution Ennin remained for more than a year in China, but his contacts were now mainly with Koreans. The eighth chapter of *Ennin's Travels* is in fact concerned with sketching out the role and historical importance of Korea as a cultural link between China and Japan. From the point of view of their level of civilization the Koreans were, in Ennin's time, ahead of the Japanese. Professor Reischauer roughs out the role of Koreans in the commerce between East China, Korea, and Japan and tells of their embassies to the court of Ch'ang-an and their influence in Chinese affairs. Korean monks were to be found in Chinese monasteries and their soldiers in the armies of the Chinese emperor, their trading communities being mainly along the south coast of the Shantung Peninsula and the lower Huai. A special paragraph is devoted to the life of a Korean merchant prince, Chang Pogo, use being made here of the Korean annals as well as Japanese and Chinese sources. The last chapter deals with Ennin's long-delayed return to Japan.

I hope I have been able to give some idea of the richness and diversity of the material contained in the *Diary*. It should be of interest not merely to specialists of things Chinese and Japanese but also to historians, ethnologists, specialists in oriental religions, and even perhaps to economists. If Ennin does

not keep the place in history he has earned, it will not be the fault of Professor Reischauer.

As I have said above, Professor Reischauer at one point compares Ennin with some other great travelers in Asia. The examples he chooses are Marco Polo, who visited China in the Mongol epoch (from 1275 to 1291); Hsüan-tsang, the great Chinese Buddhist scholar who was away in India and Central Asia from 629 to 645; Enchin, a Japanese of the Tendai sect who was in China from 853 to 858 and has left some interesting fragmentary records of his travels; and Jojin, another Japanese monk who left a valuable account of his visit to China in 1072. Although Professor Reischauer makes many judicious and enthusiastic remarks in support of the relative value of Ennin's account of his travels, I cannot help finding that in some ways he is a little hard on Marco Polo. For example, he calls him "illiterate." Now, whatever the following passage from Marco Polo's *Travels* may mean, I think it does little to suggest that he was illiterate: "Now it came to pass that Marco, the son of Messer Nicolo sped wondrously in learning the customs of the Tartars [*sic*] as well as their language, their manner of writing, and their practice of war; in fact he came in brief space to know several languages and four sundry written characters."¹ It cannot be denied, as Yule pointed out long ago with regard to Marco Polo, that "in no respect is his book so defective as in regard to Chinese manners and particularities."² But

fortunately for us his travels covered much other ground in Asia and give us valuable material on India and other Asiatic countries—which is not the case for Ennin, whom no one would think of blaming for this state of affairs. Again, I think that Professor Reischauer overstates his case when he writes that "Marco Polo, coming from a radically different culture was ill-prepared to understand or appreciate what he saw of higher civilization in China. . . . Ennin, as a fellow believer, entered easily into the heart of Chinese life." Ennin, too, noted what struck him as unusual or odd, and he often passed over the obvious, about which we would like to know so much more. Many of his descriptions of Buddhist ritual are, to an anthropologist interested in this aspect of his *Diary*, tantalizingly inadequate. Furthermore, one does not find in Ennin those sudden *raccourcis* which occasionally light up the pages of many a foreign observer precisely because they stress fundamental cultural differences. As an example may I quote Rubruck, writing of the debate between the Christians and "the Tuins": "Then [the Tuin] inquired by what I wished to begin the discussion, by the subject how the world was made, or what becomes of the soul after death. I replied to him: 'Friend, this should not be the beginning of our talk. All things proceed from God; He is the fountain-head of all things; so we must first speak of God, of whom you think so differently from us. . . .'³ A Republican on Washington or a Communist on Moscow can both

1. H. Yule and H. Cordier, *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, Vol. I (London, 1929), p. 27 (Prologue, chap. xv).

2. *Ibid.*, Introduction, p. 110.

3. W. W. Rockhill, *The Journey of William of Rubruck to the Eastern Parts of the World, 1253-55* (London, 1900), p. 231.

Book Reviews

be great bores; and Ennin is certainly not that. He is undoubtedly a much more important witness of things Chinese than Marco Polo, if only because he saw much more of how the people

really lived and had contacts with people of classes whom the other never seems to have frequented. Churchmen, like soldiers, are often closer to the common people than are merchants.

Literarische Keilschrifttexte aus Assur

Published under the direction of E. EBELING, with the collaboration of

FRANZ KÖCHER and LIANE ROST

(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1953.)

The diggings of the Deutsche-Orient-Gesellschaft at Assur (Qual'at Serqat) directed by E. W. Andrae from 1903 to 1914 have brought to light a cuneiform library which, although lacking the significance of that discovered at Nineveh, affords, nevertheless, the best available source for the study of the Assyrian religion.

This new publication adds to the important series of the Deutsche-Orient-Gesellschaft devoted to historic texts (*Keilschrifttexte aus Assur historischen Inhalts*, Volumes I and II, edited, respectively, by Messerschmidt and Schroeder) and to the legal documents (*Keilschrifttexte aus Assur juristischen Inhalts*, edited by E. Ebeling). The epigraphic harvest of Assur, particularly rich in the field of religion, has been given its

proper value thanks to the editor of these documents, E. Ebeling, who, as early as 1919, had published the first part of the series under the title, *Keilschrifttexte aus Assur religiösen Inhalts*. We are indebted to him as well for the first transcription and translation of certain cuneiform tablets which appeared in autography in the religious texts of Assur and was published as an anthology of religious literature in the *Mitteilungen* of the Société Asiatique de Leipzig, in 1918, as "Sources pour la connaissance de la religion babylonienne."

The "literary" anthology published in the collections of the Academy of Berlin is composed of 162 cuneiform texts and represents, actually, a sequel to the two books of religious docu-

Book Reviews

ments of Assur, giving us texts which run all the way from the mythological literature to ritual magic and prayer. From the mythological texts emerge certain additional fragments of the Assur copies of the "poem of creation," which was already known and used by Ebeling in the German translation, *Das babylonische Welterschöpfungslid* (1921). A broad and penetrating knowledge of the religious literature of Assur had enabled him to publish, in 1931, a choice of texts illustrating the religious beliefs linked to the idea of life and death (*Tod und Leben nach den Vorstellungen der Babylonier*). Thus, for example, to the study devoted to the incantations and rites against specters published in transcription and translation in *Tod und Leben* (pp. 122-56) is added a new series of documents.

Tables 86, 87, and 88 form a heretofore unedited group, and the appearance of No. 88 furnishes us with a clinical picture of seizure by the "vagrant" specter: "If the crown of a man's skull and his temples throb, his ears buzz, the roof of his mouth is dry, he has paralysis, muscular inertia. If his chest hurts, his throat is contracted, the hair of his head stands on end, shudders overwhelm him, if he has desires, and if he does not eat, this man has been seized by a vagrant specter." Most of the symptoms enumerated are also recognized by the *Traité akkadien de diagnostiques et pronostiques médicaux*, published by René Labat, under the heading "hand of the specter." These pathological phenomena are attributed to witchcraft, and the medical aspects envisaged in the occurrence is purely magic. The ritual prescribes the making of a clay figurine

representing the vagrant specter; the incantation, recited by the exorcist, invokes the cosmic gods, Ea, Samas, and Marduk. Those elements which figure in all ritual cleansing are also found: offerings of food and drink and the use of sympathetic magic for the purpose of forcing the hand of the specter to leave the body of the sufferer. The figurine of the specter is treated like a corpse, and the exorcist, having sealed it in a vase, buries the vase in a specific place or throws it into the river.

Text No. 133 is a new document which enriches the dossier of the demoness *haiattu* (literally, the investigator, the spy). Here one learns her lineage—she is the daughter of Ea, god of magic. In the demonological series the investigator, whose quality is most frequently malevolent, is associated with the demon called the "look-out man" (*rābisu*), the "instrument of evil" (*mukil-reš-lemuti*), etc.

The exorcism of the investigator by the *kusarikku* (the mythical animal installed at the door of the temple of Ea) has not been published. According to the tradition of the Babylonian poem of the creation, Tiamat (in truth, the cosmic womb), "she who created all things," had begotten the monsters "fearless in combat" in order to affront Marduk, the formidable delegate of the young gods. The *kusarikku* belonged, with the foaming wolf, the red dragon, the hydra, the man-fish, to that family of inexorable monsters. Marduk, conqueror-god, after having killed Tiamat, enchained her creatures forever. Since this time monster-demons have been assimilated in the magic tradition to the divinities having the reputation of

averting evil. Actually, certain ritual tablets mention the presence of the conquered demons among the prophylactic figurines buried under the doorstep of the dwelling place. And it is no longer astonishing to find the *kusarikku*, creation of Tiamat, invoked by the exorcist in the incantation against the investigator. The enchained monsters (the red dragon, the hydra, and the *kusarikku*), let it be noted, figure in a beautiful prayer addressed to the "gods of the night."

Other groups of religious texts, such as the conjuring rites, *namburbi*¹ (Nos. 108-29), and the prayers of the "raised hand" (Nos. 39-61), also have their place in this literary collection.

In the Akkadian religious literature the *namburbi* designates particularly the lustral ceremonies which, for the conjurer, take into account "all signs seen on the earth and in the heavens." The

prophylactic character defines the functions of these ritual practices, which integrate themselves in the daily life of the Babylonian. The performance of these rites calls forth the exercise of all the priest's knowledge, simply to assure the efficacy of the prescribed ceremonies.

The prayers of the "raised hand," named from the gesture which invokes the gods of the heavens, occupies an important place in Babylonian oratory. Ebeling is author of a monograph on this subject which appears in a publication of the Institut de Recherches Orientales.² In that volume he has reassembled the texts of the British Museum, first published by L. King under the title of *Babylonian Magic and Sorcery* (London, 1896), and the tablets of Assur, printed in autography in *Literarische Keilschrifttexte aus Assur*.

1. Ebeling's study on the *namburbi* appeared in the *Revue d'Assyriologie*, XLVIII, 1 ff., 76 ff., 130 ff.

2. *Die akkadische Gebetsreihe "Handerhebung"* ("Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Institut für Orientalforschung," Ver. No. 20 [Berlin, 1953]).

Wörterbuch der Soziologie

Edited by WILHELM BERNSDORF and FRIEDRICH BÜLOW,
with the co-operation of 84 prominent sociologists
(Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1956.) Pp. 640.

*Soziologie: Ein Lehr- und Handbuch zur
modernen Gesellschaftskunde*

Edited by ARNOLD GEHLEN and HELMUT SCHELSKY
(Düsseldorf-Köln: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1955.) Pp. 352.

Einführung in die Sozialpsychologie

By PETER R. HOFSTÄTTER
(Stuttgart-Wien: Humboldt Verlag, Collection "Die Universität,"
Vol. XL, 1954.) Pp. 536.

In the Foreword to the *Wörterbuch der Soziologie* it is expressly stated that this volume is not a reworking of the well-known pocket dictionary which was published by Alfred Vierkandt in 1931 and has long been out of print and was limited to a relatively small number of longer treatises on special subjects. The dictionary character of the new work is at the same time strongly emphasized: the fact that it serves more than merely the purely scientific purposes of the field. If, on the other hand, one's attention is called to the fact that no unified point of view is to be ex-

pected of the many collaborators, it is, however, at the same time conceded that the material treated is not to be considered as the depository of consolidated opinions or as a fund of sociological knowledge limited to the generally accepted concepts. Differences in point of view are naturally unavoidable, insofar as they reflect the present-day stage of development in sociology. One must, therefore, question whether this lack of homogeneity is not to be regarded at least partly as the result of a "cultural lag" in German sociology. There seems to be the tendency in this

dictionary to treat even those subjects for which there are at best only the barest beginnings in sociological investigation. One can, thus, scarcely assert that they are dictionary material. To these belong, for example, the articles "Handwriting," "Music," "Opera," "Theater," and even "The Super-State" (a forerunner of the "Total State," according to M. T. Vaerting), "Defense Sociology" (in addition to another article, "War and Peace," which would have sufficed for the needs of a dictionary), the "Physician," and many more. The same can also be said of a series of articles the subject matter of which appears indeed to be important in the framework of sociological thought up to the present day but which have hardly been the object of sociological research, such as "Co-determinism," "Conversation," etc.

Since no index for the articles is offered, one is forced to the assumption that the selection of the key words is supposed to be adequate for any reference needs. This is actually the case with the majority of the entries. But one may ask what the highly personal terminology of Hans L. Stoltenberg is doing here, for either one knows the work of this social psychologist, and needs no lexicon, or one does not, in which case it is scarcely necessary to become acquainted with this particular terminology. The following selection of key words taken at random may suffice as illustrations:

Angeföhl—empathy with the feeling of another, either in sympathy (joy for his joy or sorrow for his sorrow) or the reverse, experiencing sorrow over his joy and joy over his sorrow.

Gruppseelwissenschaft—science of the group soul, sociopsychology; the soul seen, not individually, but in relation to the group and society, to its social determinism.

Föhrhaltung—positive attitude toward another.

Widerhaltung—negative attitude toward another.

Zuwillung—conscious concession or sanction (willingness to concede) or making the other willing to accept the demand.

Beihaltung—an independent attitude (to be sharply distinguished from the determined attitude of *Mithaltung*; cf. below), which is conscious of its likeness to the attitudes of others concerning their opinions, dealings, and wants.

Entgegenhaltung—an independent, conscious attitude (sharply distinguished from an unconscious negative attitude) concerning the attitude of others in wanting to act against, to want against, to feel against something or somebody.

Mithaltung—feeling with or for another unconsciously.

Föhligen—to arouse feelings in another—to "emotionalize" him, through words, gestures, tones, colors; to arouse, calm, or make him happy or sad.

Schaft—a suffix used to designate a group of persons somehow or other related.

Tum—a suffix used to designate a spiritual-intellectual movement.

Leball—unit of life on the earth, with human life at the apex.

Vorstelligen—to arouse a conception or an idea in another—to "intellectualize" him.

Willigen—to arouse wants in another, to "volitionalize" him, to make him willing (either consciously or unconsciously).

This is also a good example of the

Book Reviews

fact that the space given over to private terminology is done at the expense of social psychology, to which only a very few articles are devoted, among them the good, short, and informative article by K. S. Sodhi under this title ("Social Psychology"). There is no article on "Prejudice" (*Vorurteil*), not even as a reference word; and social psychology of perception, so important today, is included in the article "Conviction" (*Überzeugung*) by Alfred Vierkandt, in and of itself an excellent article but surely not the place where one would look for social psychology of perception. The no less important topic of social psychology of learning is missing as a reference word by itself, whereas its rationale is at least hinted at in the detailed contribution of W. Bernsdorf on pedagogical sociology.

In the case of numerous other articles there is scarcely a need for dictionary references. Who, for example, would want to orient himself on "Love" in a sociological dictionary or on the hypothesis of hordes ("Hordenhypothese," to use E. Mayo's term for the erroneous concept of the nature of man, which is discussed in Ricardo's economic theory), or on "Time and Space" as the categorical condition of human existence, and so on?

The attempt, gratifying in itself, has been made to define briefly a number of English sociological terms under the key words themselves, a task assumed by Renate Pflaum. The peculiar situation occurs, however, whereby the English term is given as the reference word but not the German term modeled after it, which in some instances has already established itself in the German

vocabulary. Thus, there is an article on "Socialization" but no definition of "Sozialisierung" in its corresponding meaning. There is, to be sure, an article "Social Control," but under "Kontrolle" there are only references to "Ordnung," "Organization," and "Social Control." More serious is the fact that, of the two basic concepts of English sociology, namely, "status" and "role," only the first is briefly cited under "Social Status"; the other is given neither in the German nor in the English form. Also one would not, in my opinion, have had to shy away from treating the concept of "Soziale Mobilität" extensively under that heading. Instead, however, it hides discreetly in this dictionary under the reference "Social Mobility."

On these and other grounds one can scarcely say that the work in question fulfils its function as a dictionary to the degree that one would like to expect.

It might be tempting to assume that such a dictionary reflects the present-day status of German sociology in its whole width and breadth—less so in its depth—for the very reason that it does not limit itself to classifying the composite knowledge of sociology into the most important concepts, which would satisfy the need of a general reference work. Of course, such an assumption is not unconditionally justifiable, but we shall nevertheless follow it up a little further.

In reading through the dictionary, it is first of all obvious that a very large number of articles by a wide variety of authors is based mainly on two German sociologists, Leopold von Wiese and Alfred Vierkandt, whereas Max Weber

is taken as a point of departure only in the case of specialized, concrete questions.

In addition, Theodor Geiger is also cited relatively often and is himself represented by an excellent article on social stratification, which treats also of the concept of class. Nevertheless, it is precisely this article which deviates from the conceptual framework which is posited for a large number of significant analyses. Geiger criticizes among other things the customary distinction made between a class society and a caste society based on rank or political position, a distinction according to which many of the articles are specifically oriented. In relation to Geiger's conception, one is drawn to the conclusion that a more or less preponderant preference for an ideal structural caste society, based on political position and rank and projected into history, still influences the thinking of many German sociologists. This makes itself apparent, to be sure, usually in hidden form and without distortion of the essential facts as far as they are known to us today. Quite openly, the romantic idea of a state based on position and rank comes to the fore in articles such as "Stand und Ständewesen," "Berufständische Ordnung," "Korporati(vi)smus," etc., by O. v. Nell-Breuning. This is noteworthy, since the articles (written for the most part by F. Bülow) concerning ideologies (a term which, moreover, is treated only through cross-references) strive for a neutrality based on a history of ideas, as, for example, "Individualism," "Socialism," "Collectivism," "Solidarity," etc.

Noteworthy to the contrary is the

absence of the terms "Fascism," "National Socialism," although, on the other hand, the contribution of O. K. Flechtheim on communism is by no means limited to a presentation of communistic ideology. The political actuality of totalitarianism, and indeed not only in its communistic form, finds extensive treatment nevertheless by Otto Stammer in the field of political sociology; his articles are especially clear in conception and are related to one another in subject matter.

As far as the residual amount of foreign sociology in this dictionary is concerned, the influence of a few American sociologists (if we disregard the references to historical dogmas) is strikingly apparent. These are notably W. F. Ogburn and H. E. Barnes, whose concept "cultural lag" appears again and again. On the other hand, contrary to many expectations, the works of T. Parsons, R. K. Merton, and Georges Gurvitch have found but little reception. It is interesting to find as well many an echo of the industrial sociological works of E. Mayo and E. J. Roethlisberger.

It is regrettable to note in this connection that in the bibliographies belonging to the most important articles foreign literature is cited very unevenly and often according to criteria difficult to fathom. The articles by O. Stammer once again constitute a thoroughly gratifying exception, as do also the contributions of R. König on "The Family and Family Sociology," "Marriage and Divorce," "Interview," and "Sample," which merit special attention, and the contributions of W. E. Mühlmann on "Anthropology and Sociology," "War and Peace," etc.

Book Reviews

The dictionary exhibits, in my opinion, three considerable deficiencies, if one starts from the assumption that such a lexicon should not omit the explanation of purely technical expressions within its special field. In the first place, statistical, empirical sociology is represented only in the cross-references: "Interview," "Sample," and "Public Opinion." In the second place, we have already referred to the somewhat unfortunate treatment of social psychology, which is becoming less and less sharply delineated from sociology. Third, the direct and indirect influence of psychoanalysis upon sociology, a thing which cannot be overestimated, is given only little attention in the article by Emil J. Walter, "Depth Psychology, Ethnology and Sociology," as well as in other places.

On the other hand, one can say that, of the social sciences related to sociology, ethnology is extraordinarily well represented through Richard Thurnwald, who signs almost all the articles on the subject. Many of the articles which treat of the relationship between sociology and other sciences have been particularly successful, such as that on "Anthropology and Sociology" by W. E. Mühlmann and that of St. Münke on the sociological bases of social politics.

One can say in summary that German sociology, insofar as it is reflected in this dictionary, has until now only partially cemented contact with sociology abroad. This fact is above all apparent in the choice of article headings, in the bibliographies, and in its almost exclusive orientation toward German sociologists. As an over-all impression

the fact remains that an approach to sociology is reached for many German sociologists via the concept of an intellectual community in Tönnies' specific use of the term, in which case romantic philosophy still represents one of the more important points of departure. The turn toward empiricism is made by many, in any event, with reluctance.

On the other hand, one must not overlook the fact that this dictionary offers an astonishing number of excellent miniatures which would do honor to many a reference work, even if they are not precisely what one might expect to find in a dictionary.

The collected works edited by A. Gehlen and H. Schelsky present important branch areas of sociology in the form of separate essays which are directed especially toward the student. It is not a real manual of sociology, as one might conclude from the subtitle. Above all, those related fields were selected for which "recent claims are present on the basis of the prevailing status of West-German society, whenever the theory warrants it. . . . Importance was placed only upon those individual contributions which indicated a progression toward more comprehensive principles or criteria, wherever the material warrants this." The attempt to offer a general theory which would encroach on the territory of others was purposely abandoned. That is certainly justifiable in view of the present status of sociology. Nevertheless, this in itself does not necessarily mean that one must also forego a confrontation of the individual essays with one another or forego reference to the problems which are a

result of this particular status of sociology. In this work the demarcations within sociology are to some extent taken for granted from the beginning, more so, at any rate, than is the case with the dictionary, which makes use of a carefully worked-out system of cross-references. In the following discussion we shall, try, thus, to follow these internal lines of demarcation as closely as possible in order to obtain a point of reference from which we can evaluate the work as a whole.

The essay by Arnold Gehlen deals with the social structures of primitive societies. Here the general direction of recent American research in ethnological sociology or cultural anthropology is presented in a felicitous and original manner, though in a somewhat pretentious form. His discussion is primarily concerned with the problem of the stabilization of primitive societies, lacking a nationality, on the basis of their social structure. Thereby, the results of a systematic comparison of the largest possible number of primitive societies (the most extensive to date, for which we must thank George Murdock) are cited. The guiding principle of this statistical analysis is, we have said, the degree of stability. Stated in extremely simplified terms, the basic pattern or criterion employed indicates that, between the family living under the taboo of incest (practically universal) and the society in which this family is rooted, there is no dichotomy. The coherence of the group can be assured in such societies only by means of reciprocal relationships. Such reciprocal relationships are exhibited in a network of kinship relationships, which grant a

status and encompass the entire society. That is to say, these reciprocal relationships are found in the fundamental social structure. They can only take on permanent form, in that "natural" bilateral attribution is replaced by a system of "artificial" unilateral attribution within the framework of the exogamous group. As a result of the very widespread practice of levirate and sororate, marriage between parallel cousins is generally avoided, whereas marriage between "cross-cousins" (mother-brother-daughter, or father-sister-daughter) often becomes even obligatory. Gehlen points out also with convincing arguments that totemism has the function in this connection of making the identification of the individual with his kindred group possible.

Such a functional methodology naturally does not replace casual analysis, a thing which Gehlen does not indeed assert, either implicitly or explicitly, as many do. However, the possibility is not excluded that the same phenomenon can be analyzed from different functional points of view. It is, for example, possible to see the incest taboo from the point of view that it tends to drive the children out of the family and thereby forces them to establish their own family group. Such a point of view can be significant for the problem concerning the conditions necessary for a successful socializing of the growing personality, something which the function of marriage regulations in the stability of society, as pointed out by Gehlen, need not exclude. This example shows that different functional methods can be employed concomitantly to the same object of study, with the result

Book Reviews

that in some instances the understanding of certain social phenomena is tremendously increased.

The late Kiel sociologist Gerhard Mackenroth contributed the article on "Population Theory." Although brief, it is an extraordinarily clear and simple introduction to this science, which attempts, in exemplary fashion, to transplant the various factors in population growth into a sociological framework. The preindustrial society, for example, has as its variable (which takes into account the margin of the food supply) the smaller number of marriages and the higher marriage age, whereas the industrial society succeeds in making adaptations specifically in accordance with the social classes by means of fertility curtailments within marriage, as, for example, when the urban middle classes try to curtail the relatively high level of social expenditure through birth control.

In an analogous sense the essay by Carl Jantke on "Preindustrial Society and the State," a subject taken from the field of social history, belongs also to a peripheral area. One might perhaps expect here a contribution to, or a summary of, the research done on capitalism, but the author's intention is to present preindustrial society from the late sixteenth to the close of the eighteenth century, above all as not being the forerunner of high capitalism. Let us elaborate on this with one example: Jantke explains how, out of the confrontation between the absolutistic state and the inherited legal order, the institution of the commissar arises—who is no longer an official in the old sense but rather a functionary, whose contract, based on

no legal grounds, is unconditionally devoted to the prince. The commissar, thus, as many of the modern capitalists, stands outside the old social order; he points to the future of modern bureaucracy but, nevertheless, is to be understood only in the context cited. To the somewhat peripheral contributions belongs also the treatise by Carl Heinz Pfeffer on "The Social Systems of the World." When one considers that only the remaining five essays are properly part of the core of sociology, he can see in this essay the attempt to conceive of the field in the broadest possible terms and to emphasize the close connection with various sciences, which, methodologically and according to their traditional level of development, are peripheral to sociology: namely, cultural anthropology, population theory, and history. Mainly due to this latter attempt, the tradition of continental European sociology is being continued, and the possibility of a fruitful co-operation with these sciences is postulated, even if not explicitly. Nevertheless, in contrast to recent American developments, social psychology apparently does not yet fall within the scope of German sociology. In the peripheral contributions discussed up to this point there are doubtless sufficiently concrete results from the research, which can be of the greatest importance for sociology. In contrast, the contribution of Pfeffer has a clearly discernible journalistic tinge, which is not of a nature to confer a scientific character on sociology. If this essay is supposed to serve the purpose of examining the relation between the various societies—a relation that is becoming more and more a matter of

fact—then one would also be justified in expecting that the complicated problem of cultural confrontation would be articulated. This is, however, not the case, if one disregards the reference to the "Europeanizing" in non-European cultures. This emission has, therefore, an especially confusing effect, because the United States, on the one side, and the Soviet Union, on the other, are presented as world messianic systems. The sociologist, in particular, should not let himself be led to see the problem of societies, which are in the state of rapprochement, exclusively from a geopolitical point of view, any more than from the more idealistic one of messianic zeal. Occasionally, with Pfeffer, one finds a social concept which he really would like to see banned from sociology: the idea, for example, according to which social-political-cultural happenings are decided in the last analysis by the caprice of collective wills, which are limited either by the margin of the food supply or by other conditions of that sort. In reality, however, there are certain currents which do not always follow the path set by the temporary superiority of a society. The game of "Indians," which has enjoyed such widespread popularity among children in our society, is to be understood no less as a result of a process of acculturation than is the misuse of whiskey by the Sioux Indians.

The remaining five essays—"Sociology of the Family" by Rene König, "Industrial and Commercial Sociology" by Helmut Schelsky, "Agrarian Sociology" by Herbert Kötter, "Sociology of the Metropolis" by Elisabeth Pfeil, and "Political Sociology" by

Otto Stammer—are concerned with some important contributory disciplines of sociology in the narrower sense. We cannot summarize all these excellent discussions. Rather, a few remarks will have to suffice, which perhaps can give us an indication of the present status of German sociology.

In the work at hand, the field which is often designated as "rural-urban sociology" in the United States is represented by two essays, in their inception very different from each other. Both have in common, fortunately, the tendency not to romanticize about country life in the manner of modern cultural criticism and not to condemn urban life. Elisabeth Pfeil, however, gives particular attention to the pattern of social contact, characteristic of the metropolis in its specifically formalized attitudes. She rightly emphasizes the fact that the role-plans (with reference to abstract social categories), on which modern sociology generally operates, are really of urban origin. In the treatment of agrarian sociology the emphasis for modern research plainly lies in the diverse reactions of the country communities toward the influence of urban ways of life.

From the standpoint of a well-thought-out treatment, for the purpose of a handbook, of those areas related to sociology, the three contributions on family sociology, industrial and commercial sociology, and political sociology are undoubtedly the best. This is due perhaps not only to the worth of the authors themselves but also to the fact that in postwar Germany a preponderance of theoretical and practical work was done mainly in two areas

Book Reviews

(and is being continued today)—in the fields of family sociology and more recently in industrial sociology—and to the fact that, as far as political sociology is concerned, there exists a still very vital point of departure for linking German sociology with the past, namely, the work of Max Weber, recognized equally by foreign sociologists.

As a matter of form, there still remains to be said that a few regrettable discrepancies occur due to limited space, for instance, those between Kötter and Jantke concerning the development of the agrarian society; between König, on the one hand, and Pfeil and Kötter, on the other, concerning the modern family; between Pfeil and Schelsky concerning the modern labor world; etc. Such discrepancies were, no doubt, not entirely avoidable.

We have had occasion in discussing the dictionary as well as the handbook to call attention to the fact that the narrower delimitations of the field of sociology have been often and basically trespassed. At the same time, no place has been given to social psychology—a place which should have been granted within the framework of sociology on the basis of research in other countries. This lacuna is to some extent filled by Peter R. Hofstätter's book. It is, however, characteristic of the actual status of sociology in the German-speaking field that this one exceptional work is oriented completely toward the vast amount of American literature in the field. Hofstätter masterfully introduces the most complex of problems and attempts to present the status of knowledge in this field in a selective and ar-

bitrary manner, to be sure, without attempting to avoid his own bias. He by no means evades even the most difficult methodological questions; indeed, he makes no secret of the fact, for example, that he—in accord with R. Cattell—considers the possibility of innumerable uses for statistical analysis to be very promising. And this he tries to demonstrate by practical examples, leading us, thus, into the most modern empirical research. It is gratifying to see how the facts of the most recent research in the field are included in a book which is, on the whole, simply a handbook. The handbook appears thus as something which must not necessarily lag behind the up-to-date research of the period in question.

It is not always easy for us, indeed, to agree with the theories developed by Hofstätter, taken individually. For example, one of his main theses for the explanation of social prejudice toward minority groups, expressed in extremely simplified form, sounds something like this: The group leader is a person who, as a matter of course, clearly distinguishes himself from the group members; but at the same time this must not hinder the identification of those being led with the leader. Now, since any minorities within a society clearly differentiate themselves from the majority, one must consider them as potential leaders. The class which is actually the leading one therefore feels its position threatened by the presence of the minority. The prejudices directed toward the minority are thus to be conceived of as an expression of defense against this danger. The counterargument against this premise is apparent: If

the minority were to vote, then these differences in the population between the leading classes and those being led could of necessity be determined, and indeed with the tendency that the intensity of the prejudice would, for example, decrease from top to bottom. In reality this is demonstrably the case in regard neither to anti-Semitism nor to the anti-Negro attitude in the United States.

In another passage Hofstätter expounds the idea that, instead of the hypothesis of the existence of a sexual drive or of a drive directed toward the rearing of offspring, one should posit the hypothesis of the existence of a family instinct. The other drives would then be absorbed as participative instincts within the family instinct. Thus, for example, for writers of the realistic school, the emphasis on the sexual is not responsible for the marriage crisis, but contrariwise, the marriage crisis has led to an autonomy of sex. It is questionable to me whether one gains anything by such a hypothesis. Is the situation not more likely to be that there could be no continuation of the existence of society without some sociocultural, definite, formalized concept of the family, which recurs again and again in every individual case? And, in addition, that the chances for the transmission of such formalized ideas are very high on the basis of those specifically socializing conditions placed on the maturing individual—conditions which tend to fur-

ther and foster these ideas. It may be true, too, as Hofstätter explains by means of a diagnostic example, that a person who is marked by an extraordinarily conspicuous sexual drive has suffered from disrupted family relationships; if we, however, consider at the same time what a larger role such disrupted family relationships also play in respect to non-sexual criminality, then the isolation of the sexual drive which acts only as a participative element within the totality of the family instinct (which Hofstätter raises as an explanatory hypothesis) appears to be a truly artificial construction, which certainly does not satisfy as an explanation for the general effect which interfamily aberrations produce.

These and other objections, however, do not seriously discount the worth of this stimulating book, which is based on so broad a knowledge of the literature of the field. It is Hofstätter who makes us conscious once again of how much sociologically relevant insight has been gleaned from modern American social psychology and that perhaps the most decisive stimulus in the modern day for further development in the field of the social sciences proceeds from this specific discipline. In its neglect of this field, therefore, to my mind, lies the greatest shortcoming of German sociology, and this neglect must be deduced from the consideration of the representative works which have been discussed here.

Notes on the Contributors

A contributor to *Diogenes*, No. 10, for which issue he traces the interdependence of the sugar-cane industry and the water route in Brazil, GILBERTO FREYRE, a native of Pernambuco, is an anthropologist and sociologist. In this issue he rewrites a chapter of Franco-Brazilian history in terms of cultural and technological interrelations. His many published works include: *Apologia pro generatione sua* (1924); *Centenario de Dom Pedro II* (1925); *Um Engenheiro Francês no Brasil* (1940); *Brazil: An Interpretation* (New York: Knopf, 1945); *Sociologia* (1945); *The Masters and the Slaves* (New York: Knopf, 1956).

MING WONG, who collaborates with Pierre Huard in this issue in comparing the various analogical attempts to explain man's relation to his world, has had extensive training in medical his-

tory, biology, and oriental and modern languages. He has worked particularly in the history of the development of materia medica in China.

PIERRE HUARD is honorary dean of the Faculté Mixte de Médecine et de Pharmacie de Hanoï, where he taught clinical surgery from 1933 to 1954. He has also done considerable research in the fields of anthropology and the history of science in the Far East and is at present teaching the history of medicine at Rennes. He is a member of the Groupement Français d'Histoire des Sciences, of the Société Française d'Anthropologie, the École Française d'Extrême-Orient, and correspondent of the Académie Nationale de Médecine.

"Values" and "valences," "umwelt" and the "universal world," are pairs of con-

trasting terms used by RAYMOND RUYER in his provocative paper, "The Vital Domain of Animals and the Religious World of Man." Born in 1902, Ruyer has held a professorship on the Faculté des Lettres of the University of Nancy since 1945. He has published the following books: *Esquisse d'une philosophie de la structure* (Paris: Alcan, 1930); *La Conscience et le corps* (Paris: P.U.F., 1937); *Éléments de psycho-biologie* (Paris: P.U.F., 1946); *Néo-Finalisme* (Paris: P.U.F., 1952); *La Cybernétique et l'origine de l'information* (Paris: Flammarion, 1954); *Le Monde des valeurs* (Paris: Aubier, 1948); *La Philosophie de la valeur* (Paris: Colin, 1952); *L'Humanité de l'avenir d'après Cournot* (Paris: Alcan, 1930); *L'Utopie et les utopies* (Paris: P.U.F., 1950); as well as numerous review articles on a wide range of subjects. Studies of his philosophy have been made by M. Gex, *Quelques aspects du réalisme contemporain* (Lausanne, 1948); M. R. Bouvier, "La Philosophie biologique de R. Ruyer" (*Revue de synthèse*, 1947); Louis Vax, "Introduction à la métaphysique de Raymond Ruyer" (*Revue de Métaphysique*, 1953) and "La Découverte du trans-spatial" (*Critique*, 1954); André Voelke, "Les Thèmes de la métaphysique de Raymond Ruyer" (*Revue de théologie et de philosophie* [Lausanne], 1956).

DENIS SINOR was born in 1916 and studied in Budapest and in Paris. He has held a variety of positions, among them that of assistant to Paul Pelliot at the Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises de l'Université de Paris, attaché at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, member of Magdalene College

and conference master at Cambridge University, secretary-general of the Twenty-third International Congress of Orientalists, and honorary secretary of the Royal Asiatic Society. He directed publication for *Orientalism and History* (Cambridge, 1954) and for the *Proceedings of the 23rd International Congress of Orientalists* (Cambridge, 1957) and is the author of *Hungarian-English Dictionary* (Cambridge, 1957) and *Introduction à l'étude de l'Eurasie Centrale and A History of Hungary*, soon to appear.

JACQUES ELLUL, former deputy mayor of Bordeaux, is professor at the Faculté de Droit de Bordeaux and at the Institut d'Études Politiques. He has published *Présence au monde moderne* (1948); *L'Homme et l'argent* (1953); *La Technique, ou, l'enjeu du siècle* (Paris: Colin, 1954); and *Histoire des institutions* (1956); and is working at present on *Techniques et effets de la propagande*.

The prodigious expansion of the sciences of folklore and ethnology in nineteenth-century Germany had a tremendous influence on the knowledge and interpretation of pagan religion among the Germanic peoples. JAN DE VRIES, born in Amsterdam in 1890, and docteur ès lettres of the University of Amsterdam, broadens and develops this theme in his paper, "The Present State of Studies on Germanic Religion." His publications include: *Die Welt der Germanen* (1934); *Die geistige Welt der Germanen* (Halle-Saale: Niemeyer, 1943); *Contributions to the Study of Qthn* (Helsinki, 1931); *The Problem of Loki* (Helsinki, 1934); *Altgermanische Religionsgeschichte* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1956-

Notes on the Contributors

57); *Altnordische Literaturgeschichte* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1941-43); *Altnordisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* (1957); *Die Märchen von Klugen Rätsellösern* (Helsinki, 1928); and *Betrachtungen zum Märchen* (Helsinki, 1954).

PAUL-HENRI MICHEL, curator of the Bibliothèque Mazarine, has worked intensively in philosophy and in Italian studies. In this issue he examines the doctrines of Bruno, Campanella, and Ficino and develops the cosmological theories of the three Renaissance scholars. His study of humanism began with

his thesis on *La Pensée de Léon-Baptiste Alberti* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1930), from which he proceeded to a study of Giordano Bruno, whose text, *Fureurs héroïque* ("The Heroic Frenzies") he edited and translated. He has also published: *De Pythagore à Euclide* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1950); *La Question de l'Adriatique, 1914-1918* (Paris: Costes, 1938); *L'Hispanisme dans les Républiques espagnoles d'Amérique, 1914-1918: Les Fresques romanes des églises de France* (Paris: Editions du Chêne, 1949), as well as other works on art, several novels, and various translations from the Italian.

MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR
PHILOSOPHY AND HUMANISTIC STUDIES

International Union of Academies
International Federation of Philosophical Societies
International Committee for Historical Sciences
International Permanent Committee of Linguists
International Federation of Associations for Classical Studies
International Union for Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences
International Commission on Folk Arts and Folklore
International Committee for the History of Art
International Association for the Study of the History of Religions
International Federation for Modern Languages and Literature
International Union of Orientalists
International Society for Musicology
International Congress of Prehistoric and Protohistoric Sciences

OFFICERS OF THE COUNCIL

President: Professor Carsten Høeg (Denmark)

Vice-Presidents: Professor Federico Chabod (Italy)

Professor R. N. Dandekar (India)

Dr. Charles E. Odegaard (United States of America)

Professor Alf Sommerfelt (Norway)

Secretary-General: Professor Ronald Syme (New Zealand)

CONTENTS

GILBERTO FREYRE	Microscopic History: A Meeting of Influences	I
PIERRE HUARD and MING WONG	Relations between Man and the World	24
RAYMOND RUYER	The Vital Domain of Animals and the Religious World of Man	35
DENIS SINOR	The Barbarians	47
JACQUES ELLUL	Information and Propaganda	61
NOTES AND DISCUSSION		
JAN DE VRIES	The Present State of Studies on Germanic Religion	78
PAUL-HENRI MICHEL	Renaissance Cosmologies	93
BOOK REVIEWS		
E. O. REISCHAUER:	<i>Ennin's Diary: The Record of a Pilgrimage to China in Search of the Law</i>	108
	<i>Ennin's Travels in T'ang China</i> (A. W. MACDONALD)	
E. EBELING and FRANZ KÖCHER:	<i>Literarische Keilschrifttexte aus Assur</i>	113
	(MARCEL LEBOVICI)	
WILHELM BERNSDORF and FRIEDRICH BÜLOW (eds.):	<i>Wörterbuch der Soziologie</i>	116
ARNOLD GEHLEN and HELMUT SCHELSKY:	<i>Soziologie. Ein Lehr- und Handbuch zur modernen Gesellschaftskunde</i>	120
PETER R. HOFSTÄTTER:	<i>Einführung in die Sozialpsychologie</i>	124
	(PETER HEINTZ)	
Notes on the Contributors		126

